Montana\u27s cyanide mining experiment| Learning from bitter experience by Barilla, James
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1995 
Montana's cyanide mining experiment| Learning from bitter 
experience 
James Barilla 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Barilla, James, "Montana's cyanide mining experiment| Learning from bitter experience" (1995). Graduate 
Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 3017. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/3017 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
Maureen and Mike 
MANSFIELD LIBRARY 
Copying allowed as provided under provisions 
of the Fair Use Section of the U.S. 
COPYRIGHT LAW, 1976. 
Any copying for commercial purposes 
or financial gain may be undertaken only 
with the author's written consent. 
University of 
Montana 

Montana's Cyanide Mining Experiment: 
Learning from Bitter Experience 
by 
James Barilla 
B.A. Macalester College, 1990 
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science 
The University of Montana 
1995  
Approved By: 
Chairperson 
Dean, Graduate School 
Date 
UMI Number: EP35181 
All rights reserved 
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, 
a note will indicate the deletion. 
UMI' 
Dissertation Publishing 
UMI EP35181 
Published by ProQuest LLC (2012). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. 
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. 
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code 
A & uest 
ProQuest LLC. 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 
Barilla, James J. , M.S. May 1995 Environmental Studies 
Montana's Cyanide Leach Experiment: Learning From Bitter Experience 
(205 pages) 
The purpose of this project is to shed light on the operation and oversight 
of cyanide leach facilities in Montana by assimilating the heterogeneous 
and imposing records on file at the Department of State Lands and 
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences into a clear analysis of 
the patterns and problems associated with cyanide leach mining in the 
state. In doing so, I have examined the records of four of the largest 
cyanide leach mining operations to date: Beal Mountain, the Kendall mine, 
Zortman-Landusky and Golden Sunlight. A number of problematic 
patterns emerged from this review, including unanticipated water quality 
impacts, wildlife mortalities, landslides and agency enforcement lapses. 
This report includes a summary description of the problems encountered, 
followed by a series of recommendations for public citizens to affect 
changes in agency regulation and enforcement practices. Four 
appendices offer detailed analysis of the recorded history for each of the 
individual mines. 
Director: Vicki Watson 
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INTRODUCTION 
On an early spring morning not long ago I stood in a meadow above the 
east fork of the Boulder River, admiring the clouds draped over the stark 
white peaks of the Absaroka range. I could hear Canada geese calling to 
one another in the slough, and elk and deer grazing near the edge of the 
forest. The mountains were silent, appearing immutable, while along the 
stream, a ribbon of faintly green cottonwoods and aspen was vibrant with 
birdsong. 
Despite the serentity of this unfolding spring scene, I felt distinctly uneasy. 
Gazing up the valley, I knew I was looking at one of the largest platinum 
deposits in the world. Beyond the cleft where the snowy mountains 
converged in mist was the ghost town of Independence, now the site of a 
potential gold mine, and numerous mining claims by two giants of the gold 
mining industry, Pegasus and Noranda. Cooke City, where the New World 
gold mine has been proposed, was not far away. Having prepared this 
report, I could only imagine the giant scars and pallid, rust streaked heaps 
of waste rock which would mark the development of modern gold mining 
in the area. I could imagine this trout stream contaminated with sulfuric 
acid and heavy metals, its flow opaque with silt washed down off haul 
roads and pits. 
It is my hope that citizens groups can use the information in this document 
to help prevent the repetition of the mistakes which have been made at 
four of Montana's largest cyanide leach gold mines. The report should 
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inform comments on mine proposals, alert groups to potential 
problem areas with existing operations, and assist efforts to improve DSL 
and DHES oversight of mining operations. Ultimately, the studies of 
individual mines may help make the case that some pristine and 
significant areas are simply inappropriate for the kinds of environmental 
degradation associated with these kind of operations. 
Purpose and Organization of this Report 
Document files at the Department of State Lands and the Department of 
Health and Environmental Sciences have a story to tell about cyanide 
leach mining in Montana. The files contain correspondence between state 
officials and mine operators, commentary by federal officials, inspection 
reports, notes and memos from meetings, water quality data and letters 
from members of the public. For every mine there are thousands of pages 
of documents, hence the story they contain has remained obscured by the 
sheer volume of documentation. 
The purpose of this project is to shed light on the operation and oversight 
of cyanide leach facilities in the state by assimilating the heterogeneous 
and imposing files into a clear analysis of the patterns and problems 
associated with cyanide leach mining in the state. In doing so, I have 
examined the records on file at the Department of State Lands and the 
Water Quality Division of the Department of Health and Environmental 
Sciences for four of the largest cyanide leach mining operations to date: 
Beal Mountain, the Kendall mine, Zortman-Landusky and Golden 
Sunlight. I have supplemented this perusal of the documented record 
with interviews with personnel at the DSL and DHES. 
The result is not the be-all and end-all on cyanide leach mining. I have 
limited this analysis to the issues raised directly by the files; there are 
additional legal and technical issues which are beyond the scope of this 
document. The Valuable Reading section at the end of this guide provides 
a list of additional materials which discuss some of these issues at length. 
Overall Outline 
The report is organized into: 
* A brief summary of heap leach mining info issues in Montana. 
* Four case studies that offer detailed analysis of problems at four 
individual mine sites. 
The summary is then divided into the following: 
i) General information on mines that use cyanide to recover gold. 
ii) Technical issues associated with cyanide leach mining, including land 
application, heap stability, liner integrity and leaks, acid mine drainage, 
water quality, mine expansion and wildlife fencing. 
iii) Legal and enforcement issues in the permitting, bonding and 
oversight of mine operations. 
iv) A series of recommendations on improving mine operations and 
oversight. 
The observations and recommendations which appear in the summary are 
based upon the detailed appendices. Therefore readers seeking 
examples, document citations and a fuller treatment of the issues involved 
should refer to the appendices. I have divided the appendices, when 
applicable, into the same technical and legal issues found in the main text. 
Heap Leach and Vat Leach Mining: General Information 
Of the four mines I reviewed, three use heap leach methods to process 
gold deposits. The fourth, Golden Sunlight, utilizes a vat leach method. 
The following is a brief description of both methods. 
The heap leach process utilizes cyanide to dissolve metals from large 
quantities of low grade ore. The process takes place in a number of 
stages. 
1) The first step removes ore from the earth, often by blasting rock faces 
within the ore body with a blasting agent. The blasting is usually 
performed in levels or stages, with ore and waste rock removed between 
each round of blasting. The result is usually a pit, which can be thousands 
of feet deep and thousands of feet across. The mine disposes of 
waste rock in a pile nearby. 
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2) The ore is sent to an agglomerator, where it is crushed to an ideal size 
for cyanide percolation and contact. The ore is then placed in layers on a 
lined surface, eventually creating a "heap" of crushed ore. The waste rock 
is disposed of elsewhere, often in a pile nearby. 
3) Cyanide is mixed with water in a pond, then the solution is pumped 
through solution lines and out through sprayers onto the heap of crushed 
ore. The pond is called a "barren" pond because it does not contain gold. 
The solution, trickling down through the crushed rock, leaches out gold 
and other metals and collects at the bottom of the heap. 
4) The gold bearing cyanide solution is pumped to a "pregnant pond" 
("pregnant" with gold) and on to a refining and milling station, where the 
gold is removed from the solution. The solution is then pumped back to the 
barren pond, to be sprayed again on the next layer of ore. Solution volume 
lost through evaporation is replaced with "make up water," usually water 
from nearby streams or the underlying aquifer. 
5) The mine operator may pursue reclamation activities concurrently with 
mining, or may wait until final shut down of the facility for some areas of the 
mine. Reclamation often entails contouring and reseeding of disturbed 
slopes to prevent erosion. Cyanide breaks down readily upon contact with 
sunlight and oxygen, but may remain viable for decades when trapped 
beneath the surface of a heap. Reclamation activities strive to remove 
as much cyanide as possible from the material in the heap. Depending on 
the nature of the ore body, reclamation may entail rinsing heaps with water 
to remove metals and cyanide and ripping the tops of the heaps to 
promote water and oxygen penetration and circulation. 
If, however, the ore body suggests a potential for sulfuric acid generation, 
as it has at several sites, the reclamation plan usually requires capping 
waste rock piles and heaps to reduce permeability to oxygen and water. 
Until recently, mine reclamation plans have not required that the pit be 
restored to its original character. A recent court case has declared this 
exemption for open pits illegal, hence reclamation requirements are 
currently in a state of flux. 
6) Heap leach mining at most sites is a seasonal venture, beginning in the 
late spring and ending in the fall. As winter approaches, mines must 
initiate shutdown procedures and begin preparing for freeze up by 
emptying solution lines. They must prepare for spring run-off by 
maximizing evaporation and ensuring there is enough additional water 
capacity in the system to hold spring rains and snow melt. 
7) Neutralization of cyanide solutions through the addition of certain 
chemical agents can take place at any stage of the process. Usually mines 
neutralize solution to prevent contamination when there is a risk of 
cyanide escaping the system, (see Technical Issues, Section A, below) 
Vat leach operations utilize a slightly different leaching method. The 
main variation lies in the use of metal vats or containers to hold the 
crushed gold ore and cyanide solution while the leaching process takes 
place. Vats hold smaller quantities of ore and solution than heaps, but 
offer more efficient leaching. They are typically used with ore containing 
higher gold concentrations. 
Once the vats have removed the gold from the ore, the spent material, a 
mixture of crushed rock and cyanide solution known as "tailings," travels 
through a pipeline system to a pond usually called the "tailings 
impoundment." After mining finishes and ceases to add more tailings, 
water in the impoundment slowly evaporates until only the cyanide treated 
solids are left. Reclamation plans call for the dry impoundment area to be 
recontoured, covered with soil and replanted. 
In summary, both heap leach and vat leach operations are intended to be 
closed loops in which gold ore is excavated from an open pit and treated 
with cyanide solution, either by sprinkling on heaps or mixing in a vat. Both 
methods collect the gold rich solution which results for processing. Both 
send waste rock to dumps, and they both face reclamation requirements 
for disturbed areas. The two methods are similar enough to share many of 
the same problems. Significant differences do exist, however, and I will 
indicate these differences when applicable in the summary text and in the 
Golden Sunlight appendix. A more detailed description of the chemical 
and technical aspects of cyanide leach mining can be found in the 
resources listed in the Valuable Reading section of this report. 
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TECHNICAL ISSUES 
Handling Excess Water - Is Land Application Really a 
Solution? 
As many of the original mining permits indicate, heap leach facilities were 
planned as "closed loop" operations. Originally, neither the state nor the 
mine operators intended solution to leave the system. Evaporation was 
meant to be the sole reason for a decrease in solution volume, which 
would be replenished from fresh water sources in the area. The idea 
simplified water quality management considerably; since there was to be 
no discharge, there would be no need for MPDES permits, and no need 
for water degradation review. 
Heap leach mines face a fundamental problem: while they must control 
exactly the amount of water entering the system, the vagaries of the 
weather are beyond their control. Mine permits have sought to cope with 
this situation in a number of ways. The permitting process employs rainfall 
data from the area to predict precipitation extremes and then stipulates a 
storage capacity equal to handling such an event. Thus the process circuit 
of heaps and ponds is supposed to allow enough space to handle water 
added by predicted rain events, up to a 100 year storm. During storms, 
diversion ditches are supposed to divert the flow of rainwater around the 
actual "closed system", so that only the rainwater which falls directly 
on the system adds to the levels of the ponds. Winter shutdown 
procedures are supposed to circulate and evaporate enough water so that 
sufficient storage capacity exists within the system to handle spring snow 
melt and precipitation. 
Despite these precautions, there have been leaks and massive spills from 
these theoretically closed systems. Perhaps the most egregious example 
occurred in 1985 at a heap leach facility operated by the Golden Maple 
Mining Company near Gilt Edge, Montana. Department of State Lands 
inspectors found the mine's ponds within a foot of overtopping, with a 
"serious head cut" threatening to breach the barren pond. Mine officials 
had in fact just finished repairing the dam, which had overtopped and 
nearly washed out at least a day before, releasing an unknown quantity of 
cyanide solution. 
Several months later, cyanide solution once again flowed continuously 
over the same dam, nearly breaching it again, and releasing another 
unknown quantity of cyanide solution. Mine officials, in an attempt to avoid 
a complete dam failure, intentionally sprayed large quantities of 
unneutralized cyanide solution directly onto the land. Although the actual 
quantity is unknown and probably far higher, the company sprayed at least 
77,000 gallons during a 10 day period, some of which state officials noted 
flowing off the permit boundary. Among the mines I reviewed, a similar 
series of events occurred during the spring and summer of 1985 at what is 
now the Kendall mine, then operated by Triad Resources. 
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Even when a storm does not breach the system immediately, a risky 
situation may still exist. As stated earlier, the mine permit requires a certain 
amount of storage capacity in the system at all times as a contingency 
against a one time, major storm, but this capacity can be incrementally 
exceeded by a series of modest rain events or the melting of a heavy snow 
blanket. Except for evaporation, which takes time and dry weather, mines 
originally did not have any permitted mechanism for getting rid of the 
excess water in order to regain the required storage capacity. Each day of 
operations without the required storage capacity incurs the risk of a storm 
event which is greater than the amount of "freeboard" available in the 
system to contain it. 
In response to excess solution inventory, which, with additional rainfall 
could escalate into a Golden Maple style disaster, mine operators at the 
Kendall and Zortman/Landusky have first treated the excess solution with 
a cyanide neutralizing agent and then discharged this treated solution 
onto an area of land within the permit boundary. The volume of solution 
discharged is intended to be such that the soil absorbs the flow; no flow is 
intended to leave the permit boundary. Typically, the state requires 
monitoring in the land application area to ensure that solution borne 
contaminants are trapped in the soil. The state has now included land 
application methodology in mine permits so that what was once an 
emergency procedure at an accidentally underdesigned facility has 
become a routine part of heap leach operations. Is the excess solution 
volume unavoidable? Let's look at some of the causes. 
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The Certain Uncertainty of the Weather 
Originally, heap leach permits did not include any method for disposing of 
excess solution, because both mine operators and the state were 
confident that plans based on National Weather Servic and US Geological 
Survey precipitation records were more than adequate to cope with the 
expected rainfall. Yet predicting precipitation at a given site has proven to 
be problematic, with weather patterns exhibiting far more variability than 
the historical records suggested. Regional data does not always 
specifically correspond to rainfall patterns in a particular drainage. As a 
result, mines across the state repeatedly exceeded their permitted 
volumes, often because the spring and summer were wetter or cooler (less 
evaporation) than recent regional precipitation records would have 
predicted. Mines whose maximum capacities were supposedly 
constructed to handle storms which should occur once every hundred 
years filled up three and four times during only a decade of operation. 
Faulty Winter Shutdown Procedures 
Weather is hard to predict, but excess volume cannot be blamed 
exclusively on the vagaries of the weather. Mine operators head into the 
fall knowing that they must prepare for a surge in volume the following 
spring with the runoff of melting snow and rains contributing to the volume 
of the system. The mines are supposed to circulate process fluids through 
the system, spraying them onto the heaps repeatedly in order to increase 
evaporation rates and make room before snow falls and the system 
ices up. When these procedures do not take place, the result is too little 
room in the system to handle the very predictable incoming rush of water 
at spring snow melt. In the Golden Maple case, inspectors hypothesized 
that the overflow occurred not because of excessive rain, but because the 
company had not properly completed winter shutdown procedures, 
leaving too little capacity in the system to absorb predictable additions in 
the spring. The same was true at the Kendall mine in 1986, leading to an 
emergency land application of solution. 
Inadequate Diversion Ditch Maintenance 
Diversion ditches are an important part of solution inventory management, 
since they are intended to route storm water and spring runoff around the 
system to maintain manageable, safe pond volumes. The ditches require 
constant maintenance - they often fill with silt or become blocked with 
branches and other debris, which must be cleared away. Failure to do so 
eventually leads to failure of the diversion ditches during subsequent 
precipitation run-off, channeling stormwater runoff directly into the system 
instead of around it. In 1991, for instance, Canyon Resources exceeded its 
freeboard capacity at the Kendall mine after a spring of slightly above 
average precipitation when a diversion ditch failure deposited over 1 
million gallons of runoff as well as rock and sediment into the system. The 
solution excess had to be land applied. 
Problems with Cyanide Neutralization 
When land application occurs, cyanide solution is pumped from the barren 
pond and sprinkled on the surrounding land. The only barrier to 
contamination is the neutralization process which breaks cyanide down 
into other, less acutely toxic, substances. There are a number of variables 
which can either reduce or augment the risk of contamination. Mine 
operators may choose to neutralize a batch of cyanide solution in a pond 
and then spray it on the land. Or they may add the neutralizing agent to the 
pipe as a pump draws the cyanide solution toward the sprinklers. Should 
the line feeding the neutralizing agent into the cyanide solution pipe 
become plugged, or the pump in the neutralizing line falter, a discharge of 
untreated or partially neutralized cyanide solution could occur. 
In order to detect changes in the cyanide concentration or problems with 
the equipment, the DSL has required mine operators to test the treated CN 
solution periodically as it is land applied. The frequency and timing of this 
testing is crucial in both batch and continuous neutralization. When land 
application occurred with a batch method at the Kendall mine in 1987, for 
example, the operators found that neutralization in the pond had occurred 
in layers. As they reached the bottom of the pond, cyanide levels 
increased, necessitating the addition of more neutralizing agent. It was the 
testing regime, with HACH tests for cyanide conducted throughout the 
process, which identified the problem. The problem occurred despite DSL 
precautions, which required: 1) the operator to wait 48 hours before 
beginning to land apply in order to allow neutralization in the pond, 2) 
mixing of the solutions to promote even neutralization, and 3) two HACH 
tests indicating less than 0.02 cyanide in the solution prior to 
commencing discharge. Had testing been less frequent, or implemented 
only at the commencement of land application, the elevated cyanide levels 
would not have been detected. 
With continuous neutralization, testing frequency must be more frequent to 
be protective, since thousands of gallons may flow out through the 
sprinkler between tests, raising the possibility of an undetected cyanide 
release in the interval. When Kendall land-applied solution in 1987, 240 
gallons per minute were sprinkled on the land, and tests for cyanide were 
conducted every eight hours, with 115,200 gallons of solution flowing out 
between tests. In an attempt to compensate for the risk of inadequate 
neutralization, some operators (like Kendall in 1991), add a larger quantity 
of neutralizing agent than would be necessary if complete mixing and 
reaction occurred prior to discharge. When calcium hypochlorite is the 
neutralizing agent, the treated solution damages the land application area. 
Selecting a Neutralizing Agent: Cost versus Environmental Health 
During the early 1980s, the state did not foresee the need for land 
application. Once that need became apparent in the mid 1980s, the 
compound used to neutralize the cyanide prior to land application was as 
bad for the environment as cyanide itself in the opinion of state officials. 
Calcium hypochlorite, a form of bleach, was the chemical of choice in the 
mid 1980s. It reacts with sodium cyanide to form ammonia and carbon 
dioxide, both of which are relatively benign. However, the reaction also 
produces salt and calcium chloride, both of which are sources of free 
chlorine ions in solution and are therefore extremely toxic to aquatic life. 
Even worse, if the operator adds too much calcium hypochlorite to the 
solution, as Canyon did when land using a continuous discharge method 
in 1991, the result is a highly toxic bleach solution. When land applied, as 
it was at the Kendall site in 1985, 1987 and 1991, the treated solution can 
produce a white coating over trees and grass in the area and extensive 
vegetative mortality. With hundreds of thousands of gallons of salty 
neutralized solution to apply, there is always the additional risk of ground 
saturation, with toxic solution draining off into area watersheds. But 
calcium hypochlorite was cheap and easy to store. 
By 1990, an alternative neutralizing process using hydrogen peroxide had 
appeared on the scene. When hydrogen peroxide reacts with cyanide, the 
products are carbon dioxide and ammonia. This reaction did not produce 
toxic salt or free chlorine, making it a far better choice for the environment. 
On the other hand, hydrogen peroxide is considerably more expensive 
than calcium hypochlorite, and requires storage in special tanks. In order 
to land apply, the operation must invest in the storage tanks or have trucks 
deliver the product from the purchase point when needed. Some sites, like 
the Kendall mine, had already modified their permit to include land 
application without stipulating a neutralizing agent, and continued using 
calcium hypochlorite although DSL and DHES urged them to use 
hydrogen peroxide. Kendall continued to use calcium hypochlorite 
through 1991, switching to hydrogen peroxide in 1993 when the Water 
Quality Division threatened to require an MPDES permit and water 
quality degradation review for the discharge. 
Solution Storage Capacity versus Hydrogen Peroxide Treatment 
Theoretically, the destruction of cyanide with hydrogen peroxide yields 
products which are not considered to be as toxic as chlorine. The ability to 
treat and discharge solutions without severe effect has led to a rethinking 
of freeboard capacity among some mining officials. Maintaining sufficient 
volume in the system to handle a large influx of water usually means 
constructing larger ponds or adding contingency ponds to the system. 
Greater volume comes with a price: constructing ponds requires 
disturbance of the area involved during mine life, with the associated loss 
of vegetative cover, risk of erosion and stream sedimentation. Despite 
reclamation efforts, there is always the risk that the disturbed area will be 
extremely slow to return to its pre-disturbance condition, particularly at 
higher elevations with fragile alpine plant communities. 
Alternatively, if mine operators managed solution imbalances through land 
application in conjunction with hydrogen peroxide neutralization, less 
volume would be required to retain the excess solution. Less volume 
would mean smaller and fewer ponds and therefore less disturbance of 
the surrounding environs. However, this approach represents a departure 
from the closed loop design, and as such entails some risks. Maintaining 
excess freeboard capacity is a measure of preparation which is already in 
place should a large scale storm occur. 
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In contrast, initiating land application requires some time once the need 
becomes apparent. For example, when Golden Sunlight neutralized two 
ponds with hydrogen peroxide as an emergency precaution, they had to 
wait for two days for the tanker trucks bearing the chemical to arrive at the 
site. Batch neutralization adds two more days of waiting. 
Finally, if a component of the land application system were to malfunction 
or temporarily cease operation, the mine would not possess the same 
degree of extra capacity in the system to serve as a backup. The minimum 
storage option presumes that the land application would operate 
flawlessly, completely neutralizing the solution before it left the system. 
When solution leaves the system there is always a risk of mishap, 
oversight or equipment failure leading to the discharge of less than fully 
neutralized solutions. 
Which course engenders the greater risk to the environment? In permit 
updates and amendments thus far, the state has appeared to pursue a 
middle course, with both contingency ponds and land application included 
in the permitted activity. The Kendall mine, for instance, constructed an 
additional contingency pond while also incorporating land application into 
the mining permit as part of an application to expand approved in 1990. 
Does Allowing Land Application Reward Poor Design and 
Maintenance? 
Land application began in response to a series of emergency situations; 
heap leaching systems were at risk of failure should additional 
precipitation occur. Thus land application originally occurred within the 
context of adherence to a closed loop design. In the wake of the repeated 
solution imbalances, land application was incorporated into revised 
mining permits, but its role remained unclear. Was it to be an emergency 
measure or a routine maintenance method? Would each incident of land 
application be subject to state approval and control, or would it be left to 
the mine operators discretion within the parameters of the permit? Did the 
treated effluent represent a point source discharge, subject to state 
restrictions? Ensuing land application cases demonstrated this lack of 
clarity over definition, necessary procedures and control. The document 
record indicates that at times the mine operators notified the state that they 
had already commenced land application under emergency 
circumstances, while on other occasions, the state approved land 
application prior to action. The state did not lower freeboard requirements, 
a move which might have signified a shift to fuller reliance on land 
application. But on the other hand it did not increase freeboard capacity to 
prevent the recurrence of emergencies. The DHES allowed disposal of 
calcium hypochlorite treated effluent on two occasions before notifying 
one operator, Canyon Resources, that land application would require a 
water quality degradation review performed by the agency. 
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Site Stability 
Heap and vat leach mining often occur in mountainous areas. These 
operations break apart millions of tons of rock and store the fragments in 
heaps and waste rock piles on slopes of various grades. The shifting of 
these vast rock quantities sometimes creates changes in pressure on 
these underlying rock formations. The excavation of the open pit also 
serves to destabilize the area, since portions of the surrounding area may 
slide down into the pit. Mining may also change the water flows of an area, 
exposing aquifers and burying surface water, which increase the chances 
of slippage in unstable areas. 
The result of these changes can be movement along pre-existing fault 
lines in the ground beneath the operation, as the equilibrium of the once 
stable formation changes and water provides lubrication for slippage 
along the fault lines. When the shifting ground occurs beneath ponds and 
heaps containing millions of gallons of cyanide solution, it poses a 
catastrophic risk of liner tears or containment berm breaching. 
Assuring Heap Stability: A Shaky Science 
At least until the mid 1980s, heap leach pad construction occurred without 
the technical analysis now considered desirable to add to the assurance 
of stability. The DSL assumed construction requirements ensured stability. 
However, as recently as 1990, the DSL approved construction on a heap 
leach pad while knowing that its construction had not met those 
requirements. 
Heaps must completely contain millions of tons of ore and CN solution. At 
least since 1986, the state has required the following of heap construction: 
1) the operator must place ore onto the heaps in levels, 2) the overall 
angle along the sides of the heap must be stable for the site, 3) the berms 
which surround the heap leach pad must be built to certain specifications, 
with topsoil removed, water sources routed away from the berm area, and 
layers of clay, tailings and liner material used to construct the berm. The 
state presumed these specifications would assure stability. Thus when 
Grayhall Resources proposed constructing a new heap leach pad in 1986, 
for instance, no stability analysis was required or undertaken. 
In 1990, when considering a Canyon proposal to expand Grayhall's 1986 
pad, DSL discovered that Grayhall had not fulfilled the stability 
requirements for construction of the heap. Geotechnical analysis revealed 
that an unquantifiable risk of failure existed for the heap, but that 
expanding the heap would not increase the risk. The state could have 
required the operator to rectify the problem with the old heap, but instead 
allowed the operator to incorporate the old, improperly constructed 
structure into the new heap leach pad. By approving the expansion, DSL 
allowed the unquantified risk of failure to remain unaddressed. 
Slides and Failures Do Happen 
Stability questions have not remained in the theoretical realm: three of the 
four sites I reviewed encountered major movement in the ground beneath 
their operations. At Beal Mountain, a plane of soil and rock began to move 
along old fault lines, creating a slump in the pit wall with fissures extending 
all the way to the heap leach pad dike, as if a giant chunk of the earth 
above was threatening to slide down into the pit. Mine operators 
responded by drilling out material at the top of the slump and placing it at 
the base to arrest movement and drilling into the slumping material to 
break up the slide plane and dewater the sliding material. 
At Zortman/Landusky, the entire heap leach pad slid more than the length 
of a football field, covering a road. At Golden Sunlight, operations ceased 
after ground movement resulted in fissures which not only extended 
beneath cyanide tanks but cracked the concrete foundations on which 
they rested. The mine operators had deposited waste rock above an 
unstable area, creating pressure for movement along two faults in the 
area. By the end of 1994, the operators had removed over 14 million tons 
of waste rock from the unstable area. 
Leaks 
Every heap leach operation in Montana has leaked. Any time cyanide 
solution leaves the permit boundary, a violation of state water quality laws 
has occurred because any discharge to state waters without a permit is 
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prohibited. Leaks can result from a variety of sources, including 
broken pipes, faulty drains or tears in pond liners. 
You might think that cyanide in a downstream monitoring well would be 
enough to prove the existence of a leak. Actually, leaks may be difficult to 
prove. In an area of historic tailings, a leak could be taken as historic 
cyanide migration. Moreover, the mine operator is responsible for 
detecting and reporting leaks to the state, but obviously has little incentive 
to do so, since reporting a leak may mean a costly shutdown as well as a 
fine. At Beal Mountain, mine officials never reported that a cyanide leak 
from the barren pond had been discovered and repaired. A year later, 
agency personnel became suspicious when cyanide spikes appeared in 
water quality monitoring data, and the company then admitted to the leak. 
The state issued a violation and fined the company. 
Liner Perforations 
Heap leach pads are currently required to have the following triple liner: a 
layer of clay covered with finely ground tailings material, topped with a 
"primary" liner of plastic-like material. All four operations I reviewed 
experienced perforations in the liner system which allowed cyanide 
solutions to escape into the environment. The causes ranged from poorly 
sealed seams to tears in the primary liner, caused by equipment or 
underlying sharp rocks. Leaks of this kind are usually discovered when 
testing of monitoring wells shows CN spikes (sharp increases). Depending 
upon the frequency of well testing, it may be as long as a month before the 
operators discover a leak, and even longer before they trace it to its 
source. Often the quantity of lost solution cannot be precisely determined. 
For example, a September, 1993 leak at a Zortman/Landusky pond 
continued for nearly three weeks before the operators discovered the 
faulty seams which were allowing the solution to escape. State officials 
estimated that about 10,000 gallons of CN solution drained out of the 
system. 
In more recent designs, underdrains and piezometers are typically 
installed beneath the liner to quickly detect and collect any flow which may 
indicate a leak. Such additions allow the operator to identify and locate 
leaks far more rapidly than in older designs. In the Zortman incident 
described above, the lack of peizometers contributed to the uncertainty 
over how much solution had been lost. 
The underdrains and piezometers may be located between the synthetic 
primary and clay secondary liners, to collect and pump solution back into 
the system before it passes the secondary liner. A breach in the primary 
liner then becomes a gray area in terms of compliance, since solution has 
escaped one level of protection, but has not necessarily exited into the 
environment. In such cases, the question must be whether the pumps and 
drains collected the entire quantity of solution, or if some of the solution 
escaped into the environment. Ultimately, the only way of answering the 
question is to examine water quality data for evidence of cyanide 
increases downgradient of the area in question. On several occasions 
after 1990 at the Kendall mine, the collection system under the primary 
liner of the ponds and pads captured cyanide solution, but the 
presence of historic cyanide in the area, coupled with inadequate baseline 
data, made it impossible to discern whether the entire leak had been 
contained. 
Drains and Pipes 
Cyanide bearing pipelines connect the ponds, heaps and milling facilities. 
In vat leaching, cyanide treated tailings travel through pipes from the 
leaching vats to the tailings impoundments. Since pumps are used to 
move solutions through the system, the lines are usually pressurized. 
State permit requirements require the pathways of solution bearing pipes 
be lined, although this does not appear to be the case with tailings 
transport. 
Three of the four mines I studied released cyanide into the environment 
through ruptures in the cyanide bearing pipelines. At Kendall, for example, 
employees mistakenly turned valves in cyanide solution bearing pipeline 
the wrong way, causing a buildup of pressure that burst the pipe. At 
Golden Sunlight, inspectors found that tears and ruptures in the tailings 
line had spilled small amounts of cyanide treated tailings onto unlined 
ground at numerous points along the line. 
Acid Rock Drainage 
Acid rock drainage (ARD) occurs when unoxidized, sulfide bearing 
rock is disturbed during mining. Unoxidized material can include: ore 
placed on heaps, waste rock placed in piles or dumps, and the material 
used to create dikes, berms and other structures. When this unoxidized 
rock comes into contact with air and water, the reaction produces sulfuric 
acid. Without containment or contact with a buffering agent (such as lime 
or calcareous rock), the acid drains into area waters. 
Prior to 1989, the state did not anticipate problems with acid rock drainage 
at the large cyanide leach mines I studied. In that year the state first noted 
evidence demonstrating a high potential for sulfuric acid drainage from 
Golden Sunlight operations. Subsequent investigations found that acid 
production was already occurring at the mine. At Zortman/Landusky, the 
state did not discover problems with acid rock drainage until 1992. In both 
cases, the original permit stated that the company did not expect to 
encounter unoxidized rock. This miscalculation led to the 
Zortman/Landusky operator constructing heap leach pad berms and other 
unlined structures with unoxidized material, which then began to produce 
ARD. 
Because they did not anticipate mining unoxidized material, the 
reclamation plans at both Golden Sunlight and Zortman/Landusky called 
for actions which would increase the circulation of air and water through 
the heaps to promote cyanide neutralization. Such activities are the 
opposite of those demanded in an acid generating situation. A 1990 
update of the Zortman/Landusky permit suggested that mining would 
unearth unoxidized material, but that the waste rock dump would 
contain enough acid buffering potential to prevent acid drainage. The 
waste rock dump proved to have far too little neutralizing capacity, and 
highly acidic water began to drain into nearby streams. 
Acid rock drainage now appears to be a primary concern to the state in 
permitting expansions of existing sites, mainly because previous mining 
did not undergo such rigorous analysis. Three of the four sites I reviewed 
now have either severe problems with acid generation or show signs of a 
developing problem. 
Prediction of Acid Generating Potential: An Inexact Science 
Initial attempts at ore body characterization employed by the state were 
cursory at best. Based on the characteristics of ore samples taken at 
Zortman/Landusky, for instance, the mine operators assured the state that 
they would not encounter any unoxidized material in the course of their 
operations, and the state concurred. 
State officials utilize a procedure called "acid-base accounting" to 
determine the acid generating potential of rock in the area to be mined. 
The procedure involves taking core samples from different locations 
around the ore body and characterizing the rock according to the balance 
of minerals that tend to form acids versus those that tend to buffer acids. 
Each sample receives a score, with positive numbers indicating rock with 
a net buffering capacity, zero representing neutral rock and negative 
values signifying a net acid generating potential. Based on the 
characterization of the different strata of rock surrounding the ore body, 
state officials have attempted to quantify the amounts of buffering and acid 
generating rock to be produced during mining and make predictions about 
acid generation based on them. 
The process has not met with much success. In the case of 
Zortman/Landusky, acid based accounting predicted a net buffering 
potential for waste rock in a 1990 environmental assessment on extending 
the mine life at the site. Instead, the waste rock generated such large 
quantities of acidic seepage that the company attempted and failed to 
contain all seepage from the vicinity of the waste rock dump. Acid 
destroyed trout streams in the area, which during 1993 were running more 
acid than vinegar. Golden Sunlight has also experienced acid drainage 
problems, and evidence of acid-generating potential, in the form of rising 
sulfate levels, has appeared in the springs downgradient of the Beal 
Mountain waste rock dump. 
Waste Rock Segregation is not Microsurgery 
In response to the realization that unoxidized waste placed in dumps 
already posed an acid drainage threat at several heap leach mines, the 
state attempted to prevent the creation of additional problems by requiring 
that "all sulfide bearing materials disturbed during mining" be placed on 
the heaps along with the ore. This approach was used in the 1990 
amendment to the Zortman/Landusky permit. The presumption was that 
putting the unoxidized material on the lined heaps would not prevent 
acid generation but would contain any effluent produced. Implicit in the 
requirement was the belief that the amount of sulfide material to be 
encountered would be relatively small, since burdening the heaps with 
large quantities of waste would render the leaching of ore inefficient. 
However, the company did not abide by the DSL edict, interpreting the 
DSL requirement to include only sulfide bearing ore, not waste rock. DSL 
allowed them their interpretation. They continued to place unoxidized 
waste rock in uncovered, unlined dumps until fumaroles of hot sulfuric gas 
began to appear at the top of the waste rock piles. 
The next attempt at waste rock management appears in 
Zortman/Landusky's current application to expand, as well as in the Beal 
Mountain expansion amendment approved in 1993. In an attempt to 
prevent unoxidized waste contact with air and water, procedures call for 
the company to identify areas of unoxidized rock in the ore body prior to 
mining by drilling core samples at regular intervals in the pit face to be 
mined. Once the company removes the rock, unoxidized waste must be 
separated from oxidized waste material. Finally, the company must place 
the unoxidized or "hot rock" in a special dump, with the unoxidized 
material layered in tiers and surrounded on all four sides by enough acid 
neutralizing material to buffer the acid. A clay cap is to cover the pile at the 
end of the mine's life, preventing water and air from reaching the 
unoxidized material. 
At Zortman/Landusky, the procedures are to be used as a 
preventative; the presumption being that acid generation will probably 
occur unless the measures are taken. At Beal Mountain, on the other 
hand, the procedures are to be taken only in response to evidence of 
water quality deterioration due to acid drainage from the waste. 
Evidence from the files suggests that the requirement for waste rock 
segregation may not be easily implemented. When dealing with tons of 
rock, some unoxidized material, possibly through misidentification or 
insufficient separation, inevitably slips through and enters the oxidized 
waste rock pile. At Zortman in 1993, for instance, mine inspectors watched 
two dump truck loads of unoxidized waste empty into the waste rock dump, 
in spite of explicit demands that all waste be segregated and no sulfide 
bearing rock be placed in the dump. 
The question of whether or not the quantity that slips through would be 
sufficient to generate acid drainage depends upon a number of variables, 
most prominently the buffering capacity of the site and the amount of "hot 
rock" involved. In the Zortman/Landusky incident, the operator 
characterized the amount of "hot rock" as miniscule, exclaiming that 
"mining is not microsurgery". 
Reclamation Plan Alterations for Unoxidized Rock 
None of the four mines I surveyed included any reclamation measures for 
unoxidized waste in their original permits. In fact, waste rock had already 
been mined and placed in dumps before the state realized that the 
reclamation plans in place were doomed to fail. 
The mining of unoxidized rock demands a stringent set of reclamation 
procedures in order to reclaim waste rock piles, heaps and other disturbed 
areas to some semblance of stable, pre-mining conditions in the area. 
Acid generation can not only pollute water but it can kill vegetation as well. 
The reaction which produces acid rock drainage can also acidify and heat 
up the overlying topsoil, making revegetation difficult. Once started, 
acidification feeds itself: revegetation failure triggers erosion, exposing 
more "hot rock" to water and air, which then drives the acid generating 
reaction. 
The measures needed to prevent this cycle from beginning have been the 
source of controversy within the DSL and a lawsuit brought against one of 
the mines I studied. To reclaim unoxidized areas, mine operators must 
seal off the "hot rock" beneath layers of buffering material, so that no 
contact with topsoil occurs. The material cannot rest at a slope too steep 
for grading equipment to operate effectively and spread buffering layers 
evenly. Nor can the recontoured slopes above the unoxidized material be 
so steep that they encourage erosion of the buffering rock and topsoil. 
At Golden Sunlight, the controversy centered on two questions: the 
thickness of the buffering and topsoil layers, and the slope at which the 
unoxidized areas must be reclaimed. The company wanted to reclaim 
using thinner layers of soil and buffering rock than recommended for acid 
generating conditions. They also wanted to reclaim at slopes far 
steeper than the DSL's own technical staff believed would work. Thinner 
layers and steeper slopes require a lot less soil and a lot less work. The 
DSL approved the company's plan on a trial basis, stating that if the 
company's measures failed then they would be required to reclaim to DSL 
specifications. However, the DSL decision to approve the mine's 
"reclamation test plots" was struck down in 1994 in a lawsuit brought by 
several environmental organizations against the state and the mine. 
Water Quality Problems 
Several of the original mine permits I reviewed repeated the frequently 
made claim: cyanide leach systems are closed loop systems, and 
therefore water quality impacts should be minimal. Neither the state nor 
the mines expected degradation to result from mining. However, water 
quality impacts at several sites have been severe, with drinking water 
supplies contaminated with cyanide, some trout streams running more 
acidic than vinegar and other streams flowing so full of sediment that they 
resembled chocolate milk. Water quality problems extend beyond the 
cyanide used in leaching, several operations have exceeded state limits 
for metals, nitrates, sulfates, pH and turbidity. Identifying and reducing 
these impacts has been hampered to some extent both by the nature of 
the sites and by inadequate baseline characterization of water quality. 
Historic versus New Contamination 
Water quality monitoring data is very difficult to interpret due to the 
nature of the mine sites. Many cyanide leach mines exploit old mining 
sites, where traditional mining methods were no longer profitable but new, 
efficient methods can exploit the low grade ore that remains. Old tailings 
piles and historic cyanide contamination often characterize these sites, yet 
the quantities, and the behaviour of the contaminants during weather 
events or spring run-off, is unpredictable. Any cyanide level might show 
up in a well or stream and be blamed on past contamination. Without a 
series of water quality measurements taken before the commencement of 
all mining activity, there is no reference point for future monitoring results. 
For instance, a rainstorm may leach cyanide out of old tailings piles and 
into the groundwater, which will then show up as elevated readings in the 
monitoring wells. On the other hand, the rainstorm may have caused a 
breach in the containment wall of the current heap leach pad, causing 
cyanide contamination to appear in the monitoring wells. In this situation, 
only a witness to the actual breach would be able to state conclusively that 
the contamination was due to a leak and not due to historic cyanide 
migration. Thus heap leach operators consistently argue that elevated 
readings are due to construction shifting historic tailings or weather events 
causing cyanide migration through the underlying strata, rather than the 
result of a leak. Without witnessing the leak, it is difficult to prove 
otherwise. 
Inadequate Baseline Required of Sites With Incremental Expansion 
Some small mines evolve into large operations, and this incremental 
expansion may result in poor regulation if the limited expectations for a 
small mine are incorporated into the management plan for the larger mine. 
This is particularly true for baseline data, which can confuse 
interpretations of water quality monitoring in a manner similar to that of 
historic mining. For baseline data to be effective, it must include a number 
of parameters in addition to cyanide, such as heavy metals, nitrates and 
sulfates. It must include wells and surface stations in different areas of the 
site, and it must occur over a long enough period to establish averages 
and account for seasonal fluctuations in the parameters involved. 
Review of baseline data included in the permits for these four sites 
indicate that baseline data has not been gathered in this manner, resulting 
in ambiguity and numerous operator claims that elevated contamination 
levels were the result of natural, seasonal nitrate flushing from the soil or 
historic cyanide migration - claims which the baseline was inadequate to 
address. 
At the Kendall site, for example, baseline data up until 1990 consisted of 
one test at one monitoring well near the site which revealed less than 0.02 
cyanide. No other parameters were tested. The baseline data was 
originally incorporated into the permit for Triad Resources. The mine was 
then sold to Grayhall Resources, which amended the permit to expand 
without providing additional water quality data to establish a new baseline. 
Canyon Resources took over in 1987, maintaining the same set of 
ridiculously inadequate baseline data until 1989, when an expanded list of 
parameters appeared in an amendment to expand. However, the 
more complete data set still represented the results of a single day of 
testing. 
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Self Monitoring (Fox Guards Hen House) 
Heap leach mines conduct their own water quality monitoring, and the 
state currently has no policing arm to ensure that the results are valid. The 
state argues that it does not have the funds to pay for the water quality 
monitoring of all the mines in the state. Hence state policy requires the 
mining company to conduct its own water quality monitoring and to submit 
the results to the state for review. When a leak or other event occurs, the 
state may request an increase in monitoring frequency, but it is still the 
company which monitors itself. An independent lab is supposed to 
analyze the water samples. The problems with self-monitoring are 
obvious; providing evidence of leaks cost the company money, while 
submitting acceptable results allows business to continue as usual. The 
"independent" lab which analyzes samples is in fact paid by the mining 
company to conduct the testing. Without some form of state policing 
mechanism (e.g. unannounced water quality testing), a mining company 
may provide data which are unrepresentative of the site. At one site wells 
which have shown elevated cyanide readings in the past were reported to 
be dry or caved in. In other incidents, suspicious holes in a list of otherwise 
innocuous data make one wonder if the wells were not tested because of 
a suspected leak nearby. 
Examples of Water Quality Changes 
The potential for water quality impacts does not reside in the toxic solution 
alone. Since cyanide possesses a poisonous cachet, it has received the 
lion's share of attention until very recently. In reality, water quality 
problems have originated from a variety of sources at cyanide operations, 
including fertilizers used in reclamation, chemicals used in land 
application, blasting agents, waste rock piles and haul roads. While 
cyanide has been a major contributor to ground and surface water 
contamination, these other contaminants and their sources cannot be 
overlooked. These pollutants, their sources and effects, include: 
Sediments - Beal Mountain has encountered the greatest problems with 
sediment laden storm water flowing down off eroding reclamation areas 
and haul roads and into nearby streams. The sediment problem existed in 
1992, but intensified with the mine's 1993 expansion into an area of clay 
soils - a problem which the permit failed to anticipate. During the fall of 
1994, turbidity levels in German Gulch were 10,000 times the state limit. 
The increase in turbidity and total suspended solids happened in spite of 
an increase in sediment trapping structures mandated by the expansion 
permit. The state did not fine the company, despite the fact that high 
sediment levels can suffocate aquatic life and degrade habitat. 
Metals - Gold is usually not the only metal present in the ore body; mining 
typically uncovers a number of metals which can be mobilized with the 
percolation of water through rock. Waste rock dumps, which are often 
unlined and uncapped during mining, are often the source of a 
variety of metals which emerge in seeps and springs downgradient. 
Stormwater running over slopes exposed during mining can also deliver 
high concentrations of metals to area drainages. At Beal Mountain and 
Zortman/Landusky, springs and seeps downgradient from waste rock 
dumps contain high concentrations of metals, some exceeding Montana 
water quality standards. At Beal Mountain, the metals involved include 
iron, zinc and manganese, while at Zortman they included cadmium, lead, 
nickel and chromium. Both mines attempted to counter the problem by 
collecting the flow of contaminated springs and pumping it into the lined 
system of ponds and heaps. However, this in effect removes the spring's 
flow from a creek and reduces surface water contamination by obliterating 
streams. 
Nitrates - Mines provide three potential sources of nitrate contamination: 
nitrogen based fertilizers used in reclamation, blasting agents and the 
compounds resulting from the breakdown of cyanide. Nitrate pollution in 
surface waters may result in nuisance algae growth which changes the 
ecological character of the surface water involved. Nuisance river algae is 
not usually a human health hazard, hence the state standard for nitrates is 
10.0 mg/L, the drinking water standard set to protect human health. 
Preventing nuisance algae growth would require much lower levels. 
Nonetheless, cyanide operations have exceeded the state standard for 
nitrates in springs affected by mining. At Beal Mountain, nitrate levels in 
some springs in 1993 reached 12 mg/L, and biological monitoring of area 
streams indicated that pollution tolerant algae had replaced sensitive 
algae species in the biotic community of German Gulch, a stream 
populated by west slope cutthroat trout. The cause of the nitrate problem 
remains inconclusive; mine operators maintain that nitrogen based 
fertilizers were to blame, whereas the state still considers blasting agents 
a potential or partial culprit. The mine operators diverted five springs 
contaminated not only with nitrates but with sulfates and metals. They 
pumped the springs' water into the process circuit instead of flowing into 
German Gulch, reducing by half the flow in this important trout stream. 
Sulfates - Sulfates are a warning sign of potential acid drainage problems, 
since they signify the presence of sulfide rich pyrite in excavated material. 
Sulfate values for a site can be high while the pH values remain stable. In 
such a case the "hot rock" may be encountering enough buffering capacity 
in surrounding material that the result is sulfates instead of sulfuric acid, 
but no one can be certain how long the buffering capacity will last. At Beal 
Mountain, where sulfate levels have exceeded state standards, the 
sulfates have appeared in springs downgradient from the waste rock 
dump, suggesting the presence of sulfide-bearing waste in an unlined and 
uncapped pile. 
Wildlife Death 
Two of the four mines under review have caused wildlife deaths during 
mining operations. The primary culprits are the ponds which contain 
pregnant and barren cyanide solutions at heap leach facilities, and the 
tailings ponds containing cyanide solution and tailings at vat leach 
operations. These ponds pose a threat to waterfowl which land in the 
poisoned water and to big game animals such as deer, elk and bighorn 
sheep which come to drink. 
Montana is not the only state to encounter these problems. In Nevada, for 
instance, over 6000 waterfowl and shorebird deaths were documented in 
cyanide bearing impoundments prior to 1992 (GAO REPORT). Nevada 
mines experimented with various hazing techniques such as propane 
cannons and blaring rock music designed to scare away birds, but 
eventually discovered that the most effective method of preventing 
mortality was to prevent access to the water by draping a layer of netting 
above the surface. Since these ponds have been covered with nets, bird 
mortality has dropped precipitously. In Montana, both Zortman/Landusky 
and the Beal Mountain mine utilize netting over their barren pond. . 
Similarly, preventing deer access to the ponds with fencing prevents deer 
from drinking poisoned water or drowning in the slippery lined ponds 
which are difficult to escape. Despite the deaths at Montana mines, the 
document record suggests some mine operators have been slow to erect 
fences, even when required to do so by their permit. 
Wildlife fencing 
Fences and nets are only effective when they are complete, closed and in 
place. But limiting access to wildlife also limits access to mine personnel, 
bulldozers and haul trucks busy with construction, maintenance, and 
transporting ore and waste. 
At the Kendall mine, a 1992 Inspection Report states that after repeated 
state requests, wildlife fencing still had not been completed at the mine as 
mandated by the permit. At the Golden Sunlight mine in 1988, an 
inspector noted numerous deer tracks passing through an open gate to 
the tailings pond; a subsequent inspection found a dead deer floating in 
the impoundment. The state warned the mine that exclusion of wildlife 
from the impoundment was a condition of the operating permit, but took no 
further action. In 1992, three deer died at the Golden Sunlight 
impoundments. The deer may have entered via a 100 yard section in 
which fencing had been removed for construction purposes, but state 
documents warning the mine once again cite gates which are periodically 
left open. Despite these incidents, the document record includes no 
evidence of Notices of Noncompliance concerning wildlife at the four 
mines I studied. 
Netting 
Two of the four mines have experienced significant waterfowl mortality: 
Golden Sunlight and Zortman/Landusky. The most severe problems 
occurred Golden Sunlight, which is located near the Jefferson River in a 
migratory flyway. While the highest number of birds have died during 
migration periods, significant numbers of birds have also died during non-
migratory periods of the summer. Concerns include the loss of birds 
landing in the impoundments and the possibility that threatened and 
endangered raptors, such as bald eagles and peregrine falcons known to 
frequent the area, might feed on poisoned waterfowl. 
The mine has pursued a variety of mitigation options but has stopped short 
of netting the impoundments, which the operators contend would not be 
feasible due to the changing size and shape of the impoundment. The 
mine fired propane cannons, blared rock music and predatory raptor calls, 
hired two "duck guards" to haze away incoming birds with shotguns and 
"various pyrotechnics" and purchased a $20,000 houseboat, a radio 
controlled aircraft and a $30,000 hovercraft to chase birds away from the 
impoundments. While these hazing methods may have reduced avian 
mortality at the mine, bird deaths occurred despite their use. 
Zortman/Landusky's ponds have caused far fewer deaths, but after 30 
seagulls died in a pond in 1992, the BLM required the company to net all 
CN bearing ponds. With netting in place, six eared grebes died in a single 
incident in which three birds got tangled in the netting and three more 
squeezed through the netting and died in the pond beneath. 
Wildlife Death Toll 
The exact number of wildlife deaths which have taken place since the four 
mines opened cannot be ascertained from the document record, because 
no adequate reporting mechanism for wildlife mortality exists. Mine 
permits do not require operators to report wildlife deaths to the Department 
of State Lands, and the recording of wildlife deaths has typically been 4 * 
left to the operator's discretion. Wildlife affairs fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, but the personnel inspecting 
the mines for permit compliance are attached to the Department of State 
Lands. Inspection reports tend to focus on the technical aspects of mining 
and associated physical impacts to land and water; wildlife issues often 
appear tangential. Thus the document file records at least three 
inspections at the Golden Sunlight mine where inspectors discovered 
wildlife related incidents while conducting an investigation into other 
aspects of the mine. In two separate cases, inspectors found dead deer 
floating in the impoundment. 
In 1989, Golden Sunlight voluntarily began to keep records of wildlife 
deaths at the site and to report those deaths periodically to the Department 
of State Lands. From 1990 to 1992, the company reported 194 ducks, 
geese, shore birds and gulls as having perished in the Golden Sunlight 
impoundments. Yet with the exception of the death of three swans 
mentioned in 1988, the document record contains no evidence of bird 
mortality from the time the impoundment was commissioned in 1982 until 
the mine began recording and reporting the deaths in the fall of 1989. No 
enforcement activities or investigations of bird deaths appear in the record 
for the six year period. 
Least Cost, Less Effective Strategies 
The document record is replete with examples of best available 
technologies and strategies for dealing with environmental problems 
which operators chose not to use and the state chose not to require. In 
many cases these alternatives would have reduced or eliminated the 
cause of a problem or risk instead of mitigating the effects. But these 
options were often more costly, and thus the companies chose the less 
effective, but less costly option of dealing with the problem. Sometimes 
this choice paid off; the operation exposed the environment to a higher risk 
without the catastrophic event occurring. Yet on other occasions the less 
costly option caused environmental damage which could have been 
avoided. 
Zortman/Landusky, for instance, chose to cope with acid rock drainage by 
dealing with the effects, not by confronting the source of the problem. The 
company had made a bad decision in constructing buttresses, dikes, 
under drains and retaining walls out of acid generating material. Instead of 
removing and replacing all suspect material and capping it to prevent 
drainage, the company chose to remove some structures and install less 
costly pumpback facilities to catch acid drainage before it reached a 
nearby drainage. The strategy was a complete failure, as area streams 
wound up running more acidic than vinegar during the summer of 1993. 
The continued use of calcium hypochlorite at the Kendall mine, the refusal 
to net the Tailings Impoundment at Golden Sunlight and the diversion of 
contaminated springs at Beal Mountain are all additional examples in 
which more expensive options existed but were not pursued. In all 
three cases, the environment suffered as a result. 
LEGAL AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 
The state is charged with ensuring that a heap leach mine operates within 
the provisions of the permit and abides by state law. Technically, when 
the mine is not in compliance with the terms of the permit, the mine is 
operating in violation of the permit. The state should respond to a violation 
of the permit with a notice of noncompliance, which assesses a monetary 
penalty for the violation and requires remedial action. Depending upon the 
nature of the violation, the state may also suspend operations or revoke 
the permit. Yet violations often do not result in Notices of Noncompliance. 
Some flagrant violations resulting in large scale environmental damage 
have gone unpunished by the state. Consider, for instance, the glaring 
lack of any enforcement action against the Golden Sunlight mine for 
leaking 19 million gallons of cyanide solution into the groundwater from an 
unlined tailings pond. Even more common are instances in which 
enforcement actions are warranted but not pursued for violations which do 
not result in cyanide solution leaving the permit boundary. In addition, the 
files indicate that on several occasions the DSL issued a Notice of 
Noncompliance without assessing a fine. Without a fine, a Notice of 
Noncompliance has no teeth. 
How many warnings should a mine operator be allowed before 
receiving a notice of noncompliance, given the nature of the substances 
involved and the risk of gross contamination if failure occurs? A closed 
system, by design, should tolerate no leaks or conditions which create the 
risk of a leak. However, because all the mines leak, it is easy to view 
problems which are not immediately catastrophic as relatively minor and 
not deserving a notice of noncompliance or fine. 
Another problem concerns the division of responsibility for enforcement 
within the state between the Department of State Lands and the Water 
Quality Division of the Department of Health and Environmental Sciences. 
The two are supposed to work in conjunction with one another, but the 
Water Quality Division is charged with enforcing violations of the state's 
water quality laws, whereas DSL's responsibility lies in enforcing the 
provisions of the permit. Thus DHES becomes directly involved when a 
discharge off the property occurs, but does not have the authority to 
regulate the operation to prevent such a discharge. The conditions under 
which the mine is operating, which may present an imminent risk of a 
discharge to state waters, are within the jurisdiction of the Department of 
State Lands. 
Permitting Process: EA versus EIS 
With incremental expansion common among the largest mines, the 
preparation of Environmental Assessments and Environmental Impact 
Statements has become a regular feature of cyanide leach permitting. 
The Montana Environmental Protection Act requires preparation of an 
environmental review document for any state action which might impact 
the environment. An Environmental Assessment determines whether the 
impact of the proposed action is environmentally significant. If it is not, then 
the EA is sufficient consideration. If the impact is expected to be significant, 
then the agency must prepare a far more comprehensive review, the EIS. 
With some frequency, and limited success, the state has attempted to 
confine its consideration of environmental impacts to the preparation of the 
EA. The state has argued that the impacts of expansion at several mines 
are insignificant, or that mitigation measures required in the approved 
permit will reduce significant impacts to a negligible level. In approving 
major expansions at Golden Sunlight and Kendall in 1990, the state 
contended that Environmental Assessments prepared for both proposals 
were adequate consideration of environmental impacts. However, in 1994 
their argument failed to sway a District Court judge, who deemed the 
Golden Sunlight EA inadequate and ordered DSL to perform an EIS for 
the expansion. 
Negligence, Accident, Intent 
Human error and resulting accidents are perhaps inevitable in any kind of 
enterprise. However, when dealing with large quantities of extremely toxic 
chemicals such as cyanide, or more generally, when managing an 
operation that impacts a large area, the margin for error is small and the 
potential for environmental harm great. Presumably a key issue in 
determining how to prevent accidents must be whether a pattern 
exists and similar events occur repeatedly. Thus the situation in which 
Canyon employees mistakenly altered the pressure in pressurized 
solution lines, causing the lines to rupture, may be anomalous since it 
occurred only once, but it would be a different matter if it happened again. 
At all four mines, negligence in the operation of vehicles either caused 
environmental damage or created the potential for it. A bulldozer drove out 
on a pond liner at Canyon's Kendall mine, tearing the liner. A similar 
incident happened at Beal Mountain. At Zortman, a bulldozer slipped off 
the road and drove down a streambed, uprooting vegetation and 
destroying the streambed. Mistaken instructions resulted in the 
construction of a road and the bulldozing of another steambed at Zortman. 
On this scale, relatively minor mistakes can have a major environmental 
impact. When patterns of accidents emerge at a site, DSL's enforcement 
activities should intensify, even if the individual infractions are minor. 
Repeated accidents could eventually result in a significant problem and 
should be called negligence. 
Bankruptcy and Bonding 
The rights of a bankrupt company may interfere with the state's ability to 
enforce the mine's operating permit and state water quality laws. 
Bankruptcy has prevented the DSL from collecting fines from Notices of 
Noncompliance, and it has also stopped the state from revoking the bond 
of a bankrupt operator who continued to violate the permit and endanger 
state waters. In 1986, Grayhall Resources, the operator of what is ' 
now the Kendall mine, was bankrupt and without the wherewithal to fix a 
host of problems at the site. The DSL obtained legal advice from its staff 
attorney that shutting down the company and revoking its bond to clean up 
the site would probably result in a legal battle that the state might lose. 
Collection of fines for the continuing violations was even less certain in the 
legal arena, due to the protection afforded bankrupt companies. The state 
chose to allow Grayhall to continue operating. 
Estimating adequate bonds for CN leach mines is a tricky business. Bond 
amounts are calculated to cover the cost of reclaiming a site should the 
operator declare bankruptcy and walk away. But there are few mines to 
serve as reclamation cost examples, because most of the mines are still 
operating. Bond calculation for cyanide leach mines in Montana is 
therefore a kind of informed speculation. Problems with acid rock drainage 
and water quality contamination have required dramatic changes in the 
nature of these operations and the bonding amounts needed to cover 
them. 
At Golden Sunlight, for example, mine operators anticipate treating poor 
quality water forever, something never envisioned when cyanide leach 
mining came to the state. The company will post a bond, with the interest 
expected to pay for treatment 400 years from now. The ability to predict 
what treatment will cost generations from now is questionable at best. 
Expansion by Increment 
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All of the mines under review have expanded beyond the limits of their 
original permit through incremental increases in the mining area, the life of 
the mine and the amount of rock to be mined and processed. After ten 
years of operation, the mine may bear only passing resemblance in its 
size and scope to the operation approved in the initial permit. Yet 
frequently, an environmental impact statement accompanies only the 
initial permit application, with the additional expansions reviewed under 
an environmental assessment procedure. Environmental review thus 
acquires an incremental focus, which typically has resulted in a finding of 
no significant impact, rather than considering the impact of the mine in its 
totality. This approach favors mines which divulge modest intentions in the 
original stage of permit approval, then expand incrementally in 
subsequent years without undergoing the same rigorous environmental 
review which they would have received had they revealed the full scope of 
their intentions at the start. 
Mining Faster Than Permitted Rate 
Another form of expansion which occurred at one of the sites under study 
involves an increase in the rate of mining. Instead of mining the one 
million tons per year projected in the permit, a company now admits it may 
mine two million tons per year. Effectively, the total quantity of mined 
material should be the same, with the life of the mine shortened as the 
operation reached the limit more rapidly. Yet when combined with 
incremental expansions, the result is a larger operation than originally 
permitted. At Beal Mountain, operators more than doubled the rate of 
production, then applied for two life of mine amendments to dig an 
additional pit and mine deeper into the existing pit. All the while, cyanide, 
nitrate producing blasting agents, water, dump trucks and diesel fuel must 
all be utilized in quantities much higher than would be required at the rate 
projected in the permit, producing a greater risk of negative environmental 
consequences. 
Expansion versus Closure at Troubled Sites 
When trouble occurs at a cyanide leach mine, expansion instead of 
closure is often the preferable option for the state, particularly when the 
problems stem from unanticipated causes or shortcomings in the permit. 
Cyanide leach operations have encountered unanticipated problems with 
acid rock drainage, process solution management, ground movement, 
impoundment construction and perpetual water quality degradation. 
Closure of a troubled site may mean the state must take responsibility for 
clean-up. Expanding operations gives the state leverage; it can update 
permit requirements and compel the mine to abide by new restrictions or 
clean-up old messes. 
Most of Beal Mountain's expansion amendment, for example, addressed 
water quality problems previously generated by the mine, rather than the 
expansion itself. Extending mine life buys time for the operator to deal with 
problems. To deal with water degradation at Beal, the amended permit set 
water quality restoration goals which gradually reduced impacts in the 
direction of baseline levels. In its approval of the Beal amendment, 
DSL identified the expansion as the environmentally preferred alternative, 
even to the no additional mining option. According to DSL, the expansion 
would include numerous mitigation measures for already existing mining, 
while the no action option would only prevent additional mining. 
Had the state not approved the expansion amendment, it would have 
been left to pursue corrective actions in the context of the original permit 
and original bond. With an unanticipated problem like acid rock drainage, 
reclamation requirements and the potential clean-up costs to be covered 
by a bond would both change dramatically. A statement by a member of 
DSL's technical staff to the Beal Mountain illustrates how costly the 
problem could prove to be: "I appreciate your early grasp of the problem 
we face with mine waste management in the future. I'm afraid that the true 
cost of reclaiming marginal mineral deposits with the potential for eventual 
acid rock drainage will come back to haunt some mining companies in 
Montana." (Plantenberg to Dale, Letter, 1/29/91) Should the mine close 
with a permit which predicates reclamation measures and bond 
requirements on the belief that no unoxidized rock will be encountered, 
then the true cost might come back to haunt the state rather than the 
company. 
At Golden Sunlight, for instance, DSL staff welcomed the Golden Sunlight 
expansion because the mine was expected to close in 1993 and 
potentially severe, long term water quality problems had just been 
identified. Reclamation efforts included in the original permit were either 
inadequate or counter productive, leading agency officials to 
conclude that reclamation according to the existing permit would fail. In 
addition, the state had not based bond requirements on the potential for 
acid rock drainage or the need for perpetual treatment of seepage from 
chronically leaking tailings impoundments. Mine closure would have left 
the agencies scrambling to force the mine to change its reclamation 
practices and come up with a bigger bond before it finished operating. 
Expansion, on the other hand, offered the chance to make reclamation 
succeed by requiring perpetual water quality treatment and a completely 
different reclamation regime in the amended permit, state officials claimed. 
Expansion gives the state time and options, and keeps responsibility on 
the shoulders of the mining company. But at a troubled site, expansion 
may only compound existing problems instead of correcting them. At 
Golden Sunlight, water quality problems could only grow more 
complicated and severe by digging deeper into a pit expected to fill with 
contaminated water should excavation continue. When the state allowed 
Grayhall Resources to expand their troubled operations (at what is now 
the Kendall mine), the result was shoddy construction, a dangerously 
overloaded process circuit and additional cyanide contamination of 
ground water. 
CONCLUSION 
Cyanide leach mining returned to Montana in the late 1970s with the 
procedures for gold extraction clearly defined, but without an equally clear 
definition of the practices necessary to safeguard the state's * 
environment. As a result, state agencies and mine personnel have had to 
learn from costly mistakes and unanticipated problems, many of which 
have proven costly to the environment. DSL may argue, for instance, that 
agency knowledge and experience have improved dramatically since 
Zortman/Landusky began operating in 1979, and that the permit for the 
recently proposed McDonald Meadows project, for example, will reflect 
enhanced agency know how and include state of the art technology. 
In truth, agency regulation and mining technology both continue to 
improve, but the impacts associated with cyanide leach mining have 
become more pronounced as well. State mining policy has continued to 
play catch up with developing environmental problems. Recent DSL 
correspondence indicates that DSL technical staff now believe that acid 
rock drainage will be a concern at many Montana sites, that water 
treatment forever will be required at many Montana mines, and that the 
cost of reclaiming marginal sites may exceed the profits gleaned from 
mining. The industry continues to sail onward into uncharted regulatory 
waters, where unanticipated problems are likely to develop. DSL may now 
have a handle on land application, and be in the process of developing 
strategies for dealing with acid rock drainage. But perpetual water 
treatment represents a whole new experiment, with Montana's 
environment as the testing ground. 
How will the agency cope with the yet to be identified implications of this 
untested technology? Rather than approve first and react later, the DSL 
must take a far more cautious approach to the permitting and 
management of these mines. The fundamental lesson of these documents 
must be that far too often, the DSL allowed untested assumptions to pass 
for conclusive, research supported findings. Emergencies and 
environmental degradation occurred when actual operation did not 
conform to these flawed assumptions.The agency must be held partially 
accountable for the results. The agency must learn to err on the side of 
caution, which may mean preparing an EIS instead of an EA, requiring 
larger bond amounts and rejecting an expansion if the potential impacts 
cannot be quantified. 
Despite DSL assurances that their oversight has improved, it is important 
to ensure that state agencies do learn from the past, and incorporate past 
lessons into current mining permit stipulations, better enforcement 
practices and reclamation requirements. The recent Golden Sunlight court 
case indicates that pressure from the mining industry can weaken DSL's 
resolve to learn from past mistakes. Within the current framework of mining 
laws and regulation, there is vast room for improvement. Most of the 
recommendations I have to make suggest changes within this existing 
framework. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
What follows are a series of recommendations intended to improve the 
operation and regulation of cyanide leach mines in Montana. I have tried 
to organize the recommendations according to three stages of mine 
operation: the permitting stage prior to actual operation or expansion, 
the regulation and enforcement stage, when active mining is underway, 
and the reclamation stage after mining is complete. Many of the 
recommendations call for DSL to take action, since this agency usually 
takes the lead in permitting and regulating mining operations. Citizens 
groups face several obstacles to ensuring proper regulation of cyanide 
mines, the most prominent of which is a lack of access to the mine site. It is 
difficult for groups to take water samples, observe the condition of pads 
and dumps or monitor diversion ditch conditions when the gates are 
locked and entry denied to non-employees. 
The primary goal of the citizens groups in this case should be to pressure 
DSL into adopting these recommendations as administrative rules to be 
followed as standard procedures whenever they prepare a mine permit or 
inspect a site. For those recommendations which the state chooses not to 
adopt, citizens groups should still request these changes when 
commenting on individual mine permits, mine amendments, 
environmental assessments and environmental impact statements. 
While many of the recommendations will help improve environmental 
protection at existing and future operations, the case studies also suggest 
that the suitability of potential mining sites must be carefully reviewed. 
However, changes within the existing framework may not be enough to 
protect environmentally important areas. One of the policy implications 
which emerges from this study is the need to assess the environmental 
value and fragility of a particular site more fully than the current NEPA 
process allows. The process should allow a determination that 
environmental values outweigh mineral values, and therefore a site is 
unsuitable for mining. Similar provisions currently exist in Montana's coal 
mining law, and citizens groups should push for their adoption in the hard 
rock mining rules as well. However, these kind of policy changes may be 
difficult to acheive in the current political climate. 
Permitting 
The permitting stage is a crucial opportunity to define the practices, 
procedures and environmental safeguards by which the mining operation 
must abide. The documents for all four mines offer numerous examples of 
inadequate permit requirements. Sometimes vague permit language 
allowed polluting mines to escape enforcement activity. In other cases, the 
mine permit omitted consideration of environmentally dangerous practices 
altogether. Judging from previous DSL permitting efforts, citizens should 
demand that DSL: 
1) Define annual quantity of material to be mined and require annual 
reporting of quantity mined in previous year. In order to provide the 
company with some flexibility, define in the oriiginal permit the maximum 
quantity foreseeable to be mined in the future, even if it is well above 
current levels. If the mine had to define possible future increases at the 
start, and undergo environmental review for that level, then the current 
repetition of expansion amendments could be avoided. If the mine 
proposes to expand beyond the maximum outlined in the permit by more 
than 5%, then an amendment to the permit must be prepared with an 
environmental review which fulfills Montana Environmental Policy Act 
(MEPA) guidelines. This will prevent situations like that at Beal Mountain, 
where operators doubled the mining rate without agency notification, an 
amendment to the permit or an environmental review of the 
consequences. The DSL took no enforcement action because the permit 
failed to define the maximum annual quantity of material to be mined. The 
Legislative Audit of DSL offered a similiar recommendation. 
2) Define quantity of cyanide, ANFO, water and diesel fuel to be used 
annually, and require annual reporting of their usage levels. Once again, if 
the mine proposes to increase the use of these beyond the maximum 
originally defined in quantities greater than 5%, then an amendment must 
be prepared to reflect the changes, and the amendment must undergo an 
environmental review as required by MEPA. This will address cases like 
that at Beal Mountain, where the company increased substantially their 
use of these substances without agency notification or review. Once again, 
the permit failed to define maximum annual quantities of these 
substances, and the DSL took no enforcement action as a result. The 
Legislative Audit of DSL also made a similar recommendation. 
3) Define annual schedule of mining at the site which indicates months of 
active mining and leaching as well as months when the mine must remain 
dormant. Any departure from the schedule must require an amendment to 
the permit, with an environmental review in accordance with MEPA. This 
recommendation will address situations like that at Beal Mountain, where 
operators switched from winter closure to year round leaching without ' 
any modification of the permit or environmental review of the change. The 
DSL did not pursue a noncompliance because a Forest Service official 
overseeing the mine had given verbal approval of the change. The 
Legislative Audit of DSL also made a similar recommendation. 
4) Require baseline water quality testing over an extended period of 2-4 
years, particularly across seasons, to characterize fluctuations and 
migration patterns of contaminants due to historic or predecessor mining. 
The set of baseline data currently required is too ambiguous; it has 
allowed companies to successfully argue that they are not responsible for 
water pollution. Better baseline data will allow the state to distinguish 
between cyanide readings which are due to spring run-off moving through 
old tailings, and cyanide contamination which has been caused by spills 
during current mining operations. 
5) Specify at least quarterly submittal of water quality monitoring reports. 
Water quality data can be an important tool in identifying problems at a 
mine, but to be useful the information must be timely. The files indicate that 
spills have occurred and gone unreported for over a year before the 
company submitted annual water quality monitoring reports revealing the 
leak to DSL and DHES. At Beal Mountain, the permit did not specify when 
the company had to submit annual hydrologic reports, and the company 
did not submit three previous years worth of data until 1993. The 
Legislative Audit also made this recommendation. 
6) Require geotechnical analysis of area surrounding projected mine 
site to characterize potentially unstable areas. The fault lines and 
movement blocks which lie beneath the mine area must be characterized 
before mining begins, and waste rock dumps, mine facilities and open pits 
located accordingly. This will help prevent a Golden Sunlight situation, in 
which geotechnical analysis described ancient planes of movement 
beneath waste rock dumps only after the dumps had already triggered a 
slide. 
7) Require use of hydrogen peroxide as a neutralizing agent, and require 
sufficient quantity to be stored on site to neutralize at least two days of 
worth of land application (or however long shipment of additional 
hydrogen peroxide would take by tanker truck). Treating cyanide with 
calcium hypochlorite produces salt and bleach, which when land applied 
have killed vegetation and threatened ground and surface water at the 
Kendall mine. The use of hydrogen peroxide instead of calcium or sodium 
hypochlorite will reduce the harmful impact of land application, but it must 
be present on site to be ready for an emergency. 
8) Specify the use of a batch treatment method for cyanide solution 
neutralization, with three HACH tests to ensure neutralization of cyanide 
below 0.02 before beginning land application and periodic testing during 
application . Batch treatment offers far more security than a continuous 
system which treats and land applies solution almost simultaneously. 
Testing before application begins ensures that the cyanide has been 
neutralized; subsequent testing will determine whether any stratification of 
cyanide levels exists in the pond. Hence the testing intervals must be 
at least frequent enough to accompany and characterize significant 
changes in the pond's volume. The actual testing frequency will depend 
on the overall pond volume and the rate of application. 
9) Require enough storage capacity in the system to hold a 100 year storm 
for the period of time it takes to neutralize solution, get land application 
equipment in place and functioning, and begin land applying. The safest 
form of neutralization, batch treatment, typically requires 48 hours for 
complete neutralization of a pond, indicating that the system must be able 
to hold the additional volume from a major storm for at least that amount of 
time without spilling. 
10)  Reso lve  uncer ta in l y  ove r  con t ro l  o f  l and  app l i ca t ion  by  spec i f y ing  the  
protocols for authorizing the process. If an imminent threat of overtopping 
exists, then the operator must take whatever measures are necessary to 
deal with the problem. If there is too much solution in the system but no 
emergency exists, then the operator must consult with DSL and gain 
permission to commence neutralization and land application. 
11)  I f  an  expans ion  inc reases  the  amoun t  o r  du ra t ion  o f  d i s tu rbance  a t  a  
site by more than 25% of the original permit levels, then require an EIS 
which considers cumulative impacts and provides alternatives to 
expansion. Hopefully, better anticipation of maximum mining quantities in 
the original permit will render these kind of changes less frequent. 
Incremental expansion demands a re-evaluation of the mine's impacts, not 
just of the additional environmental burden, but of the overall impact 
to the area. Additional disturbance may push the mine past a threshold 
where significant effects might appear, which may not have been identified 
by consideration of the expansion alone. Requiring alternatives helps 
identify other options for the site, some of which might prove superior to 
the original expansion proposal. 
Regulation and Enforcement 
The document records suggest that DSL needs to significantly improve 
enforcement activities in order to protect the environment. Rules and 
regulations on the books are meaningless unless the agency identifies 
violations and assesses stiff fines to dissuade operators from making the 
same mistake again. I offer the following suggestions for both the 
construction and operation stages of mine activity: 
Construction 
12)  Requ i re  d i ve rs ion  d i t ch  cons t ruc t ion  p r io r  t o  o r  concur ren t  w i th  c rea t ion  
of waste rock dumps, roads, heaps and other sediment generating 
disturbance. This will help prevent sediment loading of streams like 
German Gulch, a cutthroat stream near Beal Mountain which looked like 
chocolate milk after a rain because the mine built roads without adequate 
diversions. It will also protect recently reclaimed slopes from erosion after 
rains. 
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13) Increase inspection frequency during construction of pads, laying of 
pond liners and building of berms to ensure adherence to permit 
requirements. This measure is intended to identify shoddy construction 
before it gets covered up with ore. At the Kendall mine, no inspectors were 
around to notice the faulty construction of a leach pad foundation before it 
was completed and the company placed cyanide and ore onto it. The 
Legislative Audit of DSL offered a similar recommendation. 
14)  Ensure  in teg r i t y  o f  fenc ing  du r ing  cons t ruc t ion  pe r iods  th rough  the  use  
of temporary fencing of downed areas when work is not in progress. At 
Golden Sunlight, deer gained access to the impoundments even after 
fencing was complete, because a 100 yard section was down due to 
construction. 
Operation 
15)  Requ i re  fa l l  i nspec t ion  to  ensure  tha t  w in te r  shu tdown p rocedures  
have been initiated and that the company has ceased adding water to the 
system. Many emergency land application episodes occurred not because 
of an inordinate amount of rain, but because the operator failed to 
shutdown properly or kept adding water to the system too late into the 
year. A fall inspection would insure that the mine initiated appropriate 
procedures at the right time. 
16)  Requ i re  DSL to  es t ima te  the  amoun t  o f  money  requ i red  to  
perform a proper fall shutdown, repair a liner, fix broken pipes, conduct 
reclamation and whatever else might be required should an operator walk 
away from the mine. DSL should then require a contingency fund to cover 
these costs which could be used by the state to bring the site into 
compliance even after the company has filed for bankruptcy. This measure 
is needed to avoid situations like that at Kendall, where the mine was in 
terrible shape, the company, Grayhall, was in bankruptcy and the DSL 
could not revoke the company's bond, which was inadequate to cope with 
the problems regardless. 
17)  Requ i re  repor t i ng  o f  a l l  w i l d l i f e  dea ths  w i th in  a  week  o f  d i scovery  to  
DSL and FWP. The report should include the species, number, date 
discovered, likely cause of death and the company's remediation 
response. Reporting of wildife mortality has been haphazard at two mines. 
The federal agency with jurisdiction over Zortman operations demanded 
monthly reporting after bighorn sheep and birdlife died there in 1992, 
while Golden Sunlight volunteered to report all deaths in 1989. The 
General Accounting Office made a similar recommendation. 
18)  Conduc t  unannounced  wa te r  qua l i t y  mon i to r ing  inspec t ions ,  t ake  
samples and substantiate reported data. Consultants paid by the company 
conduct water quality monitoring, although at times company personnel 
actually take the samples. Verification of results should be part of the 
regulation regime, particularly since suspicious holes and dry wells have 
occasionally appeared in the water quality data at troubled mines. 
The Legislative Audit of DHES recommended similarly. 
19)  Inspec t  fences  fo r  gaps  and  open  ga tes  a l l ow ing  w i ld l i f e  access  as  
part of regular inspection process. Include wildlife fencing in Inspection 
Checklist. Wildlife mortalities have often been observed by accident while 
inspecting other aspects of the mine. The Inspection Checklist does not 
currently include wildlife fencing in its chcklist of areas to consider during 
an inspection. This measure would attach greater importance to wildlife 
and increase awareness of wildlife issues among inspection personnel. 
20) The agencies should consider patterns of "accidents" in determing 
whether a negligent or gross violation of the permit has occurred. Patterns 
of minor infractions should receive a Notice of Noncompliance. The extent 
to which violations with minor environmental consequences receive 
warnings instead of notices of noncompliance must be reduced. Minor 
mishaps can translate into big problems; several of the cyanide leaks 
which occurred at various mines resulted directly or indirectly from 
accidents involving heavy equipment. The DSL must consider the context 
of a minor error and take action before a major problem develops. 
21) Fine amounts must be increased. The DSL often fines multi-million 
dollar operations too little to encourage companies to avoid violations. 
When calculating fines, DSL could assess a penalty for each day in 
violation of the permit, with the resulting fine amounting to thousands of 
dollars. Instead, the fine amounts I observed in the files rarely 
exceeded $2000, and fines of $500 or less were most common. 
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22) Fines must be assessed and paid after Notices of Noncompliance are 
issued. There are too many examples of notices of noncompliance which 
are never finalized; the company receives the notice but the state never 
fixes a penalty and the company never pays a fine. The Legislative Audit 
of DSL includes a similar recommendation. 
Reclamation 
None of the four mines have finished operation, and therefore complete 
reclamation has yet to occur. However, problems like acid rock drainage 
demand reclamation planning prior to closure. There are a number of 
steps which DSL can take to improve the chances that reclamation will 
succeed, including: 
23) Treatment of water in perpetuity must be studied thoroughly before it is 
approved at any sites. The duration and scope involved in permanent 
water treatment demand rigorous testing and experimentation before it 
can be relied upon to mitigate the potentially enormous impacts 
associated with the infilling of an open pit with water. In addition, the 
legality of the concept must be clarified before it can be approved. 
Permanent disturbance appears to contradict the reclamation requirement 
of the Montana Constitution. 
24) Require a full ore and waste rock characterization of acid 
generating potential before mining begins, and as part of subsequent 
expansion amendments. At several mines, the state has only recently 
discovered that previous ore and waste characterizations unoxidized rock 
were woefully insufficent and have greatly underestimated the extent of 
the problem. As a result, the operators have already placed unsorted 
waste rock in dumps on top of springs and have contaminated topsoil 
stockpiles to be used in reclamation. Thorough, independent study, not 
company assurances, must be undertaken to prevent similar situations at 
mines in the future. 
25) If acid generating potential exists, then a series of steps must be 
initiated before the appearance of signs that oxidation is occurring within 
waste dumps. The assurance that enough buffering waste exists to 
prevent acid drainage is not sufficient. The waste rock must be sorted and 
the "hot rock" placed in separate dumps where no springs will be 
encountered. The unoxidized waste must be surrounded with buffering 
rock, capped with clay and at least 18 inches of topsoil. Diversion ditches 
must route storm water around the dumps, and underdrains must colled 
seepage from underneath the dumps and prevent contact with the waste. 
Two mines have claimed that they had enough neutral waste to buffer acid 
production in their waste dumps and hence special precautions were 
unnecessary. One mine now has severe problems with acid rock 
drainage, and the other shows signs of developing the same problem. The 
steps must be taken before signs of acid production begin to appear, not 
after, as the state chose to require in regulating waste rock dumps at Beal 
Mountain. The signal that acid rock drainage has begun is 
deteriorating water quality; state waters should not have to suffer 
degradation before the state requires preventative measures. 
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26) Require at least 3:1 slopes on reclamation of unoxidized waste rock 
dumps and heaps. DSL's own technical staff recommended this ratio of 
horizontal to vertical angles on the reclaimed slopes of waste rock dumps 
and impoundments to ensure reclamation success. Anything steeper 
makes equipment operation and the even spreading of topsoil difficult. 
Erosion also increases on the steeper slopes, leading the DSL technical 
staff to state that anything steeper than 3:1 was likely to fail. 
Glossary of Terms 
Acid Rock Drainage (ARD): Sulfuric acid tainted water draining from areas 
in which unoxidized rock has been exposed to air and water. Typical 
areas include waste rock dumps and old mining tunnels. 
Acid Base Accounting: Method used to evaluate the sulfuric acid 
generating potential of an unmined ore body and associated waste rock. 
The method attempts to quantify and assess the balance between rock 
which can neutralize acid and rock which will produce acid. A positive 
value, such as +20, means the rock can neutralize acid, whereas a 
negative value indicates an acid generating potential. The assigned 
number corresponds to the number of tons of lime needed to ' 
neutralize 1000 tons of rock. A value of - 20 means 20 tons of lime must be 
applied to 1000 tons of the rock in order to neutralize it. 
Acid Generating Potential: Any rock containing unoxidized sulphide 
material has the potential to generate sulfuric acid if it contacts air and 
water. 
Agglomeration: The process by which gold bearing ore is prepared for 
leaching. The ore is crushed to size and then sprinkled with cyanide 
solution. 
ANFO: A nitrogen based blasting agent used to excavate rock from the 
open pit in mining operations. Breaks down into nitrates in the 
environment. 
Angle of Repose: Angle at which a pile of rock placed on an incline will 
cease motion and become stable. 
Aquifer: An underground spring or source of water table recharge for an 
area. 
Barren pond: In the heap leaching system, a pond which contains cyanide 
bearing solution, but no gold or other metals. Precedes application to the 
heaps. 
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Baseline: A series of data intended to characterize the environmental 
quality of a site prior to anticipated impacts. Baseline data allows the state, 
for instance, to compare water quality data over time, identify trends and 
quantify impacts to water. 
Berm: An earthen wall intended to contain water. Berms typically surround 
pond areas, or collection points for storm run-off. 
Closed Loop: Heap leach mines were originally permitted to rule out any 
discharge of highly toxic cyanide to the environment by prohibiting any 
discharge of solution whatsoever. The system formed a closed loop: pipes 
connected ponds, heaps and processing facilities. The only sanctioned 
way for solution to escape was through evaporation. 
Cyanide: A highly poisonous chemical used to dissolve gold from rock in 
the leaching process. Abbreviation: CN. 
Downaradient: A relative term used to characterize the direction of water 
flow between two sites. For instance, the permit boundary may be 
downgradient of the waste rock dump, indicating that water will tend to 
flow from the dump to the boundary. 
Environmental Assessment (EA): An environmental review required for all 
state actions which are not expected to have a significant impact on the 
environment. The EA identifies potential environmental impacts and 
discusses why they will not be significant. It does not consider alternatives 
to the proposed action. This review may be undertaken as a precursor to 
an EIS if the agency is unsure whether potential impacts will be significant. 
A less comprehensive review than an Environmental Impact Statement. 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS^: An environmental review required 
for all state actions which may significantly impact the environment. The 
review identifies impacts and considers the benefits of a number of 
alternatives course of action, including the no action alternative in which 
the desired alternative does not take place. A more comprehensive review 
than an Environmental Assessment. 
Freeboard Capacity: In order to be prepared for storm water running into 
ponds and heaps, mines must maintain a specified quantity of extra 
volume in their systems at all times. The difference between the capacity of 
the system and the actual amount of solution in the system is the freeboard 
capacity. 
Fumarole: A fissure spouting hot sulfur dioxide gas. Sometimes observed 
in waste rock dumps, where sulfides in the rock are undergoing an 
oxidizing reaction. 
Geotechnical Analysis: Analysis of the underlying rock formations and fault 
lines of a particular site, associated with identifying potential ground 
related stability problems. 
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HACH Test: A field test used for measuring cyanide levels in water. 
Results are immediate but less precise than lab testing of water samples. 
(WAD or total?) 
Head Cut: A breach or gouge near the top of an earthen berm caused by 
water running over the berm from the pond behind it. 
Heap: A layered mound of ore used to extract gold with cyanide. Gold 
bearing rock is placed on the heap in layers and sprinkled with cyanide, 
which dissolves the gold. A collection system under the heap collects the 
cyanide solution for processing. 
Incremental Expansion: Mine expansion by amendment, in which the life 
of the mine and the quantity of excavated material increases in stages. 
The ultimate size and scope of the project may bear little resemblance to 
the initially approved mine. 
Leach: Process by which cyanide mixed with water trickles through rock 
and dissolves metals into the solution. Processing removes the gold from 
the solution. 
Leaching Vats: The vat leaching process uses large steel containers, or 
vats, to contain gold bearing ore and cyanide solution during the leaching 
process. 
Level stages: Refers to the elevation of a heap or pile in equal layers. 
A pile of unoxidized waste rock, for instance, may be built up in step-like 
layers like a pyramid to inhibit contact with air and water. 
Life of Mine Amendment: An amendment to a mine's operating permit, 
issued by the Department of State Lands, granting an extension of mine 
life and an expansion of mine operations. 
Liners: Mine facilities often include a layer of impervious material beneath 
areas containing cyanide such as heaps and ponds. Liners may be made 
of clay or synthetic materials. 
MPDES permit: A permit, issued by the Water Quality Bureau, allowing 
the discharge of waste water which may degrade state surface waters. The 
permit application must undergo a non-degradation review which justifies 
the degradation of state surface waters. 
Neutralization: A chemical process typically involving hydrogen peroxide 
or sodium hypochlorite or calcium hypochlorite which breaks cyanide 
down into other substances such as carbon dioxide and ammonia. The 
reaction between cyanide and calcium or sodium hypochlorite is given by: 
Ca(OCI)2 + NaCN -> CaCI2 + NaCI + C02 + NH3. The reaction between 
hydrogen peroxide and cyanide is given by: H202 + NaCN -> C02 + 
NH3. 
Neutralizing Potential (Buffering capacity. Buffering potential^: Any 
rock type which has the capacity to neutralize a quantity of acid. Often 
mentioned in this capacity are calcareous rock types, and lime. 
Non-degradation Review: A permit for waste water discharge from a mine 
must undergo a non-degradation review conducted by the Water Quality 
Bureau, which considers whether or not degradation will occur, whether 
adequate consideration has been given to means of preventing 
degradation, and whether the degradation is justified by economic or other 
factors. 
Notice of Noncompliance (NON): A notice sent by the Department of State 
Lands which informs a mine of an operating permit violation. 
Ore: Rock bearing economically recoverable gold deposits, which is 
excavated and placed on heaps for leaching. 
Pad: see Heap. 
Permit Amendment: A major change in the mining permit, affecting such 
factors as the life of the mine, the quantity of material to be mined or the 
location of mining activities. Significant environmental impacts may result, 
necessitating the preparation of an Environmental Assessment or 
Environmental Impact Statement. 
Permit Boundary: The area in which the mine permit allows mining 
activities to occur. The boundary also represents the physical limit for 
impacts to such factors as ground and surface water. Any impacts beyond 
the permit boundary are a violation of the permit. 
Permit Revision: A minor change in the permit which will result in no 
greater land disturbance or environmental impact. No environmental 
review required. 
Piezometer: Device used to measure flow of water. Often used to measure 
the efficiency of underdrains and leak collection systems in leaching 
operations. 
Pregnant pond: In the heap leaching system, a pond which contains 
cyanide solution and gold or other metals. Collects solution after it has 
leached through the heaps. 
Primary Liner: A layer, usually of synthetic material, placed beneath a 
pond or heap to prevent contact with the underlying ground. The primary 
liner will typically be placed over a secondary liner made of clay. 
Pvrite: A type of rock containing sulphides, a form of sulfur. If the sulphides 
present in the rock are unoxidized, they could generate sulfuric acid upon 
contact with air and water. 
Secondary liner: A back-up layer, usually of clay, placed beneath a 
pond or heap to prevent contact with the underlying ground. The 
secondary liner underlies the primary liner and is intended to contain any 
solution which escapes the primary liner. 
Stability Analysis: Study conducted to determine the stability of a given 
structure, such as a heap leach pad. 
Sulphide Bearing: Rock types, such as pyrite, which contain sulphides, a 
form of sulphur. The sulphides, if present in an unoxidized state, have the 
potential to react with air and water to produce sulfuric acid. 
Tailings Impoundments: Large ponds store tailings, the mixture of ore and 
cyanide solution, after processing has extracted the gold. 
Underdrain: A system of coarse rock channels constructed underneath a 
waste rock dump or heap leach pad to drain groundwater or springs away 
from the area and prevent contact with the material above. 
Unoxidized: A term used to describe rock which has the potential to 
generate acid. The sulphides in the rock are in an unoxidized state, 
meaning contact with air and water will bring about an oxidizing reaction 
and produce sulfuric acid. 
Waste Rock: Sometimes referred to as overburden, waste rock contains no 
gold but must be removed to access the gold bearing ore bodies. 
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Waste Rock Dump: Pile of waste rock created by mining. 
Winter Shutdown: A set of procedures which a mining operation 
undertakes in the fall to prepare for winter. Typically the mine shuts down 
for the winter months. The procedures include reducing cyanide solutions 
in the system to make room for spring run-off. 
Valuable Reading 
Babamento, Rasim, "Regulating Mining in Montana: Stealing the Common 
from the Goose," Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Montana, 
1993. 
Offers an examination of the history of state and federal laws governing 
hard rock mining in the state. Critiques the existing legal framework and 
offers recommendations for improving mine regulation. 
Chamberlin, Peter G., and Pojar, Michael G. "Gold and Silver Leaching 
Practices in the United States," U.S> Department of the Interior, Bureau of 
Mines, 1983. 47 pages. 
Describes leaching methods, technology and regulations for 
potential miners. 
Erickson, Lil, Olsen, R. Dennis and Black, Anne, Reclaiming the Wealth: A 
Citizen's Guide to Hard Rock Mining in Montana. Northern Plains 
Resource Council, 1990. 107 pages. 
Good introduction to hard rock mining terms, processes and laws. Usefule 
sections on organizing principles and opportunities for influencing mining 
decisions. Describes different mining processes for different minerals, 
explains the relationship of state and federal laws to mining practices and 
offers a step by step discussion of the environmental review process for 
mines. 
Grove, Angie, "Performance Audit Report: Enforcement of the Water 
Quality and the Public Water Supply Acts, Water Quality Division, 
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences", Office of the 
Legislative Auditor. September 1994. 65 pages. 
The Legislature requested a review of DHES operations, and the Office of 
the Legislative Auditor performed a review of agency files. The audit did 
not focus on mining operations, but it did utilize the files to track 
enforcement activities. The report describes a lack of sufficient 
enforcement activity, and makes recommendations for improving DHES 
procedures. 
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McClelland, G.E., and Eisele, J.A., "Improvements in Heap Leaching to 
Recover Silver and Gold From Low-Grade Resources," U.S. Department of 
Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1981. 26 pages. 
Prepared during James Watt's tenure as Secretary of Interior, presents 
the results of a study which determined cyanide heap leaching to be an 
effective means of gaining profitable gold quantities from low grade ores. 
U.S. General Accounting Office, "Increasing Attention Being Given to 
Cyanide Operations," GAO: June 1991. 38 pages. 
Report to Congress which describes impacts of cyanide mining in 
California, Nevada and Arizona. Included is information on wildlife deaths 
and cyanide leaks. Recommends improvements in federal management of 
sites. 
Wingard, Mike, "Performance Audit Report: Hard Rock Mining Regulation, 
Reclamation Division, Department of State Lands", Office of the Legislative 
Auditor, December 1994. 83 pages. 
At the behest of the Montana legislature, the Office of the Legislative 
Auditor reviewed the files of 23 mines for the period of January 1989 to 
December 1993. The examiners looked specifically at DSL performance 
in fulfilling its regulatory duties. The report identifies a number of 
administrative and procedural shortcomings and makes a series of 
recommendations. Some of the problems discussed in the audit report 
also appear in the enforcement section of my report. 
A Note on the Documents Used in This Report 
The documents from the DSL and DHES files which I used to prepare this 
report have been bound and are available in the special collections room 
of the University of Montana's Mansfield Library in Missoula, Montana. 
Case Study 1: Golden Sunlight Mine 
Overview 
The Golden Sunlight mine, owned by Placer Dome, is a vat leaching 
operation near the Jefferson River and Whitehall, Montana, that received 
its first permit from DSL in 1975. The state prepared an EIS for the first of 
six permit amendments in 1981. The additional amendments approved the 
mining of 20 million tons of ore and 90 million tons of waste rock. In 1988, 
the company submitted a seventh amendment to expand operations. The 
amendment, approved in 1990, permitted the excavation of a 209 acre pit 
and the construction of a tailings impoundment of 250 acres. Total ore 
production increased by 30 million tons, and waste rock by 210 million 
tons. The amendment doubled the area of disturbance, with waste rock 
dumps expanding to cover 750 acres alone, making the mine the state's 
largest. 
However, in 1994, a District Court judge overturned the DSL's approval of 
the expansion, citing the state's insufficient review of environmental 
impacts. In 1994 the ground beneath the mine began to move, halting 
operations for nearly a year. The mine has a history of significant 
environmental problems, from the loss of approximately 19 million gallons 
of cyanide solution to the recent identification of large quantities of 
unoxidized rock in waste rock piles and tailings impoundments. The water 
quality problems associated with the mine may require treatment into 
perpetuity. 
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1) Ground Movement 
On June 13, 1994, the Golden Sunlight mine notified the DSL that some 
type of ground movement was occurring beneath the vats and tanks used 
in the leaching process. The following night, one of the leaching vats 
inside the mill building shifted 4-8 inches, causing cracks in the mill floor, 
buckling catwalks and damaging equipment. The mine shut down 
operations immediately. (DSL, Written Findings, 1/30/95) Neither the state 
nor the company knew what was causing the movement (which continued, 
albeit slowly) or what might develop next. In the weeks following the 
shutdown of the mine, consultants hired by the operators identified two 
major blocks (geological formations) associated with a landslide situated 
beneath the mine facilities. 
The Rattlesnake Block, an area of movement which had gone unnoticed 
until the events in June, either underlies or is adjacent to the GSM mill 
complex and a portion of Tailings Impoundment I. Thousands of years 
before mining commenced, the "ancestral" Rattlesnake Block had 
experienced significant movement, but had remained relatively stable 
since mining began until the 1994 events. Movement in the Rattlesnake 
area totaled 1-1.5 feet by July, 1994. (BLM, Meeting Notes, 7/7/94) 
Geotechnical investigations revealed that the Rattlesnake Block began to 
move as it was dragged along a fault line by an adjacent block of 
movement, the Sunlight Block. (Golder Associates, Memo, 10/21/94) 
The Sunlight Block is another reactivated ancestral area of sliding 
material located to the west of the Rattlesnake Block and the mining 
complex. Geological analysis identified this block as the primary cause of 
movement during the 1994 episode. 
The June ground movement was not the first stability problem the mine 
had encountered. The mine had previously experienced problems with 
landslides and slumping material, neither of which were related to the 
ground movement which occurred in the spring of 1994. 
The Swimming Pool slide, which the DSL termed a "minor" area of 
movement between the pit and the mill complex had caused ground 
cracking and movement problems near the GSM operations in the past. 
(Clinch to Marx, Memo, 8/2/94) In 1989, The Swimming Pool slide caused 
a failure in the highwall of the pit. (Creek to DSL, Report, 6/24/94) DSL 
reports describe the movement in the pit as ongoing, with the extent of the 
slide appearing to end above the fire water tank and the mill complex. 
(Williams, Inspection Report, 6/20/94) On April 6, 1994, the slide had 
demonstrated increased movement on the hillside above the mill. (Creek 
to Olsen, Letter, 6/24/94) 
The Midas Slump, located in the North Dump area, extended 
approximately 1/10 of a mile. (Clinch to Marx, Memo, 8/2/94) There has 
been a history of waste dump instability related to sliding on weak 
foundation materials and the flow of an intermittent spring underneath the 
dumps. A 1990 DHES Inspection Report described the slump visually: 
"The "Midas slump" at the toe of the north waste dump was seen next. 
We were quite a distance away, on a dump to the south, but the amount of 
mass movement and soil fracturing was very apparent." (Bugosh, 
Inspection Report, 3/20/90) The sliding dump "dozed" weak foundation 
materials ahead of its movement southward. (Golder Associates, Memo, 
10/14/94) 
The ground movement in the area of the mine associated with the 
Swimming Pool slide and Midas slump made recognition of the movement 
caused by the Rattlesnake and Sunlight blocks difficult. In fact, mine 
personnel first noticed cracks in the mill foundation and in soils near the 
mill in April, 1994, several months before the events which shut down the 
mill. But they assumed these cracks were associated with a variety of 
causes other than the mile long and half mile wide landslide which was 
slowly beginning to move. On April, 8, 1994, a consultant evaluating the 
Swimming Pool slide found a crack near the mill complex and assumed it 
was the result of movement in that slide. (Clinch to Marx, Memo, 8/2/94) 
Subsequent cracks in facilities, roads and dump surfaces were deemed 
suspicious, but were thought to be the possible result of heavy traffic or 
adjacent construction. Mine operators attributed a crack in the foundation 
near a leach tank, for instance, to construction of a pit water treatment 
facility nearby. (Creek to Olsen, Letter, 6/24/94) However, by early June 
cracks running several thousand feet in length had appeared in the 
ground and continued to widen. When the vat containing 45,000 gallons of 
cyanide sank and tilted several inches due to movement in the concrete 
foundation beneath, it marked the end of three months of steadily 
more pronounced signals that the mine was on unstable ground. 
A) Cause of the June, 1994 Ground Movement 
At first neither the company nor the state knew what was causing the 
movement, but they both became convinced from geologic testing that the 
slide was occurring along an ancient series of fault lines, similar to a slide 
that had happened thousands of years before. At that time, a buildup of 
eroded material located at the top of the Rattlesnake block had put 
downward pressure on the unstable material beneath, pushing the block 
into a slide. Mine managers unwittingly recreated the same conditions 
which caused the ancient slide by loading the top of the unstable 
Rattlesnake block with 30 million tons of waste rock in the North Dump 
Complex. (Ludwick, Missoulian, 8/3/94) They also removed tons of rock 
from the bottom of the slide area in order to construct a second tailings 
impoundment, thereby increasing the pressure at the top of the unstable 
material while decreasing the support at the base. 
Mine managers and the agencies involved in permitting the mine were 
quick to attribute the inability to predict the movement to a lack of 
information. "Sometimes, there are things that come up that you haven't 
thought about that cause problems," BLM geologist Dave Williams told the 
Missoulian in response to the ground movement. (Ludwick, Missoulian, 
8/3/94) Yet the question remains: why were no stability analyses 
performed before the siting of the waste dumps that caused the slide? Of 
course, hindsight attaches great importance to underlying stability in 
this case, but a thorough understanding of area stability should be part of 
any permitting process. Certainly these analyses should have been 
performed once the Midas slump and Swimming Pool slide occurred. It 
should not take a major landslide to trigger analysis of underlying fault 
lines and slippage areas. Earlier stability analyses would have saved the 
company a great deal of money and eliminated risks to the environment. 
Omission of stability analysis may be one more example of the problems 
which develop with incremental expansion. The Golden Sunlight mine first 
began operations in the late 70s, expecting to process far less ore and 
produce far less waste rock than the operation which encountered 
problems in 1994. Yet the decisions regarding siting of waste rock dumps 
had already been made under earlier, smaller incarnations. Unlike the 
siting of a new mine or new facilities, the state does not have the same 
latitude after the disturbance, be it waste rock dump or open pit, is already 
there. The state must anticipate the change in stability resulting from a 
change in scale for the site, despite the appearance of stability under 
current loads. 
B) Response to the June, 1994 Ground Movement 
As a first response to the settling of the cyanide leaching vat inside the 
mill, the company began draining all the vats in the process circuit, 
pumping the material to the tailings impoundments and then neutralizing 
the tailings impoundments with hydrogen peroxide. The mine also 
constructed earthen containment berms around the mill to contain 
potential cyanide leaks and sealed cracks in the mill's concrete 
foundation with bentonite clay to prevent water entry into the foundation 
(which would have further destabilized the foundation). 
The response serves as a measure of how long an emergency shutdown 
and neutralization takes to complete. The draining of the vats required a 
week to 10 days, while the company continued to run the solution through 
the gold recovery processing equipment before sending it on to the 
impoundments. (Winegar, Inspection Report, 6/15/94) During this period, 
cyanide contaminated tailings and solutions continued to travel down to 
the impoundments through pipes exposed to shifts and shears in the 
sliding ground. Two water lines ruptured and several monitoring wells 
sheared, but no tailings lines broke as a result of the movement. (Scholz to 
Olsen, Letter, 11/18/94) While the vat movement occurred on the 14th of 
June, the company had to order hydrogen peroxide and did not begin 
neutralization of the tailings impoundments until the 17th. Thus it took 
several days to begin neutralizing the impoundments and even longer to 
drain the leaching vats, a period in which the system remained vulnerable 
to ground movement. 
In order to slow the ground movement, the mine began removing waste 
from the dumps at the slide's top and began construction of a buttress at 
the base to restrain movement. The removal needed to be conducted 
quickly, in order to arrest further cracking in the area of the mill. The 
company first requested to remove 7.3 million tons, or 24 percent of the 
total waste placed in the dumps. Later, they upped it to 12. 5 million tons, 
then to 15 million. Movement of the slide slowed as the waste was 
removed and stopped in October when about 8.8 million tons had been 
transferred. (Foster to Olsen, Letter, 12/4/94) But geotechnical analysis 
suggested that additional unloading would provide a margin of safety from 
movement in the future, and the company continued to unload to the full 
15 million tons. 
The removal commenced while stability analyses were ongoing, with 
limited proof that the area where the material would be relocated was 
stable. The initial GSM request for waste rock removal states, "In the 
unlikely event foundation problems are encountered [at the relocation 
site], GSM is prepared to relocate waste rock from this area to a more 
suitable site." (Creek to Olsen, Letter, 6/29/94) Relocation proceeded 
under the aegis of preliminary reports suggesting stability. (Stacey to 
Creek, Preliminary Report, 7/23/94) The final stability analysis for the 
waste rock relocation area northeast of the Midas slump was submitted to 
DSL on December 23, 1994, after the bulk of the material had already 
been placed there. The analysis concluded that the foundation materials 
at the site were sufficiently stable to support 12 million tons of material, 
although correspondence between the mine and DSL from the same time 
mention 15 million tons. (DSL, Written Findings, 1/30/95) 
When relocation began, mine operators did not know how much rock 
needed to be removed, nor did they know how much could be removed 
safely. The material at the top of the slide served to buttress the Midas 
slump. Mine operators were faced with a situation in which removing 
material was necessary to halt one landslide, but the removal of too 
much of the very same material might trigger another landslide. The 
northernmost waste dumps had been built on the Midas slump material. 
Waste dumps further to the south served to buttress these dumps against 
movement. In fact, mine operators had constructed a "Midas Capture 
Dump" at the southernmost extent of the waste dump area, a waste rock 
depository intended to serve as a buttress to prevent the other dumps from 
sliding. But portions of both the southern dumps and the Midas Capture 
Dump were located at the headscarp, or crest, of the Sunlight Block, thus 
creating the downward pressure that caused the June 14 movement. 
Based on their geotechnical analysis of the site, consultants to GSM 
concurred with the decision to unload portions of the Midas Capture Dump 
and backfill behind it. Some of the transfer would result in additional 
loading to the Sunlight Block, whereas other portions would provide the 
chance to unload material from it. (Stacey to Creek, Memo, 10/14/94) The 
final amount transferred represented a compromise between the two 
landslides. The analysis suggested that 14.6 M tons of relocation would 
provide some margin of safety for the Sunlight Block without triggering 
movement in the Midas Slump. According to the technical report prepared 
by the consultants: "Substantial unloading beyond the 14.6 M tons within 
the Sunlight Block headscarp area could possibly lead to relatively 
shallow surface instability of the waste dumps north of the headscarp area. 
Prevention of such shallow failures would require additional unloading 
north of the Sunlight Block headscarp." (Stacey to Creek, Memo, 12/1/94) 
In other words, removing more of the material causing Sunlight Block 
instability would also require removal of unstable waste associated 
with the Midas slump. 
The Rattlesnake Buttress constructed at the base of the Rattlesnake Block 
also had its share of stability related questions. The mine used waste rock 
known to have acid generating potential to construct the buttress, with the 
DSL stipulating that net neutralizing material be employed at the toe of the 
buttress where any acidic seepage would collect. The company 
constructed a drain system underneath the buttress to separate the flow of 
the Bunkhouse spring from the sulfide rich rock. However, both the 
company and the state expected the buttress to continue moving for some 
time after its completion, raising the possibility of a failure in the integrity of 
the buttress, its clay cap, or the drain system (If the buttress moved 
significantly then cracks might appear, allowing air and water access to 
the pyrite, or the drain system might rupture, causing the Bunkhouse 
Spring to trickle through the acid generating rock. The situation would then 
resemble that which occurred at Zortman/Landusky, where a buttress 
constructed of acid generating material developed a myriad of 
contaminated seeps known as the "Weeping Wall"). 
Once construction was complete, the buttress continued to move, at first 
more rapidly than either of the blocks, then slowed. As of January1995, no 
cracks or failures in the integrity of the buttress had been reported. 
Movement in the Rattlesnake block also slowed. 
The DSL found that the mine had fulfilled all state stipulations for 
reopening at the end of January, 1995. Before allowing the mine to 
reopen, the DSL delineated the following goals: 1) Halting of ground 
movement and reasonable assurances that the movement would not 
resume 2) A plan for continued monitoring 3) Shutdown criteria and 
procedures in case of resumed movement, and 4) Procedures for 
prevention of all environmental effects if movement resumes. These four 
goals in turn led to the formulation of the seven stipulations which GSM 
had to fulfill in order to reopen. In addition to the movement of waste 
material described above, the DSL required the company to replace 
pumpback wells below the impoundments should movement shear them 
and provide an emergency containment and detoxification plan for 
cyanide solutions in the mill and impoundments. 
It remains to be seen whether or not the mine's responses to these 
stipulations will actually prove successful in preventing future movement 
and effectively dealing with any movement which does occur. However, 
the stipulations and the mine's responses do illustrate the areas in which 
both the mine and the state saw the need for improvement. The primary 
shortfalls resulted from the fact that neither had planned for ground 
movement. When the first incident occurred, there was no planned 
threshold at which the mine should shut down, thereby allowing potential 
signals of instability to appear for months before closure. There was no 
plan for containment of solutions lost due to ground movement; the mine 
hastily dug an earthen berm around the mill. No detoxification procedure 
had been mapped out for the system, and the one implemented took 
several days to complete. 
The updated plan established criteria for identifying the point at which 
operations must cease due to renewed ground movement. It included 
construction of higher concrete containment walls in the mill, rerouting 
pipelines and laying pipes in lined ditches. (DSL, Written Findings, 
1/30/95) It required a quantity of the neutralizing agents sodium 
hypochlorite, calcium hypochlorite and hydrogen peroxide to be stored in 
sufficient quantities on site to neutralize the 6 million gallons of cyanide 
bearing material in the process circuit. The process solutions would be 
pumped down to the impoundments, which would then be neutralized by 
truckloads of neutralizing agents. 
While the development of emergency plans undoubtedly represents an 
improvement over the lack of planning which characterized the first event, 
certain shortcomings remain. The final stipulation dealing with the 
detoxification of process materials and impoundments retains some 
apparent contradictions and inadequacies. For instance, the plan requires 
the company to keep enough neutralizing agent on site to cope with the 
entire volume of the process solution. Yet it also stated that these solutions 
would drain to the impoundments where "detoxification can be initiated." 
(DSL, Written Findings, 1/30/95) The on site reagent quantity called for by 
the plan is not sufficient to neutralize the ponds, yet the document does not 
specify any other point, such as the mill, where the process solution would 
be neutralized prior to emptying into the ponds. If detoxification is to be 
initiated in the ponds and not before, then presumably the mine 
should keep sufficient quantity on site to detoxify the ponds instead of just 
the process solutions. 
This is especially true since 2 days are required for additional truckloads 
of neutralizing material to reach the site. Although the previous incident 
did not involve the impoundments, this is no guarantee that future 
movements will spare the ponds. In the first case, the toe of the slide 
appeared just above a diversion near the top of Impoundment II. (Foster to 
Olsen, Letter, 7/29/94) Should movement cause a breach in the 
impoundments' walls or liner, a great deal of CN solution could drain away 
before neutralization could begin. 
In addition, DSL incorrectly states that sodium and calcium hypochlorite 
convert cyanide into "inert, stable and harmless compounds." (DSL, 
Written Findings, 1/30/95) The products of the reaction between cyanide 
and these neutralizing agents include highly reactive free chlorine ions 
and salt, both of which are potentially damaging to the environment. DSL 
staff have indicated to other mines (such as the Kendall mine) that they 
consider the products of these reactions to be more toxic to the 
environment than low levels of cyanide, and have requested the use of 
hydrogen peroxide instead. (Frazier, Inspection Report, 5/29/91) The issue 
is relevant since neutralization in essence signifies preparation for a 
release. Were the solution treated with hypochlorite, the released solution 
would not be benign. 
2) Acid Rock Drainage 
A) Waste Rock Characterization 
The EIS for the Golden Sunlight mine, prepared for Amendment 001 in 
1981, identified sulfide bearing materials in the material to be mined, but 
neither the state nor the company anticipated problems with this material 
oxidizing and producing sulfuric acid. The few permit requirements 
designed to prevent oxidation from occurring were not strictly followed. For 
instance, while the company was supposed to keep sulfide materials 
separate from oxidized waste rock dumps and topsoil stockpiles, they 
failed to do so, resulting in the acidification of the oxidized rock and topsoil 
needed for reclamation of the disturbed areas. (Plantenberg to Foster, 
Comments on 1990 Annual Report, 8/26/91) At least 80% of the oxidized 
dumps were contaminated with sulfides. (Plantenberg, Inspection Report, 
3/19/91) 
No references to the acidification issue appear in the document record 
until after the company submitted a proposal for expansion in 1988. In 
preparing the EA on the expansion proposal, DSL requested more 
information on the rock types to be encountered during mining. 
(Plantenberg to Olsen, Memo, 1/31/90) The result was a 1989 report by 
consultant Doug Dollhopf, cited by both Plantenberg and the BLM (I was 
unable to locate it in the records) which concluded that the material to be 
mined had a far greater potential to generate sulfuric acid than either the 
mine or the state had previously believed. Soon after the Dollhopf report 
appeared, DSL inspections began to detail the extent of sulfide oxidation 
occurring in the waste rock dumps. A 1989 inspection, for example, 
observed mine operators moving material in a waste rock dump. The 
inspector stated, "Sulfide oxidation was observed to be actively occurring 
in the top 10-12 feet of the dump in what appeared to be a zone of 
moisture retention, and was evidenced by considerable heat and release 
of sulfur dioxide." (Pagel to Walther, Memo, 4/27/89) 
Based on the Dollhopf report, both the BLM and DSL technical staff 
declared the GSM reclamation plan which was included as part of the 
expansion proposal to be inadequate. (Hadley to Olsen, Letter, 12/12/89) 
However, the DSL had already declared the amendment application to be 
complete, and was already nearing completion of the mitigated EA for the 
expansion. The extent to which revisions to the reclamation plan should 
be made prior to approving the expansion became the focus of 
disagreement within DSL and ultimately one of the central issues in a 
lawsuit filed against the state and the company. 
B) Problems with Acidic Seepage 
Acidic seepage related to mining activities appeared in three locations at 
the mine: the Midas seep, West Dump seep and Ohio adit. Two of the 
seepage areas occurred at the base of unreclaimed waste rock dumps 
loaded with unoxidized pyrite. Mine officials claimed the two waste dump 
seeps only occurred after precipitation events. The seeps include: 
Midas Seep - Seepage appeared in this area after the mine began 
dumping waste rock there in 1984. Prior to 1984, according to mine 
officials, no seeps or surface flow were apparent in the area. (Foster to 
Frazier, Letter, 8/26/93) Although the seepage from the dumps was 
of poor quality, with low pH, high TDS, iron and sulfate concentrations 
suggesting acid rock drainage from the dump, mine officials contended 
that the discharge did not contact state surface or ground waters and did 
not require an MPDES permit. Foster states in a letter to the DHES that 
there are no receiving waters in the vicinity and that any seepage which 
does not evaporate enters the vadose zone, with groundwater levels 200 
feet below the surface.(Foster to Frazier, Letter, 8/26/93) 
The first DSL acknowledgment of the Midas seep's existence and poor 
water quality appears in a 1989 Inspection Report, in which the Inspector 
sampled the seep at the dump toe and found the pH to be 2.7. (Inspection 
Report, 5/4/89) According to mine personnel, the operators had dealt with 
the seepage by constructing earthen retention berms below the dump to 
collect and retain the seepage. (Foster to Frazier, Letter, 8/26/93) The 
issue did not come to the fore, however, until a 1993 inspection revealed 
retention berms to be inadequate. The DSL inspector found about 20 
gallons per minute flowing from seeps at the base of the dump, over a soil 
stripped area and down a dirt road before infiltrating into the ground about 
200 yards away. The acidic discharge was effervescing due to contact with 
carbonate rich soil. A water sample found the pH to be 2.77 and the 
specific conductivity 13,000. (Gurrieri, Inspection Report, 7/29/93) The 
operators responded first by digging additional dozer trenches to retain 
more water and treating the collected seepage with milk of lime. (Foster to 
Frazier, Letter, 8/26/93) As Gurrieri's inspection indicates, however, their 
attempts were not completely successful in containing the acidic seepage. 
In the wake of these events, the mine constructed several 
underdrains at the waste dump to collect the Midas seepage and route it to 
Tailings Impoundment No.2. (DHES Field Investigation Report, 6/7/94) 
On August 10, 1993, the DHES informed the mine that the Midas seep, 
along with three other seeps at the mine, might require MPDES permits for 
discharge to state waters and requested information about the seeps. 
(Fraser to Wilson, letter, 8/10/93) Yet the agency did not inspect the site to 
make a determination until the following June, after several environmental 
organizations sent a notice of intent to file a citizen suit for unpermitted 
discharge at the mine. (DHES Field Investigation Report, 6/7/94) The 
inspection found that the Midas seep drained to ground water, not to state 
surface waters, and therefore no MPDES permit was required. 
Contamination of ground water was a potential concern according to the 
report, but ground water was not the subject of the inspection.(DHES Field 
Investigation Report, 6/7/94) The document record does not indicate any 
further DHES analysis of the contamination question. 
West Dump Seep - In July, 1993, mine operators noted a 1-2 gallon per 
minute seep draining from the toe of the southwest dump complex. Ice was 
present in the temperature stratified dump, and the source of the seepage 
appeared to be melting ice created by a combination of springs buried by 
the dump and high precipitation infiltrating into the dump. The operators' 
1993 report claimed that retention berms below the dump toe contained 
the seepage, and reported the water quality of the discharge to be "near 
neutral pH, low Fe and other metals, and relatively low solids and sulfate." 
(Foster to Frazier, Letter, 8/26/93) However, a July, 1993, DSL 
inspection found that the pond collected the seepage from the dump, 
which then seeped through the retention berm and continued 
downstream. (Gurrieri, Inspection Report, 7/29/93) Gurrieri's follow-up, 
August 3, 1993 inspection found10-15 gallons per minute flowing down an 
iron stained gully from a pond at the base of the dump, suggesting flows 
much greater than company estimates and a viable connection between 
the gully and the contaminated pond. (Gurrieri, Inspection Report, 8/3/93) 
Subsequent evaluations of the West Dump seep offer a more complicated 
view of water quality. The DSL account of the June, 1994 inspection 
describes two water sources at the base of the dump: one a spring 
"flowing as it has been for the past year," and a "small amount of ARD 
(1/10 gpm) contained behind a berm." (Gurrieri, inspection Report, 
6/20/94) The spring, according to Gurrieri, possessed relatively good 
water quality while the seepage water quality was "quite bad." The DHES 
account of the same inspection described the ponded seepage as orange 
in color, with a pH of 2.5-3.5, TDS of 75,000 mg/L, sulfate 51,000 mg/L and 
nitrate 11.2 mg/L, although evaporation in the pond may have affected 
concentrations. (DHES Field Investigation Report, 6/7/94) A series of 
springs issued immediately below the pond from an orange stained area 
which fed into an intermittent drainage. Chemical analysis of this water 
revealed a pH of 6.9, sulfates at 2180 mg/L and TDS at 3510 mg/L. 
The DHES inspection report states that the West Dump seep involved an 
area where state surface waters(i.e., the springs) flowed; such waters are 
subject to water quality standards and the discharge permit 
requirement. Yet the DHES report does not state that an MPDES permit 
for the seepis required, nor does it recognize any violation of water quality 
standards which might be occurring as a result of the acid rock drainage 
from the mine. 
By the time DHES inspectors arrived, no connection between the pond 
and the springs was visible, and thus the agency could only state, "the toe 
pond is at a higher elevation than the spring and could reasonably be 
expected to affect the quality of this spring through seepage." (DHES Field 
Investigation Report, 6/7/94) The sulfate and TDS levels of the springs 
were eight and seven times higher than the state water quality standards 
of 250 mg/L and 500 mg/L respectively (The report presumably refers to 
Federal Drinking Water Standards, since secondary MCLs for these two 
contaminants are not explicitly stated in Montana Water Quality 
Standards). But no baseline data for the spring had ever been collected 
by the company, and therefore the DHES report states that "given the lack 
of baseline data it may not be possible to determine, with any certainty, the 
impact to these springs." Complicating matters, the report cites the poor 
quality of other springs in the area which may not be impacted by mining 
and may therefore approximate a baseline for the West Dump springs. 
Sulfate and TDS levels in the West Dump spring, the report states, may be 
consistent with normal levels for the area. 
Ohio Adit -The Ohio adit discharged acid rock drainage from historic 
underground mining in the GSM permitted area. A capture system 
collected the discharge and routed it to the impoundment until 1994, 
when mining in the pit intersected and continued below the adit, causing 
the discharge to dry up at the previous location. 
C) Causes of Seepage Problems 
The Failure of Capture and Pumpback Systems The history of the Ohio 
adit's capture system illustrates the inadequacy of collecting seepage, 
using systems intended to collect and pump the contaminated water into 
the mine circuit. On separate occasions in 1990 and 1993, mine 
inspectors found the Ohio adit system plugged with sediment and the 
contaminated water running over land. In March1990, DHES inspectors 
reported that the culvert which normally routed the acid mine drainage to 
the tailings line had been plugged with adit material several weeks earlier. 
(Bugosh, Inspection Report, 3/20/90) Again on May 3, 1990, DSL 
inspectors found the collection system plugged and the discharge flowing 
into an unplugged exploration drill hole 25 feet from the portal. The drill 
hole, the report states, could have the potential to discharge to the 
underlying aquifer. (DSL Inspection Report, 8/22/90) In both cases the 
operators cleaned out the collection system, but not before contaminated 
water had discharged, and the problem recurred. Gurrieri's July, 1993 
inspection found the Ohio Adit discharge containment system inoperable 
due to a clogged pipe under the road. About 30 gallons per minute of 
acidified water were flowing over land. (Gurrieri, Inspection Report, 
7/29/93) 
The Midas seep collection system, completed in 1994, has 
encountered similar problems. An August, 1994 inspection found mine 
operators mucking out the Midas Capture System. (DSL Inspection 
Report, 8/4/94) After a storm, the capture system had plugged with 
sediment and overtopped. The inspector, having arrived some time after 
the storm, observed the flow escaping the capture system at 6 gallons per 
minute. 
No Stormwater Diversions - In a 1993 letter to DHES, GSM suggests 
abnormally high levels of precipitation are the cause of seeps which 
appeared beneath the waste dumps and the tailings impoundment. 
(Foster to Frazier, Letter, 8/26/93) However, the blame for seeps and 
sediment problems lies squarely with the mine, not wet weather. 
Numerous field inspection reports document the mine's failure to 
adequately divert storm water and control sedimentation in the area 
through 1994. Undiverted storm water ponded on the top of waste rock 
dumps and infiltrated into the piles of rock to react with the acid generating 
waste. (Gurrieri, 7/29/93) It washed away topsoil and mulch placed on top 
of the waste dump in an attempt at reclamation. (DSL Inspection Report, 
9/15/94) Seeps appeared at the toes of the waste dumps after heavy rains, 
in part because storm water was flowing into the waste dumps. 
(Plantenberg, Annual Tour Report, 8/13/93) 
The August, 1993 DHES letter characterizing these seeps as potential 
discharges in need of MPDES permits triggered an interest in diversion 
construction. (DHES Field Investigation Report, 6/7/94) An August, 1993 
DSL report states, "GSM has finally realized the need to control run-
on water. They are reviewing the overall mine drainage patterns and have 
begun to divert water to manage some operational drainage problems. 
Runoff water from recent rainfall may have a direct correlation with the 
seeps because of the lack of operational diversions." (Plantenberg, 
Annual Tour Report, 8/13/93) Yet by 1994, these operational diversions 
were only partially in place, and the waste rock dumps which the mine 
operators had re-soiled in preparation for seeding rilled badly and spread 
sediment down the drainages below the dumps. (DSL Inspection Report, 
9/15/94) The inspector observed other, similar problem areas "visible by 
the trails of sediment spread down the hills by the storm event." 
The sediment flowed freely because the mine had not installed any 
sediment capture structures or implemented any sediment control best 
management practices. (DHES Field Investigation Report, 6/7/94) The 
clogging of the Midas Capture System, therefore, should not be blamed on 
the storm. The system clogged because a storm predictably produced 
runoff and the mine had no structures in place to prevent erosion and 
sedimentation. 
3) Cyanide leaks 
The Golden Sunlight mine leaked approximately 19 million gallons of 
cyanide solution from Tailings Impoundment I between 1983 and 1984. 
Neither DSL nor DHES took any action against the company for 
contaminating groundwater. In fact, company documents indicate that both 
the company and DSL expected relatively small amounts of seepage from 
the impoundment from the start. The cyanide plume has continued to * ^ 
spread underground, and the impoundment has continued to leak. State 
officials and mine personnel now plan to treat seepage from the 
impoundment forever. 
A) Unlined Impoundment Leaks Cyanide In February, 1983, GSM 
commissioned the use of Talings Impoundment I. The unlined 
impoundment was constructed on supposedly impermeable bedrock, but 
the cyanide solution immediately began to leak down through 
underground alluvial gravel channels, under a cut-off wall intended to 
prevent groundwater migration out of the impoundment, and out into the 
surrounding aquifier. April, 1983 monitoring reports indicated a significant 
rise in cyanide levels down gradient of the cut-off wall. (GSM, Plan of 
Action, 7/85) Subsequently, cyanide began to appear in wells used by two 
ranch families down gradient from the mine. The mine provided an 
alternative water supply, but in January, 1987 the families threatened to 
sue. (Hemmer to Black, Findings, 5/22/87) The mine company decided to 
avoid further complaint by purchasing the family ranches. 
In a 1985 Plan of Action, the company attributed the leak to "errors made 
during the initial construction of the bentonite slurry cut-off wall" which 
"resulted in portions of the wall not being propoerly keyed into the 
underlying relatively impermeable Bozeman Foundation." (GSM, Plan of 
Action, 7/85) The Plan of Action indicates that the company and DSL 
expected the wall to leak one to five gallons per minute of groundwater 
contaminated by cyanide, but that when the impoundment was filled, 
far larger quantities began bypassing the wall. 
In response, the company installed a series of pumpback wells 
downstream of the cut-off wall and along the eastern edge of the 
impoundment. Water levels declined in monitoring wells down gradient of 
the eastern flank of the impoundment. But another monitoring well, to the 
south of the impoundment, began to show a rise in water quantity and 
cyanide concentrations. The company stated that the cyanide tainted 
water could still be migrating through the buried channel, or" a more direct 
pathway may exist from the impoundment." (GSM, Plan of Action, 7/85) 
The company did not determine the actual cause of the seepage. The plan 
of action stated that despite company dewatering and pumpback efforts, "it 
is not certain that an absolute physical and hydraulic barrier to southward 
groundwater movement exists." (GSM, Plan of Action, 7/85) 
The problem in determining the cause or causes of seepage lay in the fact 
that most of the area involved was already covered with tailings. Rather 
than identify and rectify the cause of the problem, the company chose to 
control contamination through pumpback. GSM did not propose tailings 
removal to rectify construction problems with the cut-off wall and identify 
other potential pathways. Nor did it propose contructing another, lined 
impoundment and moving the tailings there. DSL concurred with the 
company's plan of action, and did not pursue a Notice of Noncompliance 
for the possibly faulty construction of the cut-off wall. The DHES did not 
pursue any fines for the contamination of groundwater. To date, no 
hydrologic study of the movement of the cyanide contaminated 
ground water has been completed. 
Unfortunately, the 1985 Plan of Action was inadequate, and cyanide 
continued to migrate via unknown pathways out of the impoundment and 
into the surrounding groundwater. Both the DSL and DHESnoted 
probable leakage areas in inspection reports, but no enforcement actions 
were ever taken against the company. For example, an August, 1993 DSL 
inspection report states "CN seepage [from the impoundment] has 
probably been occurring for awhile. Catails at impoundment toe prove this 
theory." (Gurrieri, Inspection Report, 8/13/93) Similarly, a 1992 inspection 
report describes a visit to the "leaking" impoundment. During the visit, Fess 
Foster described two alluvial channel systems beneath the impoundment, 
one consisting of old river channels in the upper section of the 
impoundment, and the other a larger and more distinct channel in the 
lower portion called the Bozeman Formation. Both had created cyanide 
plumes in the groundwater, but the Bozeman cyanide plume remained 
uncontrolled and the extent of the contamination remained unclear. 
(Snyder, Inspection Report, 1/27/92) To date, no hydrogeologic studies 
have been completed to characterize the movement of cyanide in the 
groundwater surrounding the mine. 
B) Groundwater Seepage Mixes with Permeable Impoundment 
On August 2, 1993, mine operators discovered two seeps issuing just 
downgradient from the Tailings Pond No.1 embankment. The water flowed 
down to a man made catchment pond in the drainage, which was 
discharging into an overflow pipe down into an intermittent stream 
which runs into the Jefferson River. Hach tests found the cyanide content 
of the water in the pond to be 3 ppm, but the cyanide content of the seeps 
ranged from 10-89 ppm total cyanide. (Foster to Fraser, Letter, August 26, 
1993) The state water quality standard for cyanide is 0.02 ppm total. In 
response, the mine plugged the overflow pipe, added sodium hypochlorite 
to the catchment pond to neutralize cyanide in the trapped solution and 
installed a pump to move water back to a lined pond intended to collect 
seepage. (Foster to Fraser, Letter, August 26, 1993) However, the seeps 
had been flowing down into the catchment pond and then on into the 
intermittent drainage at a rate of 10 gallons per minute for an 
undetermined length of time before these measures were taken. 
Initially, mine operators suspected a break in the pipes designed to pump 
seepage back into the impoundment. (Foster to Fraser, Letter, August 26, 
1993) However, no ruptures were found in the excavated pipes. The 
mine's 1993 report to the DHES describes the source as "shallow ground 
water movement in alluvial material coming in contact with the southwest 
corner of the embankment." "Abnormally high" precipitation recharged 
seeps and caused the water movement, the report claims, but it also 
mentions "the abnormally high water volume and head in the tailing 
impoundment may have also contributed to the seepage." (Foster to 
Fraser, Letter, August 26, 1993) 
A 1993 DSL report states the probable cause as storm water inundating a 
cyanide contaminated area of ground and then flowing through the ground 
to the embankment. (Plantenberg, Inspection Report, 8/13/93) The 
area had been used for tailings storage for one day in 1986. The report 
also suggests that although mine operators downplayed the Impoundment 
as a seepage source because its water levels remained at expected (as 
high as expected given the abnormal amount of precipitation) levels, "a 
rocky outcrop area near the west end of the impoundment is probably also 
a major leak area from the impoundment which could be feeding the seep 
area." Presumably the rocky outcrop within the unlined impoundment 
served as a conduit for solution to seep down beneath the impoundment, 
mix with groundwater and flow out under the impoundment berms. 
When the DHES inspected the seepage area the following year, they did 
not mention the tailings storage area, instead citing high groundwater 
levels in the area mixing with solutions in the tailings impoundment and 
then flowing out at the base of the embankment. (DHES Inspection Report, 
6/7/94) Rather than an isolated incident, this situation resembles previous 
episodes in which cyanide solutions migrated through the permeable 
ground beneath the unlined impoundment. The problem, once again, was 
that ground water could enter and exit the impoundment. The mine 
installed another series of pumpback wells near the Southwest corner of 
the impoundment, lowering the water table and drying up the seeps. But 
the discharge had already impacted not only ground water, but state 
surface waters as well. 
During the 1994 inspection, DHES staff found 3-5 gallons per minute 
flowing in the intermittent drainage downstream of the impoundment, 
enough to constitute a state surface water. Thus, as the report states, 
the seepage from the impoundment during the previous summer 
represented a discharge to state waters, since cyanide contaminated 
water exited the containment pond through the overflow pipe and flowed 
down the drainage. According to the DHES report, "the impacts of these 
discharges are unknown." (DHES Inspection Report, 6/7/94) 
Yet the DHES recommended no violation for the escape of cyanide 
solution from the impoundment. The report states that GSM's pumpback 
measures corrected the problem and "should prevent future discharges in 
this location." (DHES Inspection Report, 6/7/94) The pumpback wells may 
have stopped seepage in that section of the embankment, but the fact 
remains that they were not the first instance of cyanide migrating from the 
impoundment. Since 1983, the mine had installed pumpback wells near 
other parts of the impoundment to control contamination in those areas as 
well, only to have seepage occur in yet another portion of the 
impoundment. The more intractable problem which the agency failed to 
address was not the particular seeps but the lack of an adequate liner. The 
discharge of cyanide solutions to state waters without an MPDES permit 
was a violation of Montana water quality laws, and should have resulted in 
prompt enforcement action. 
In a similar vein, no violation appears in the DSL records in connection 
with leaks from the impoundment caused by the rocky outcropping, nor do 
any requests for remediation appear. No DSL violation appears for the 
storage of cyanide contaminated tailings on unlined ground, which DSL 
inspectors hypothesized as a source of contamination in ground 
water. Both are clear violations of the DSL administered mining permit, 
and should have caused the agency to issue notices of noncompliance. 
4) Spills of Contaminated Tailings 
In the weeks following the 1994 ground movement which shut down the 
mine, the state conducted several inspections of the site. While inspecting 
potential rerouting lines for surface water, DSL inspectors discovered 
numerous areas where the lines which conveyed tailings to the tailings 
impoundments had broken or spilled finely ground ore and cyanide 
contaminated solution onto the ground. (Plantenberg, report, 6/21/94) 
Tailings from several of the spills had migrated downhill along two minor 
drainages for as far as a quarter mile. None of the spills had been reported 
to the state. 
Inspectors identified one major spill of 45 tons of tailings and an equal 
amount of solution from the line. The spill appeared to have occurred 
during the preceding fall or early spring, but the mine had not cleaned up 
the spill by June, 1994, when inspectors discovered it. The state issued a 
Notice of Noncompliance to the company both for failing to notify the state 
and for not cleaning up the spill immediately. A GSM press release, 
responding to the notice, called the spill an "isolated incident," caused by 
a truck gouging the pipe. Yet follow-up DSL inspections revealed 
numerous, recurring spills at different points all along the line. For 
instance, inspectors found areas such as the "bleed off air riser," which 
"obviously spills a small amount of tailings every time the line is bled." 
(DSL Inspection Report, 6/28/94) At another spot along the line, 
inspectors found "a little spill that had occurred since last week's visit." 
Overall, inspectors found nine areas where spills had taken place, several 
repeatedly over time. They found areas where tails had been partially 
cleaned up with a backhoe and grader, but tailings remained under the 
pipe where the equipment couldn't reach. 
Thus the Notice of Noncompliance inadequately addressed the spills as a 
single incident when in fact the problem had occurred repeatedly without 
the company notifying the state or cleaning up the spills. A BLM rendering 
of the June 28, 1994 inspection calls managing the spills a 
"housekeeping/education undertaking," since the quantities of cyanide 
contaminated material are relatively small and can be shoveled up and 
taken down to the impoundment. (BLM Inspection Report, 6/28/94) An 
article on the spill quotes the mine's environmental manager as stating 
that the largest spill could not have contaminated groundwater because it 
was upgradient of the tailings pond, which would have captured any 
downhill flow. (Whitehall Ledger, Article, 7/21/94) 
However, these spills may not be as innocuous as these statements 
suggest. In 1993, the company investigated cyanide contaminated 
seepage issuing from the containment wall of the Impoundment. 
Ultimately, they attributed the seeps to cyanide migration under and 
around the impoundment from the temporary storage of cyanide laced tails 
on unlined ground upgradient of the tailings impoundment. ( Plantenberg, 
Memo, 8/11/93) In other words, the situation was very similar to the spills 
of tailings onto the ground under the tailings lines. The path of 
cyanide contaminated material along unlined routes cannot be strictly 
controlled or predicted, so we should question the view that repeated, 
neglected and unreported tailings spills should be regarded as routine 
maintenance events unworthy of enforcement actions or fines. 
5) Wildlife deaths 
Environmental Impact Statements on mining proposals often scrutinize the 
expected impacts to local wildlife populations, so one might expect wildlife 
mortalities to be a top state priority and the focus of stringent enforcement. 
Yet the Golden Sunlight mine's record indicates that the state responded 
to wildlife deaths with lax enforcement, no reporting requirements and 
inadequate prevention measures. The agency expected to identify wildlife 
problems during inspections is not the same agency charged with 
protecting wildlife, the Dept. of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, but the agency 
expected to ensure compliance with the mining permit, the Department of 
State Lands. 
In approving Golden Sunlight's expansion in 1981, the state apparently 
concluded that fencing of the proposed Tailings Impoundment would be 
sufficient to protect wildlife. The state did not anticipate wildlife mortality 
and therefore neglected to include any requirement to record, report and 
redress wildlife mortality. As a result, no reports of wildlife deaths appear 
in the record for six years after the mine commissioned Tailings 
Impoundment No. 1 in 1982 to store cyanide contaminated rock and 
solution. 
Not only does the state not compel the company to report wildlife deaths, 
but the state agency charged with inspecting the site does not look for 
wildlife mortalities. The Department of State Lands standard inspection 
form includes a checklist of areas to be evaluated during an inspection, 
including reclamation, disturbance, water quality and road construction, 
but no wildlife related issues such as fencing or mortalities. Consequently, 
when the state discovered dead wildlife it was by accident while 
inspecting other aspects of the mine. In 1988, Pat Plantenberg requested 
an inspection of the reclamation trials at the mine. His two page report 
notes at the very end that "a dead deer was observed floating in the 
impoundment adjacent to the reclamation trials." (Inspection Report, 
Plantenberg, 5/27/88) 
No Notices of Noncompliances have been filed regarding wildlife 
mortalities at the site, despite clear evidence of negligence on the part of 
the operator. Plantenberg's report requests a statement from the mine 
indicating what was done about the dead deer, but does not mention the 
possibility of a Notice of Noncompliance for failing to comply with mine 
fencing requirements. Yet a DSL letter to the mine from the same period 
refers to an August, 1988 inspection by another state agency, the Solid 
and Hazardous Waste Bureau, which found numerous deer tracks passing 
through an open gate leading to the impoundment, a clear violation of the 
requirement that the impoundment be enclosed with fencing. 
(Strazdas to GSM, letter, 8/31/88) 
Subsequent documents suggest that the gates continued to be left open 
until three more deer drowned in the mine's impoundments during the fall 
of 1992. The company, not the state, discovered and voluntarily reported 
the mortalities, to which DSL responded by calling for a joint inspection 
with FWP for October 22, 1992. The two agency accounts of that 
inspection offer two different perspectives on the mine's wildlife protection 
measures. The DSL inspection report mentions two problems: a 200 meter 
gap in the fence removed due to construction in the vicinity and a gate with 
too great a gap between it and the ground. (Plantenberg to File, Memo, 
10/23/92) The group found that in response to the deaths, the mine had 
installed a single strand of electric fence around the pond, placed an 
additional water trough outside the fence and added a strip of rug on top of 
the pond's synthetic liner to help deer scramble out of the impoundment. 
The DSL report notes that the group concluded these measures would 
probably be ineffective, and instead suggested closing the gap in the 
fence with temporary fencing. Yet the DSL report went on to say that the 
group found the mine had taken adequate measures in response to the 
deaths and thus no compliance violations were warranted. The DSL 
memo does not refer to the previous deer death, nor does it mention gates 
left open as a potential source of deer access. 
On the other hand, the FWP version of the same inspection takes an 
entirely different tone. The FWP letter to the mine states that "this [the three 
deaths] is not the first time an incident of this nature has occurred" 
and concludes that the deaths occurred due to company negligence in 
three areas. (Wells to Scharf, letter, 11/2/92) The letter mentions not only 
the missing fence and gap beneath the gate, but also states, . . gates 
entering the impoundment area are apparently periodically left open." The 
letter also asserts that unless the company corrects these areas, the 
leaching ponds could be subject to civil penalties as a public nuisance, 
and the failure to prevent more deaths could be prosecuted as criminal 
mischief under the law. The operator responded by installing temporary 
fencing and sealing the gap beneath the gate. (Scharf to Carlsen, letter, 
10/30/92) 
Bird mortality in the impoundment only comes to light in the files when the 
mine volunteers to submit reports of bird deaths to the DSL. In a 1991 
letter, mine manager D.J. Wilson states that although no official permit 
stipulation requires it, he will record and report bird deaths to the DSL. 
Wilson relates that he has been recording mortalities at the impoundment 
since 1989. (Wilson to Plantenberg, 9/19/91 letter) The letter lists 131 bird 
deaths occurring between the Fall of 1989 and the Fall of 1991, all of 
which occurred without DSL acknowledgment or response. During the 10 
year period beginning with the Impoundment's commissioning through the 
company's decision to report bird deaths, state inspectors did not note a 
single bird mortality at the mine. 
Even after the company began to report continuing bird deaths to the state, 
the state did not demand that the company take the step known to ensure 
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prevention: netting the impoundment. The state had the opportunity to 
address bird poisonings in the 1990 permit amendment allowing 
expansion to a second tailings impoundment. The National Wildlife 
Federation lawsuit makes two valid points on this issue: 1), that the state 
was aware of three swan deaths in the impoundment as early as 1988, 
and 2), that netting tailings impoundments had proven successful at 
providing zero mortality at similar mines in Nevada (Knowles, Affadavit) 
Instead, the state accepted the mine position that "because of the 
constantly changing size and shape of the impoundment, we do not 
believe this [netting] is feasible. It is not a question of cost but a question of 
effectiveness. The problem with shorebirds would probably remain." 
(Wilson to Plantenberg, letter, 9/19/91) The state allowed the company to 
continue experimenting with various hazing techniques, a strategy the 
company had been pursuing for an unspecified length of time. 
Despite intensified efforts, birds continued to die in the impoundment. Up 
until 1989, the mine used loud rock music and propane cannons. Although 
the files do not contain evidence of avian mortality, the company chose to 
hire a "duck guard" in 1989 to patrol the pond area and haze away birds 
with a shotgun and fireworks. The following year the company hired a 
second duck guard and commissioned a houseboat to haze birds away 
and retrieve poisoned birds to be revived. Fifty birds died during the year 
that the state released its Record of Decision approving an additional 
impoundment without netting; 83 died in the following year. None of the 
hazing methods employed were able to reach shallow areas and 
shorelines where shorebirds landed and died. The mine continued to 
experiment, purchasing first a radio controlled aircraft and then a 
hovercraft to patrol the shallows. With sixty two bird deaths occurring in 
impoundment I in 1992, the company stated in its 1992 Annual Report that 
"the plan for Impoundment No. 2 bird and wildlife access control will be 
similar in most respects to the current plan for Impoundment No. 1 which 
was modified after the recent bird mortalities." (GSM Annual Report, 3/92) 
The 1992 deaths occurred after the state requested "immediate action" 
and a remedial action plan j'as soon as possible," going so far as to 
mention a "potential noncompliance." (Plantenberg to Foster, comments, 
8/26/91) 
The trouble with hazing techniques is that they do not offer blanket, 
constant prevention. In order to drive away the birds, the equipment must 
be working and the staff must be present to operate it. When the 
equipment breaks, or the staff is not there because no migratory activity is 
predicted, birds can still land and perish. According to GSM, the sixty two 
bird deaths in 1992 occurred during the late summer when the operator, 
anticipating little bird activity in the area, pulled the houseboat out of the 
pond for repairs. (Scharf to Plantenberg, letter, 3/26/93) In addition, hazing 
techniques rely on the staff seeing birds before they land on the pond, 
which might prove difficult at night. 
6) Expansion 
The Golden Sunlight mine received its first permit in 1975. In 1980 the 
mine proposed to expand operations significantly, which the agencies 
(DSL and BLM) approved after preparing an Environmental Impact 
Statement. In 1988, GSM submitted an expansion proposal which 
would extend the life of the mine, scheduled to conclude in 1993, through 
the year 2005. Plans indicated the mine would produce 50 million tons of 
tailings and 300 million tons of waste rock during the additional life of the 
mine. The expansion also called for increasing the size of the pit and 
building'a second tailings impoundment. (BLM, Draft Statement, 3/26/92) 
The agencies (DSL and BLM) chose to prepare an Environmental 
Assessment for the expansion instead of the more comprehensive 
Environmental Impact Statement. The Environmental Assessment 
recognized that significant impacts to the environmental would result from 
the expansion as proposed. Therefore the agencies, when issuing their 
Record of Decision granting the expansion, attached 31 stipulations 
intended to mitigate the potential impacts and reduce them to 
insignificance. DSL retroactively changed the conclusions of the final EA 
to state that significant impacts would occur unless the state required 
mitigation. The mine completed construction of the second tailings 
impoundment and began mining under the expanded terms of the 
amended permit. 
Several environmental groups, including the National Wildlife Federation 
and the Montana Environmental Information Center, first appealed the 
BLM's role in the decision to the Interior Board of Land Appeals, then filed 
suit in district court against the mine and DSL claiming violations of state 
mining laws, MEPA regulations and the Montana constitution. (NWF vs. 
DSL and GSM, Complaint, 3/30/92) In September, 1994, Judge Thomas 
Honzel ruled that the state had violated Montana mining law, MEPA 
regulations and the state constitution. (Honzel, Memorandum and Order, 
9/1/94) Honzel remanded the permit back to DSL for preparation of an EIS 
and compliance with Montana Mining law, although he stopped short of 
compelling the mine to comply with the Montana constitution by reclaiming 
their already extant open pit. 
A) Reclamation 
The reclamation plan proposed by GSM as part of the proposed 
expansion sparked controversy both within the agency charged with 
permitting the mine and among environmental groups fighting the 
expansion. The state allowed the mine to use increasingly steep slopes in 
its site reclamation. A more gentle slope angle requires a great deal more 
grading, soil cover and work on the part of the company, but it lessens the 
chance of topsoil erosion, mine waste exposure and reclamation failure. 
By 1989, initially proposed slope angles of 6.7 horizontal to 1 vertical had 
been reduced to 2:1 in successive mine permit revisions. (Honzel, 
Memorandum and Order, 9/1/94) 
In the initial EIS and the first expansion EIS, acid generation was not 
anticipated to be a problem. As part of the EA for the proposed second 
expansion, the mine commissioned a study of the waste rock. Meanwhile, 
the DSL completed a draft EA for the proposal based on the expectation 
that waste rock and ore for the site were pH neutral. (Hard Rock Technical 
Staff to Olsen, Memo, 1/23/90) The Dollhopf report on waste rock 
characteristics, which appeared in October, 1989, showed that the 
assumptions upon which the DSL had based reclamation 
requirements were completely wrong. Waste rock and tailings at the site 
had far more acid generating potential than previously thought, and would 
require a number of measures to prevent acid mine drainage and fulfill 
vegetative reclamation requirements. 
As a result, the previously amended and approved reclamation plan for 
both waste rock dumps and tailings impoundments, was doomed to fail. 
(Hadley to Olsen, Letter, 12/12/89) In the opinion of the DSL's own 
technical staff, the proposed reclamation plan for the expansion included 
in the draft EA would fail also. (Hard Rock Technical Staff to Olsen, 
Memo, 1/23/90) DSL inspectors had already found waste rock oxidizing in 
the waste rock dumps, generating hot sulfur dioxide gas and steam. 
(Pagel to Walther, Memo, 4/27/89) Now the observed conditions were 
known to be only preliminary indications of far worse to come in the 
dumps. The technical staff recommended a revised waste rock dump plan 
with at least 3:1 slopes, a cap of neutral waste rock and accurate 
inventories of oxidized and unoxidized soil and rock at the site in addition 
to previous requirements. (Plantenberg, 1/31/90) 
Yet the DSL administration continued to negotiate with the company over 
reclaimed slope angles, since the company held firm to the desire to 
reclaim slopes to a 2:1 angle. The administration position met with internal 
resistance. A letter signed by six DSL technical staff expressed strong 
disagreement with the administration's position and stated, "to permit 
reclamation of 2h:1v slopes, either outright or by "test plot" permitting, 
would not be responsible representation of both industry and public ( 
interests." (Hard Rock Technical Staff to Olsen, Memo, 1/23/90) The memo 
concluded with a recommendation that the agency abandon discussion of 
2:1 slopes with the company. Patrick Plantenberg in a subsequent memo 
states, "we don't allow other operations to test the feasibility of reclamation 
without an acceptable reclamation plan in hand. It is time to insist on a 
stringent, detailed reclamation plan." (Plantenberg, 2/21/90) According to 
Plantenberg, the mine has a history of failed test plot reclamation. Since 
1Q84, the sole reclamation effort on GSM waste rock dumps consisted of 
one test plot, which was hydromulched and seeded in 1986. The 
reclamation effort failed, and the company applied no further research to 
resolve the problem. (Plantenberg, 2/21/90) 
The final EA for the expansion contains numerous references to the 
expected failure of the 2:1 reclamation as proposed, including statements 
that the reclamation of Impoundment 2 is "bound to fail," and that 
reclamation failure of the waste rock dumps "can be assumed." (Wilson, 
Brief in Support of Alternative Writ of Mandate, 3/30/92) Despite predicting 
reclamation failure in the final EA, and over the repeated objections of its 
own technical staff, DSL allowed the mine to conduct reclamation using 
2:1 test plots while bonding for 3:1 plots in case of failure. However, the 
state did attach 31 stipulations to its Record of Decision approving the 
plan, many of which required additional monitoring and research to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the approved reclamation methods. 
Several environmental organizations filed suit against the DSL, 
arguing in part that the agency's failure to abide by its own staff's 
professional reservations, coupled with a reliance on a post approval 
study, violated MEPA. This issue will be discussed at length in the section 
below. The groups also alleged that the omission of the pit from 
reclamation consideration was a violation of the Montana constitution, 
which states that "all lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources 
must be reclaimed to a beneficial and productive use." (Honzel, 
Memorandum and Order, 9/1/94) 
Judge Honzel found in favor of the plaintiffs. Both the Montana 
Constitution and the MMRA require the reclamation of all lands disturbed 
during mining to the extent feasible. DSL should therefore have at least 
considered whether or not reclamation of the open pit was feasible, 
Honzel said, but no discussion of the feasibility matter appears in the EA. 
Honzel went one step further, however, in declaring the MMRA in conflict 
with the Montana Constitution. The Constitution requires all lands to be 
reclaimed, while the MMRA makes an exception for unfeasible cases, and 
specifically mentions open pits. The judge stopped short of interpreting the 
implications of this conflict, which might include ordering all mines to abide 
by the Constitution. Honzel acknowledged that mines like Golden Sunlight 
had been operating for years under the assumption that their open pits 
would not have to be reclaimed, and reclamation of the GSM pit might not 
be feasible at the time of the his decision. 
B) EA vs. EIS 
One of the central issues of the lawsuit involved the requirements of the 
state law known as Montana Environmental Protection Act, MEPA, which 
is modeled on the federal National Environmental Protection Act. 
Argument focused on whether DSL, in its preparation of an Environmental 
Assessment instead of an Environmental Impact Statement, had violated 
MEPA. As the plaintiff's counsel put it: "Whether the EA in this instance met 
the requirements for mitigated EAs is at the heart of this mandamus 
action." (Wilson, Brief for Alternative Writ of Mandate, 3/30/92) The state 
contended that its preparation of a "mitigated EA" precluded the need for 
an EIS. The plaintiffs argued that the state's mitigated EA inadequately 
addressed the environmental issues involved and therefore failed to fulfill 
MEPA. 
State and federal agencies must initiate the NEPA process for any 
proposed government action with potential environmental impacts. The 
requirements are strict; under MEPA, when the agency considers an 
action "which may significantly impact the environment," it must prepare an 
EIS. (Honzel, Memorandum and Order, 9/1/94) An EIS must include a 
detailed statement on the environmental impact of the action, any adverse 
environmental effects which cannot be avoided, alternatives to the 
proposed action, a consideration of short term uses versus long term 
interests and any irreversible commitments of resources involved. Justice 
Honzel described the EA, on the other hand, as a "less exhaustive 
environmental review" prepared for activities which do not constitute major 
state actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment. (Honzel, Memorandum and Order, 9/1/94) 
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In this case, the agencies sought to utilize what is known as a "mitigated 
EA" instead of an EIS. The plaintiff's side described the mitigated EA as 
follows: 
"The agency may, as an alternative to preparing an EIS, prepare an EA 
whenever the action is one that might normally require and (sic) EIS, but effects 
which might otherwise be deemed significant appear to be mitigable below the 
level of significance through design, or enforceable controls or stipulations or 
both imposed by the agency .... For an EA to suffice in this instance, the 
agency must determine that all of the impacts of the proposed action have 
been accurately identified, that they will be mitigated below the level of 
significance, and that no significant impact is likely to occur." (Wilson, citing 
ARM 26.2.643 (4), Brief for Alternative Writ of Mandate, 3/30/92) 
The plaintiff's counsel argued that the state should have included its 
stipulations for public review in the final EA rather than attaching them to 
the Record of Decision allowing the expansion. They also maintained that 
the state's stipulations were in fact requirements for monitoring problems 
and evaluating ways to alleviate impacts, whereas MEPA requires a 
concrete description of actual steps to be taken to reduce impacts to 
insignificance. (Honzel, Memorandum and Order, 9/1/94) A BLM 
description of the Record of Decision substantiates their claim. "The 
environmental assessment did not resolve some of the questions related 
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to the issues. Consequently, the operating permit, which was issued 
on July 9, 1990 included stipulations for monitoring many of the 
parameters which will enable the mine and regulatory agencies to 
determine measures which prove effective in assuring ultimate 
reclamation is successful." (BLM, Draft Statement, 03/26/92) Without 
knowing what the mitigating actions would be, the plaintiffs asserted, the 
state could not guarantee that the impacts would be mitigated. 
Justice Honzel agreed with the environmental organizations that the 
stipulations did not necessarily alleviate significant environmental impacts, 
and therefore the mitigated EA was insufficient in replacing the EIS. The 
attachment of stipulations to the final EA was not in itself a violation of law, 
but their insufficiency constituted an "arbitrary and capricious" action on 
the part of the state. In his decision, Honzel cited the DSL's own lack of 
conviction: "In this case, DSL stated merely that the 31 permit stipulations 
were believed to preclude' significant environmental impacts, and that 
potential impacts 'have been minimized to the extent reasonable and 
feasible.' (Honzel, Memorandum and Order, 9/1/94) He said the agency 
had failed to offer sufficient explanation of how the stipulations could be 
expected to render impacts insignificant. According to Honzel, the DSL 
could not legally substitute post licensing study for the analysis and proof 
of insignificance MEPA requires before activities may proceed. "MEPA 
does not permit this kind of approve-now, ask-questions-later kind of 
approach."(Honzel, Memorandum and Order, 9/1/94) 
C) Pit Fills with Water and Requires Treatment Forever 
One controversial aspect of the expansion application involved the 
disposal and treatment of water flowing into the open pit, possibly forever. 
In the EA, GSM predicted that water quantity and quality in the open pit 
would stabilize after 400 years, creating a 40 acre lake with an inflow of 
two gallons per minute. DSL calculated that the inflow figure might be 
closer to four gallons per minute, and stated in the EA that GSM's 
assumptions regarding water flows were not substantiated by data. 
(Honzel, Memorandum and Order, 9/1/94) In order to deal with the 
accumulation of potentially contaminated water in the pit, the mine 
committed to constructing a water treatment facility and treating water from 
the pit into perpetuity if necessary. The DSL, using a high end estimate of 
outflow quantities, estimated the treatment of an anticipated 95 gpm inflow 
once mining ceased would require a water treatment plant, a 9 acre 
evaporation pond and a 70 acre landfill. (Honzel, Memorandum and 
Order, 9/1/94) The operation and repair of the treatment facility would be 
paid for out of a trust fund supported by interest from a bond posted by the 
company. (Casey to Wilson, Affadavit Response, 3/23/92) 
In their lawsuit, the environmental organizations contended that the water 
treatment plan violated both the MMRA and MEPA. They alleged that the 
EA had failed to consider the effectiveness of water treatment in 
preventing ground water contamination, failed to contemplate the 
environmental impacts associated with the facility, and failed to provide a 
reclamation plan for the ponds and plant. (Honzel, Memorandum and 
Order, 9/1/94) 
In reply, the state argued that the plan as approved would capture 
and treat contaminated waste waters, and therefore no groundwater 
contamination would occur. The facilities required no reclamation plan, 
according to DSL, because treatment would be perpetual. 
Judge Honzel sided with the plaintiffs. He said the state could not 
guarantee groundwater protection without knowing how much water 
would have to be treated. Since the EA acknowledged that the actual 
volumes of seepage from the pit and the tailings impoundments "are not 
known with any certainty," the state could not assure treatment of the 
contaminated effluent. In addition, Honzel said the plan called for 
treatment of waste water from the pit and tailings impoundments, but did 
not provide measures to prevent seepage from occurring. Providing a 
treatment facility did not guarantee the capture and treatment of all 
contaminated effluent. (Honzel, Memorandum and Order, 9/1/94) 
Honzel agreed with the environmental organizations on reclamation of the 
facilities as well. He said the construction of the waste water treatment 
facilities required consideration in the EA of the potential environmental 
impacts which might result. Regardless of whether or not the facility might 
always remain open, he said, a reclamation plan should have been drawn 
up to facilitate clean-up after its possible closure. (Honzel, Memorandum 
and Order, 9/1/94) 
The key question which Honzel's ruling addressed was not whether the 
state should allow a perpetual treatment facility, but how the state should 
go about permitting it. However, the permitting of a permanent 
treatment facility is itself a precedent setting issue. DSL officials 
acknowledged that the MMRA fails to address such facilities, and that the 
GSM case may represent the first of many more to require water treatment 
into perpetuity. (Plantenberg, Draft Comments, 1/16/92) The state included 
no bond estimates for the trust fund in the final EA, because officials were 
still developing the procedures for creating a fund of this kind and 
purpose, which they had never done before. (Plantenberg, Draft 
Comments, 1/16/92) 
As the first of its kind, the GSM proposal demanded closer technical and 
legal scrutiny. The MMRA and associated administrative rules require the 
state to develop measures to prevent objectionable effluent from mined 
lands. (Plantenberg, Draft Comments, 1/16/92) But they also require 
reclamation of lands disturbed during mining. Acceptance of perpetual 
treatment means reclamation of the site will never be complete. As a result 
of mining, the GSM site will retain a 70 acre hazardous waste landfill, a 9 
acre evaporation pond filled with contaminated water and a treatment 
plant. Disturbance of the site remains; hence the intent of reclamation 
remains unfulfilled and an irretrievable commitment of resources has 
occurred. One must also wonder how the DSL can calculate a bond 
amount now which will be valid for treatment in 400 or 1000 years. 
Ultimately, the state's options may be limited at already extant sites. 
Inflows to the GSM pit began at the rate of 45-57 gallons per minute in 
1991. Contaminated seepage under the tailings impoundments continues 
at the mine. Currently, the mine pumps the seepage into the process 
circuit. However, at the end of mine life, mine officials expect the 
contaminated water to continue flowing. If the flow cannot be stopped, then 
treatment for as long as contamination persists (and possibly even longer, 
during intermittent or periodic water contamination) would appear to be 
the only response at existing mines. 
At mines in the permitting stage, on the other hand, contaminated seepage 
into the pit or through tailings impoundments has yet to occur. Should 
treating effluent forever become a standard part of the state-of-the-art 
mining permit, or is this institutionalizing inadequate reclamation? If the 
reality of mining is that most sites will require treatment into perpetuity, 
then we must ask in an EIS whether a permanent mining presence is 
appropriate for an area before the mine gains approval. If the area cannot 
really be reclaimed, should the mining be allowed? Mine permitting 
should also consider the risks and costs associated with treatment left to 
future generations. 
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Case Study 2: Beal Mountain Mine 
Pegasus' Beal Mountain mine near Butte, Montana received its initial 
permit to process 1.64 million tons of ore using cyanide heap leach 
methods in 1988. In approving the mine, the state hailed its future as a 
"showcase" operation which would utilize state of the art technology and 
expertise to avoid the environmental problems encountered by older 
mines. The DSL granted an expansion of mine operations in 1993 which 
approved mining two additional open pits for one million more tons of ore. 
At its inception and during the first four years of mine life, mine operations 
did not include any MPDES water discharge permits. While the mine has 
been in operation for only 6 years (compared to 19 at Golden Sunlight), it 
has already developed significant water quality problems and violated the 
terms of its operating permit. The mine has applied for MPDES permits for 
storm water discharge and to allow discharge of water from dewatering 
wells in the open pit. 
Slumping in the Pit Wall 
The slumping of material in the walls of the open pit is not necessarily a 
major environmental concern. The area surrounding the open pit is 
already subject to heavy disturbance as excavation proceeds. Slumping 
material which slides down into the open pit may make the miner's job 
more difficult since it can bury the active mining area of the pit floor, 
but it becomes a serious environmental concern only in terms of the risk it 
poses to mining facilities nearby. Obviously, the closer the process circuit 
is to the open pit, the shorter the hauling distance for the tons of excavated 
ore. Hence heap leach pads tend to be located close to the open pit. 
When the pit walls begin to fail, there is always the chance that the 
unstable chunk of ground extends to the area beneath the pad. Ground 
movement could cause the liner to tear and discharge cyanide solution, or 
in the worst case, the pad could slide down into the pit along with the 
slumping material and release massive quantities of cyanide solution 
which could enter groundwater. 
Mine personnel first observed slumping in the wall of the Main Beal pit in 
April, 1991. Movement of wall material ceased in November, 1991, after 
the operator drilled dewatering drains into the slipping material and 
blasted the plane along which the slide was occurring to increase friction. 
(LeLacheur, Inspection Report, 9/1/92) However, in June 1992, following 
snowmelt and spring rains, slumping began again in the same area but 
lower in the pit, and continued for several months, sometimes moving as 
much as a foot a day. 
The heap leach pad and other facilities at Beal rested above the wall of 
the pit. What was termed a "wedge block failure" by officials meant that a 
portion of the pit wall was in the process of breaking away from the 
surrounding pit walls and sliding down into the pit, with the potential to 
carry with it any structures on the wrong side of the fault line. As early as 
August, 1991, a Forest Service inspection indicated that the slump 
had reached the SW corner of the containment dike for the heap leach 
pad, although the inspector stated that "it looks like it's far enough away 
that it's not a big hazard." (Bump, Inspection Report, 8/15/91) 
By August, 1994, the slide was still moving at about 1 inch per day. The 
mine operators were mining out the material which had slid down and 
were re- depositing the material as backfill after keying the backfill into the 
substrate, in order to halt the slide. (DSL, Inspection Report, 8/5/94) The 
leach pad cell nearest the slide was drained and deactivated while the 
slump block was removed. (Jepson, Inspection Report, 9/30/94) Mine 
officials relocated plans for the Stage III leach pad to the northeast of the 
fault line as a result of the ground movement. (LeLacheur, Inspection 
Report, 9/1/92) 
The mine's response served to slow down the slide and reduce immediate 
threats of leach pad failure. Over the long term, however, the risk of ground 
movement beneath the leach pad remains, particularly after mining 
ceases. A September, 1992, DSL Inspection Report states, "Over the long 
term, it is possible that after the end of mining, slumping may reactivate 
even if motion is arrested during the life of the operation." (LeLacheur, 
Inspection Report, 9/1/92) The report identifies the potential for movement 
in another layer of unstable material beneath the two already sliding 
layers, which could begin to move as the pit deepens. It also states that 
dewatering efforts which have halted movement so far will cease after 
mining finishes, increasing the danger of leach pad failure. 
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Cyanide Leak 
In May, 1992, the mine submitted water quality monitoring results for 1991 
as part of the 1991 Annual Monitoring Report. The data indicated that 
during the spring of 1991, cyanide appeared in a collection drain beneath 
the leach pad, evidence that a leak had occurred over a year before 
without any notification of DSL or DHES. (Jepson, Inspection Report, 
5/20/92) Cyanide levels peaked in May, 1991 at 0.281 mg/L. When 
inspectors arrived at the site in May, 1992 to inquire about the cause of the 
elevated readings, the mine operators reported that one year previously 
they had detected a leak in the barren pond and had drained and 
replaced the pond lining. Inspectors took water samples, which indicated 
that the cyanide was still present at some of the monitoring stations, 
although concentrations were lower than those in the report. (Spano to 
Rife, Letter, 6/25/92) 
DSL issued a Notice of Noncompliance and ordered the company to 
increase the frequency of testing in downgradient monitoring wells to a 
biweekly rate. DSL also directed the mine to submit hydrologic data 
quarterly instead of annually, to provide "more timely results for 
compliance purposes." (Spano to Rife, Letter, 6/25/92) As the discussion 
below will demonstrate, however, the state never actually required 
submission of water quality monitoring reports on even an annual 
basis prior to the leak. 
Water Quality 
Beal Mountain did not submit annual hydrologic data reports for 1988, 
1989 and 1991 until April, 1992, three years after the commencement of 
mining, in conjunction with their proposal to expand. One might presume 
that an annual report which reviews the events of the preceding year 
would be available soon after that year ended. But DSL decided the 
company's failure to submit the reports was not a violation, because the 
mining permit did not specify a time frame for submitting the annual 
reports. (DSL staff to Olsen, Memo, 1/12/93) The oversight in the original 
permit is bad enough, but even worse is the fact that nobody at DSL 
noticed that three years worth of information about water quality was 
missing. It took a cyanide leak for the state to compel the mine to submit 
quarterly monitoring reports, which are the standard for most other mines 
in the state. (Spano to Rife, Letter, 6/25/92) Initially requiring quarterly 
reports was only an emergency requirement. Ultimately, DSL decided to 
modify the permit and require periodic submittal of water quality 
monitoring reports as part of the South Beal amendment . 
Once the agencies got their hands on the 1988-91 reports, they found the 
data indicated a trend of increasing surface water contamination over the 
course of mining. The state responded with an inspection which found 
high levels of contaminants in a spring which originated beneath a 
waste rock pile and drained into German Gulch. High concentrations of 
contaminants in the spring were diluted by the waters of the stream, but 
still represented elevated levels relative to the pre-mining condition. For 
instance, the inspection stated that sulfates and nitrates in the spring 
exceeded state water quality standards (Presumably, this refers to Federal 
Drinking Water Standards for sulfates). They found elevated levels of iron, 
zinc and manganese, with manganese at the standard. (Reid, Inspection 
Report, 7/9/92) 
In January, 1993, the DSL drafted a Notice of Noncompliance for the 
unpermitted use of nitrogen-based fertilizer (the Beal permit expressly 
forbid its use) which led to the excessive nitrate levels; the rationale for the 
citation states that nitrate levels peaked at 12.5 mg/L in the spring and 
reached 2.6 mg/L downstream on German Gulch. (Jepson, NON 203, 
1/7/93) The Forest Service sent a memo stating that the mine had 
exceeded state water quality standards for nitrates and sulfates, thereby 
jeopardizing the original 1987 Environmental Assessment's finding of no 
significant impact to state waters. (Ewing to Rife, Letter, 2/17/93) The 
issuance of a Notice of Noncompliance indicates that DSL regarded the 
nitrate contamination levels in the stream as significant degradation and a 
violation of the Metal Mine Reclamation Act, although the notice's rationale 
describes the nitrate levels in this case as the cause of "slight 
environmental harm." (DSL, Rationale for NON 203, 1/7/93) At this point in 
time, the state used the original baseline water quality in German Gulch to 
make comparisons and determine that degradation due to nitrates had 
occurred. Yet with the approval of the South Beal amendment, the 
state departed from the original stream quality as a baseline reference and 
began using what it called "trigger levels." 
In approving the South Beal Amendment, the state required the mine to 
meet certain "trigger levels" for water quality parameters in German Gulch. 
The trigger levels, generally set below state water quality standards (also 
known as Maximum Contaminant Levels or MCLs) for each potential 
contaminant, would force the mine to divert upstream springs and withhold 
the contaminated water from the stream until the pollution had abated for 
three consecutive weeks or the contamination source was identified and 
mitigated. If the exceedance of the trigger levels could not be rectified and 
concentrations continue to rise, the company would be forced to suspend 
operations or treat all German Gulch water. 
While the trigger levels and associated activities appear to be attempts to 
protect German Gulch water quality, they in fact represent de-facto 
acceptance of mining related water quality degradation in the drainage. 
The 1987 EA predicted no impact to water resources. (Reid, Inspection 
Report, 7/9/92) The state selected trigger levels for nitrate, sulfate, total 
dissolved solids, pH, copper, selenium and arsenic because the mine had 
already demonstrated that these parameters were or could prove to be 
pollution problems. The 1988 mining permit recognized the pre-mining 
quality of German Gulch as the standard to which the mine must adhere. 
The 1993 amendment, on the other hand, acknowledges the areas in 
which the company has degraded German Gulch, accepts this 
degradation as a new status quo, and recommends trigger levels for 
most parameters which are higher than the highest levels yet measured in 
the already degraded water quality found in the stream. (DSL, Amendment 
002 Approval, 7/20/93) Exceptions are nitrates and selenium. In addition, 
some of the water quality standards have since changed. 
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*The in stream levels and trigger levels values come from the 1993 amendment and the 
1988 permit levels appear in the 1988 permit and are based on pre-mining levels. 
The amendment approval does require a reduction in the levels of some of 
these contaminants, but begins with the status quo and does not demand 
a return of the stream to its pre-mining condition or the quality required by 
the original permit. According to the amendment approval, sulfates must 
be reduced to 150 mg/L by 1995, and 100 mg/L by 1998; nitrates to 1.0 
mg/L and 0.8 mg/L; TDS to 300 mg/L and 250 mg/L and selenium to 0.1 
mg/L and .006 mg/L. The approval does not explain why these levels were 
chosen as restoration goals, and does not justify their selection over 
baseline values. The document neither discusses nor defends the 
apparent sanctioning of state surface water degradation. 
1 3 5  
The increased monitoring and trigger levels included in the plan did little 
to abate the pollution. Almost immediately after the amendment was 
approved, in July, 1993, the mine exceeded the trigger levels for nitrates 
and selenium in German Gulch. Water in the contaminated spring below 
the waste rock dump exceeded federal or state water quality standards for 
nitrate, sulfate, selenium, and total dissolved solids. (Ewing to Olsen, 
Letter, 9/22/93) The mine operators responded by diverting the spring's 
flow into the process circuit and away from the stream, in accordance with 
the amendment. The spring contributes over half the flow of German Gulch 
during the summer months. (Reid, Inspection Report, 7/9/92) 
Since nitrate and selenium levels had approached the trigger levels in the 
past, the South Beal amendment had anticipated the spring's 
contamination, and called for the diversion of the contaminated spring 
water to prevent it from reaching German Gulch. In actuality, the 
amendment's mitigation option merely ratified the status quo. The springs 
had shown chronic contamination for several years prior to the expansion, 
and mine operators had already attempted their diversion. A year prior to 
the South Beal approval, in June, 1992, DSL inspectors found the 
company in the process of constructing ditches to divert three 
contaminated springs in the drainage. DSL issued a Notice of 
Noncompliance, stating that the diversion had been undertaken without 
state consultation, and that the diverted springs make up a large 
portion of the flow in upper German Gulch. (DSL, NON 202, 4/7/93) A 
February, 1993 Forest Service memo indicates the same concern over 
flow rates in German Gulch, and suggests that the mine not only continued 
to construct the diversions after the 1992 DSL inspection, but had diverted 
four contaminated springs in the drainage months before the approval of 
the South Beal amendment. (Ewing to Rife, Letter, 2/17/93) 
The South Beal amendment codified these concerns into contradictory 
requirements, since it required the diversion of contaminated springs while 
also requiring the operators to maintain sufficient flow in German Gulch to 
sustain the west slope cutthroat trout population (without quantifying 
sufficient flow). As the company had already constructed and employed 
diversions, it was the easiest mitigation option to approve, even if flow 
rates were compromised as a result. 
Despite the diversion of contaminated spring water during part of 1992 
and 1993, a DHES analysis of hydrologic data found that from the fall of 
1987 to the fall of 1993, upper German Gulch waters had undergone a 
218 % increase in TDS, 268% in sulfates, 2,300% in nitrates and a 460% 
increase in selenium levels. (Reid to Winegar, Memo, 8/12/93) Either 
diversions were not an effective means of preventing contamination, or the 
water quality of German Gulch was already so degraded that diverting the 
springs for only the last year of the seven year period showed little overall 
impact. 
Sediments ' 
In July, 1992, just after receiving Annual Hydrologic Data reports 
indicating elevated cyanide levels in monitoring wells, DSL and DHES 
conducted a joint inspection of the Beal site. While their primary concern 
was to evaluate the sources of the elevated cyanide and nitrate levels 
indicated by the data, they discovered another water quality issue upon 
arrival. 
At monitoring Site 3A on German Gulch, located 100 yards above the 
permit boundary, the inspectors found the cobble and pebble stream 
bottom heavily embedded with fine particulate material. The water itself 
was visibly turbid. (Reid, Inspection Report, 7/9/92) At Spring 5, which 
drained from the toe of the waste rock pile into German Gulch (contributing 
half the stream's volume) , fine sediment covered most of the substrate, 
although the water was clear at the time of inspection. The inspectors 
noted that diversion ditches around the waste rock pile had not been 
constructed according to permit specifications, resulting in erosion of 
reclaimed surfaces and fresh sediment deposits below the waste rock pile 
after heavy rains. In addition, the inspectors noted unpermitted road 
construction occurring near spring 5, without any sediment control 
structures such as straw bales or silt fences in place. 
The situation did not, however, result in a Notice of Noncompliance. Tom 
Reid of DHES sent the mine a follow-up memo in September of 1992 
which stated that German Gulch Creek is classified as a B-1 stream with 
turbidity limited to 5 NTUs, and that the turbidity observed in July likely 
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in turbidity was probably a violation of Montana Water Quality Standards, 
but that the activity creating the disturbance was probably already 
complete and therefore DHES would not pursue the matter further. (Reid 
to Rife, Letter, 9/30/92) Thus the state did not undertake any testing to 
quantify the stream's turbidity and define the extent to which the company 
was violating state water quality laws. 
The DSL did not issue a Notice of Noncompliance for the failure to 
construct diversion ditches around the waste rock pile to permitted 
specifications. DSL inspectors had noted the shortcoming in an earlier 
April, 1992 inspection, but the permit stated that the diversions must be 
constructed to meet specifications within five years of beginning to mine. 
Since mining began in 1988, the diversions did not have to stop storm 
water from flowing over reclaimed areas of the waste rock pile and 
depositing the sediment in German Gulch Creek until 1993, according to 
the permit. By 1993, the diversions had been completed to specification. 
(DSL Staff to Olsen, Memo, 1/12/93) In essence, the DSL permitted the 
company to foul the creek for five years before putting the protective 
diversions in place. 
The construction of the unpermitted road without proper siltation 
prevention or DSL consultation did not receive a Notice of 
Noncompliance. A meeting of DSL technical staff in early 1993 stated that 
the mine operators, concerned about storm water moving sediment in 
German Gulch, built the road in order to access the waste rock dump and 
1  3  9  
construct diversions around it to the permit specifications. Regardless 
of motivation, the company's activity occurred without safeguards against 
silt movement and created rather than solved sediment problems. The 
need for haste without consultation is suspect, since four years of apparent 
unconcern preceded the construction. Yet the DSL technical staff 
concluded that the company's activity was undertaken in an emergency 
and thus did not warrant a Notice of Noncompliance. (DSL Staff to Olsen, 
Memo, 1/12/93) 
Throughout the permitting process, both DSL and DHES appeared to 
believe that sediment problems would disappear, either through the 
completion of the diversion ditches required in the original permit or 
through additional Best Management Practices to be included in the South 
Beal permit amendment. The technical staff meeting report, written in 
January 1993, states that although the company had utilized the BMPs it 
committed to in the 1987 permit, the BMPs were insufficient to prevent 
sediment from entering German Gulch. (DSL Staff to Olsen, Memo, 
1/12/93) The additional BMPs included in the South Beal Amendment 
were more of the same, and they failed to adequately control movement in 
the underlying clay soils of the South Beal area. (DSL, Record of Decision, 
7/20/93) 
As a result, instead of alleviating the problem, the South Beal amendment 
intensified sediment problems in German Gulch. An August 1994 
inspection report describes a number of new erosion control and sediment 
runoff control structures which the mine put into place after the 
commencement of South Beal mining. (DSL, Inspection Report, 
8/5/94) In October, 1994, mine inspectors from DSL and DHES returned to 
the site to find the new sediment control structures overwhelmed. The 
mine's environmental director explained that the bedrock on the south 
side of German Gulch contained much more clay than the north side 
where the operation began, and that sediment control had become more 
difficult since the development of the South Beal pit and haul roads. 
(Jepson, Inspection Report, 10/27/94) He stated that turbidity in the stream 
increased after the South Beal operation opened. (Bugosh, Inspection 
Report, 10/27/94) 
Inspectors found sediment laden water flowing down along haul road 
diversions, over and through sediment traps, and into German Gulch at 
several locations at the site. As the DHES inspector states in his report, 
"The storm water was routed through a series of settling basins, yet the 
discharge resembled chocolate milk." (Bugosh, Inspection Report, 
10/27/94) The sediment traps appeared ineffective given the volume of 
storm water, for as the DSL inspector states in his report, "These [sediment 
traps] may have been catching a lot of sediment, yet the apparent turbidity 
of the storm water remained unchanged." (Jepson, Inspection Report, 
10/27/94) As a result, German Gulch was extremely turbid at several 
sampling points, from the center of mining activity down to the permit 
boundary. Above the active mining area, however, the inspectors found 
German Gulch to be "quite clear." The inspectors took samples, which 
revealed the following: 
TSSfma/L) Turbidity (NTU) 141 
German Gulch upstream of mine: 64 13 
German Gulch in mine area: 40,490 10,500 
(Bugosh, Inspection Report, 10/27/94) As Reid's memo indicated above, 
the legal standard for German Gulch is 5 NTU. 
Despite turbidity levels over 2000 times greater than the legal limit, the 
mine did not receive a NON. Both inspectors declared the mine in 
compliance with all the requirements of the Storm water Pollution 
Prevention Plan, devised in consultation with both agencies. Both reports 
indicate that the operators had installed all the BMPs required by both the 
main permit and the South Beal amendment. Since all aspects of the 
approved permit were fulfilled, the company was not at fault. The 
inspectors concluded that the sediment prevention efforts were 
overwhelmed by drainage from the recently installed South Beal haul 
roads, and that new methods for contending with the sediment drainage 
would have to be adopted. 
The two agencies emphasized different approaches when discussing 
mitigation of the problem. The DHES report discussed the transferal of 
storm water discharge coverage from the general operating permit to an 
individual storm water permit with MPDES provisions, thereby transferring 
responsibility to DHES and allowing the construction of an 
"elaborate, engineered system" to cope with the storm water. (Bugosh, 
Inspection Report, 10/27/94) The DSL report mentioned the construction 
of large settling and containment ponds, but stated that with mine life 
expected to last only a couple more years, the increased disturbance 
necessary to construct the ponds would render this option less than 
worthwhile. (Jepson, Inspection Report, 10/27/94) By this logic, speeding 
up mining and shortening mine life becomes an excuse not to correct 
problems. Instead of ponds, the DSL report recommended more of the 
same: additional straw bales in the ditches to be replaced after every 
storm event. 
Nitrates 
As indicated by the water quality discussion above, mining activity at the 
site has had a significant impact on nitrate levels, which have exploded by 
several thousand percent over the course of mining. The source of the 
nitrates, however, was also the source of some uncertainty. The company 
increased the rate of mining, which also increased the usage rate of the 
blasting agent ANFO which produces nitrates. One potential source for 
elevated levels, therefore, was the blasting agent residues on waste rock 
and ore. Another potential source was the ongoing reclamation activity at 
the site, including reseeding with nitrogen based fertilizers on exposed 
dike faces. 
Neither the increased mining rate nor the use of nitrogen-based fertilizers 
was approved by DSL; in fact, the permit expressly prohibits the use of 
nitrogen based fertilizers. DSL issued a Notice of Noncompliance for the 
fertilizer use, which the company acknowledged in a 1992 report on 
the sources of nitrogen pollution. (DSL, NON 200, 3/22/93) While DSL 
officials suspected blasting residues as the source, the company report 
fingered reclamation activities. (Fitzpatrick to Olsen, Letter, 7/15/92) The 
mitigation requirements depended upon the source; identifying fertilizers 
meant ceasing to use nitrogen based materials, digging ditches to 
intercept seepage and placing the ditch which collects water from beneath 
the heap in a culvert to prevent seepage infiltration. (Fitzpatrick to Olsen, 
Letter, 7/15/92) Fingering the blasting agents would have meant a 
reduction in the mining rate and construction of a seepage collection 
system around the waste rock dumps. A report on nitrogen contamination 
at the Golden Sunlight mine also appeared in the document record. Wells 
drilled in response to a cyanide leak at the mine had elevated nitrate 
levels as well. The report claimed a "natural reservoir" of nitrogen in the 
soil was the source of contamination at that site, freeing the mine 
operators from culpability. (DSL, Report on Well Investigations, undated) 
A DSL review of Beal's report remained critical of the contention that 
fertilizers were the sole contamination cause. The report's conclusion was 
based on a single waste rock sample rather than samples from different 
areas of the waste rock pile. The report stated that if ANFO were the 
primary source of the pollution, then all areas containing waste rock would 
show elevated nitrate levels, which was not the case. Yet the same logic, 
the report stated, defeats the notion that fertilizers were responsible, since 
many of the waste rock areas that failed to produce elevated nitrate levels 
were also hydromulched with nitrogen based fertilizers. (Jepson to Olsen, 
Memo, 7/23/92) "Blasting residue on waste rock as a potential nitrate ^ ̂ 
source cannot be discounted so easily," the report states. (Jepson to 
Olsen, Memo, 7/23/92) 
Regardless of the source, the most recent hydrologic data reviewed in the 
fall of 1994 indicated that nitrogen levels remained elevated in the springs 
which flow into German Gulch. The fact that sulfates and heavy metals are 
also elevated in the waters which originate under the waste rock dump 
suggests that the contamination is not limited to fertilizer alone. 
Sulfates 
Elevated sulfate levels in the spring which originates beneath the waste 
rock pile indicate a potential for acid rock drainage which was not 
anticipated in the original permit. The pH levels in monitoring wells and 
surface waters have remained fairly constant, but sulfate levels have 
increased dramatically. The increase in sulfates suggests unoxidized rock 
in the waste rock dumps is oxidizing to form sulfuric acid, but that the acid 
is then being neutralized by the buffering capacity of some of the waste 
rock types. (Spano to Rife, Letter, 6/25/92) At the time of the South Beal 
expansion, and the proposal to mine deeper into the Main Beal pit, there 
was no acid rock drainage, but an unaccountably high sulfate level in 
surface waters. As early as January, 1991, the DSL informed the mine of 
the need to test rock types on site and determine their potential for acid 
production. (Plantenberg to Dale, Letter, 1/29/91) Subsequently, a DSL 
inspector in September 1991 took two rock samples from the Main Beal 
pit, stating, "Obviously the potential for acid production is indicated by 
these first samples from the mine." (Plantenberg, Inspection Report, 
8/22/91) The inspector went on to state that the reclamation plan for the 
mine, and the eventual seepage from the heap and waste rock dump, 
would have to be re-evaluated "with the new concern for potential acid 
production." (Plantenberg, Inspection Report, 8/22/91) The company 
responded with a complaint to the DSL Commissioner, claiming that the 
inspector's comments were unsubstantiated personal opinions. 
(Fitzpatrick to Casey, Letter, 10/8/91) The DSL responded by instructing all 
employees to limit inspection report comments to compliance issues. 
(Olsen to Fitzpatrick, Letter, 2/26/92) 
Ultimately, the South Beal deposit demonstrated little potential for acid 
rock drainage, but the amendment addressed concern over rock already 
mined in the Main Beal pit. State officials, in preparing the amendment, 
were already aware of elevated sulfate levels in waters directly 
downgradient of the waste rock dump. Yet the amendment states that the 
operator must monitor the waste rock dump for temperature, pore gas 
composition and other parameters necessary to detect oxidation of sulfide 
bearing rock. (DSL, Record of Decision, 7/20/93) While the amendment 
states that the mine cannot dispose of excess water by spraying it onto the 
waste rock dump, it does not demand a waste rock segregation program 
unless the dump begins to indicate oxidation of sulfides. The document 
states that if water quality parameters, such as sulfates, continue to 
deteriorate, then the mine must segregate waste and mix lime into the 
higher sulfide rock. Yet water quality parameters, as indicated by the 
levels included in the very same document, had already deteriorated since 
the commencement of mining. (DSL, Record of Decision, 7/20/93) 
The Record of Decision approving the amendment does not specify the 
levels of deterioration which would cause waste segregation and lime 
mixing to begin. 
Year Round Operation 
Mining at the Beal Mountain site began as a seasonal affair. The 1988 
Environmental Assessment which evaluated the Beal Mountain mine 
proposal identified the mine site as elk winter range. The company 
believed average winter temperatures were too cold to feasibly operate 
(Davis to Olsen, Letter, 2/23/93). As a result, the original permit allowed 
the mine to operate only between March and November. 
During the first year of operation, the company initiated winter shutdown 
procedures as the permit required, but during the next season the 
company came up with a method of leaching year round. They never shut 
down again. Potentially significant impacts to the environment resulted, 
including an increase in the annual use of cyanide. Continual activity and 
traffic around the mine no longer spared the time when elk needed the site 
for winter range. Indirectly, continual leaching allowed the company to 
process greater quantities of rock than the permit allowed, another 
violation with significant environmental impacts (see below). 
Four years passed before these changes generated concern at DSL. In 
September, 1992, DSL staff drafted a Notice of Noncompliance for the 
mine's apparent departure from the operating permit (Snyder, NON 202, 
9/28/92) The Notice of Noncompliance was never sent. According to 
the Forest Service ranger in charge of overseeing the operation in 1989, 
both the DSL and Forest Service staff verbally approved the change 
(Davis to Olsen, Letter, 2/23/93). Agency staff never documented the 
change or their approval, however. They did not even require a formal 
modification of the operating permit. Subsequent staff turnover led to a 
situation in which DSL personnel were unaware that their predecessors 
had approved the switch, or even that the change had taken place. A 
situation which on the surface appeared to be company malfeasance was 
in actuality an agency blunder. 
The change to year round operations represents a significant departure 
from the operating permit, with the potential for significant environmental 
impacts. The mine operators should have applied for an amendment to the 
operating permit, but even that would not have been sufficient. No formal 
consideration of the potential environmental impacts of the change ever 
took place. No formal evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of 
applying cyanide to leaching pads during the winter months occurred. In a 
department memo discussing the change, DSL staff note that the switch 
never received an environmental review as required under the Montana 
Environmental Protection Act (DSL Staff to Olsen, Memo, 1/12/93). They 
suggest that the change should be retroactively considered as part of the 
South Beal Expansion Environmental Impact Statement. 
Mining Rate Increase 
The rate at which mining proceeds is an important factor in 
determining the intensity of environmental impacts to the area. Even when 
the total quantity of excavated material remains the same, mining faster 
means blasting more often, driving more trucks and equipment through the 
site and using more ANFO blasting agent, more cyanide, more water and 
more diesel fuel. The pit grows deeper more rapidly than permitted, and 
waste rock dumping occurs at a more rapid rate than permitted. These 
kind of significant changes typically require the company to submit an 
amendment to the operating permit for DSL review. In evaluating the 
amendment, the state must fulfill Montana Environmental Protection Act 
requirements, usually through preparation of an Environmental 
Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement. 
At Beal Mountain, however, the company dramatically increased the 
quantity of ore being mined at the site without DSL knowledge or any kind 
of administrative review. The DSL drafted a Notice of Noncompliance after 
the company submitted replacement pages to their permit application 
reflecting the change. (Miller, NON, 1/6/93) Replacement pages are 
intended to reflect minor changes in operation which do not alter 
dramatically the conditions of the mine. In this case, the replacement 
pages indicated that the mine had increased yearly production from 1.64 
million tons per year to 3-4 million tons per year. (Miller, NON, 1/6/93) 
Diesel fuel usage increased from 80,000 gallons to 800,000 gallons per 
year. The replacement pages did not constitute a request for a change in 
practices; the increase in mining had already been in place for at least a 
year. 
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Initially, the DSL response was clear; the increased rate was a violation. A 
memo from the DSL technical staff to the Hard Rock Bureau Chief defined 
the rationale for a Notice of Noncompliance; "Impacts from the doubling of 
production have not been evaluated. The change may cause greater 
environmental effects than those disclosed in the original EA. The staff has 
had no opportunity to analyze the effects of increased blasting on ground 
water and surface water. . . . Although it would be difficult to pinpoint the 
effects of doubling production, the doubling of production and associated 
increases are clearly not permitted and a violation should be issued." 
(DSL Staff to Olsen, Memo, 1/12/93). In effect, the state recognized that the 
company had circumvented the environmental review process and 
deserved to be penalized. 
DSL never sent the Notice of Noncompliance. A meeting of DSL technical 
staff concluded that the permit had only established estimates of average 
annual production, not maximum annual volumes or a maximum mining 
rate. In this case, the mine had not increased the total amount of waste 
and ore to be mined, only the rate at which they would be excavated and 
processed. (DSL Staff to Olsen, Memo, 2/19/93) Thus the DSL decided 
that the company could double production and still remain in compliance 
with the operating permit. 
The DSL staff also indicated that a violation might not be justified because 
the philosophy governing production rates had changed only recently. The 
mine's submission of replacement pages was consistent with the state's 
old way of thinking, in which changes in production rates were "not 
considered major changes, and did not require review." (DSL Staff to 
Olsen, Memo, 1/12/93) It may be that the shift in management philosophy 
was not made clear to the mining company, and therefore a violation in 
this instance may have been inappropriate. Yet if current DSL guidance 
required environmental review of production rate changes, then the DSL 
should have demanded an amendment to the permit which defined 
annual production rates. If the rates were significantly different from those 
used to prepare the original Environmental Assessment, then the state 
should have required a new environmental review of the mine's impacts. 
Instead, the state allowed the mine to continue at the increased rate. 
Bulldozer Accident 
In October, 1988, a bulldozer dropped off the road onto Cell #1 of the heap 
leach pad, catching the leach pad with a ripper tooth of the blade and 
tearing the liner. The company responded by unloading the ore from the 
pad with hand tools, causing a number of additional tears in the liner. The 
company then replaced the 30 mil PVC liner. The entire episode cost 
$250-300,000. Bulldozers at the site no longer have ripper teeth.(DSL, 
Note, 10/25/88) The document record offered no indication whether or not 
cyanide leaks had occurred due to the multiple tears in the liner. 
Case Study 3: Zortman/Landusky 
Overview 
Pegasus Gold's cyanide heap leach facilities at Zortman/Landusky in ^ * 
the Little Rocky Mountains, which began operating in 1979, are among the 
oldest of their kind in the state; they are also among the worst when it 
comes to pollution of the state's surface and groundwaters. The mine, 
which abuts the Rocky Boy Reservation in central Montana, has a long 
history of permit violations, water degradation and cyanide spills, and the 
mitigation measures employed have often served to compound old 
problems and create new violations. 
The summer of 1993 serves as a case in point. Inspectors found an 
unpermitted road filling one streambed; another stream had been 
destroyed by a bulldozer "walking down" the drainage. EPA inspectors 
found 7 separate discharges of polluted seepage draining into streams, as 
well as a chlorine "feed shack" where, to cope with the lingering effects of 
a previous cyanide spill, the company added highly toxic chlorine directly 
to a stream. Rapidly worsening problems with acid rock drainage (ARD) 
finally came to a head as above average rainfall overwhelmed all attempts 
to contain highly acidic and heavy metal contaminated seepage, which 
flowed in high volume into area streams. The summer ended with a 
10,000 gallon cyanide leak upgradient of the domestic water supply for the 
town of Zortman. 
In August, the state Department of Health and Environmental Sciences 
filed suit against the mine for the unauthorized discharges to state waters, 
seeking thousands of dollars in penalties. The case is still pending. Yet 
despite the array of problems, the mine has continued to seek an 
expansion of its operations with the Department of State Lands. The 
expansion would mine still deeper into sulfide bearing ore bodies, 
increasing the likelihood of even greater acid generation in the future. 
Acid Rock Drainage 
Of the four mines I reviewed, Zortman/Landusky has developed the most 
severe problems with acid rock drainage. Yet the recognition of the 
problem, which took years to develop, has only recently been recognized 
by the state agencies. The problems at this site may serve as a warning of 
the potential for similar problems at other mines. 
a) Recognizing the ARD Problem 
What is most interesting about the problems with acid generation at the 
Zortman/Landusky mines is that the problem appears to come out of 
nowhere at the end of 1992. In reality, however, even such documents as 
an Environmental Assessment for a mine expansion first drafted in 1988 
noted declines in water quality associated with acid rock drainage. But as 
recently as 1990, nobody at ZMI or DSL appeared to think acid rock 
drainage would be a problem at the Zortman and Landusky sites. 
The acid rock drainage problem at ZMI arose after DSL approved a 
Landusky amendment to expand operations in 1989. The amendment 
indicated an awareness of non-oxidized material to be mined without any 
recognition of the potential for acid rock drainage to occur. The 
amendment reads: 
Due to the low-grade mineralization of Zortman and Landusky ore and 
waste rock, the acid generating potential of waste material going to the 
depositories is quite low. In review of previous baseline and operational 
monitoring material for the Montana Gulch and Mill Gulch waste areas, no 
significant changes in pH values have been detected. Any sulfide materials 
disturbed during oxide ore mining operations will be loaded, transported 
and leached on existing leach pad facilities along with mined oxide 
materials. 
(DSL, Landusky Life of Mine Amendment, 12/6/89) The amendment 
commits to sorting all sulfide bearing material, including waste rock and 
ore from the rest of the mined material and placing the sulfide bearing rock 
onto heap leach pads with the oxidized ore, where it will be contained in a 
closed system. Before the approval of this amendment in 1990, acid 
generating waste material had already been dumped in two other 
locations (the Alder Gulch Waste Dump and the OK pit) and used for the 
construction of the 85/86 leach pad dike buttress and an unspecified and 
probably unknown number of other construction projects. The reclamation 
plan for the mine called for ripping the waste dump tops to improve air and 
water movement, the exact opposite of the procedures used to prevent air 
and water access in an acid generating situation. (Jepson, Memo, 
12/30/92) 
Despite the warning signs of deteriorating water quality found in both an 
August 13, 1991 inspection and 1991 water quality monitoring data, it was 
not until a December 17, 1992 inspection startled state inspectors 
that the ARD problem gained recognition. At Zortman, inspectors viewed 
an acidic seep from the 85/86 buttress and took a sample of sulfide 
bearing rock from the buttress. At Landusky, inspectors observed sulfur 
dioxide fumaroles venting in the Mill Gulch Waste Dump, where the life-of-
mine amendment stated that no net acid generation would occur. (Jepson, 
Memo, 12/30/92) As Jepson states, "Landusky waste probably contains 
lower sulfide content than Zortman waste," and "if waste observed in the 
Landusky Mill Gulch Waste Dump and in the walls of the Zortman OK pit 
and 85/86 buttress are indicative of the waste buried in the Alder Gulch 
waste dump, this (Alder Gulch) reclamation is likely to fail over the next few 
years." 
Suddenly the problem was both widespread and severe. The BLM 
explained the lack of foresight by stating that the most recent EA (1990) for 
the Landusky life of mine amendment analyzed rock types and concluded 
that more acid neutralizing capacity existed than acid generating potential 
in the rock, and that this constituted "due consideration of the matter." 
(Lawton to ZMI, Letter, 4/13/93) The BLM letter goes on to require ZMI to 
cease disposing of waste rock in the Mill Gulch Waste Dump while 
modifications are made to the existing Plan of Operations and these 
modifications undergo scrutiny to determine whether they are significant 
under NEPA. The document record does not indicate any company 
objections, and the BLM and DSL therefore expected no more waste to 
enter the Mill Gulch Waste Dump. 
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b) More "Hot Rock" in the Dump 
On April 16, however, a BLM inspector watched as mine waste hauling 
trucks deposited two trucks loads of unoxidized, sulfide bearing waste in 
the dump. Rock along a side slope indicated that these were not atypical 
loads. (Haight, Memo, 5/18/93) 
At this point, company actions veer away from the intent of DSL and BLM 
instructions. The inspector, Scott Haight, told Jim Geyer, the Mine 
Manager, that it looked like sulfide bearing waste rock was being 
deposited in the dump, contrary to the Plan of Operations and the April 13 
BLM letter. Geyer stated that they were not putting waste in the Mill Gulch 
dump but" merely building up the backslope and sideslope to prepare 
drainageways that would be needed at final reclamation." Haight saw the 
mine operator putting more waste rock in the dump; Geyer claimed they 
were performing slope reconfiguration in the dump using waste rock. 
Haight concluded that the mine operators had failed to segregate sulfide 
bearing material as called for in the amended Plan of Operations, and that 
this waste material was placed in the dump in contradiction to the April 13 
letter. 
On June 1, 1993, DSL issued a Notice of Non-Compliance which 
addresses both issues. (DSL, NON 207, 1/6/93) The Notice of 
Noncompliance states that observation of fumaroles at Mill Gulch makes 
clear that "sulfide material was disturbed during mining, and that this 
material, if not of ore grade, was placed in the waste rock dump rather ^ ^ ^ 
than on the leach pad." The violation refers to the commitment in the 
Landusky amendment, which appears straightforward: "Any sulfide 
material disturbed during oxide ore mining operations will be loaded, 
transported and leached on existing leach pad facilities . . . The intent of 
the statement would appear to be that any sulfide bearing material 
encountered while mining be dealt with in such a way that it does not 
contact the surrounding environment and produce deleterious 
environmental effects. Yet ZMI successfully refined the above statement 
after the fact. Just as "slope reconfiguration" using sulfide bearing waste 
rock was not, according to ZMI, placing waste rock in the Mill Gulch waste 
dump, so "overburden stripping is not oxide ore mining." A letter from ZMI 
to DSL argues that the life-of-mine amendment did not deal with waste 
rock produced during excavation to get to the ore body. (Fitzpatrick to 
North, Letter, 6/29/93) Sulfide bearing waste rock might be removed to get 
to the oxide ore body, but this is "overstripping," and this material would go 
to the waste rock dumps, not the heaps. "At no time has Zortman Mining, 
Inc. ever committed to placing only oxide materials in the waste rock 
depositories," the letter states. 
The letter also cites the 1990 EA, which the BLM and DSL approved, as 
indicating recognition and acceptance of acid rock drainage from the Mill 
Gulch waste dump: 
Monitoring of downgradient surface water has shown some impacts which 
are attributable to seepage from waste rock dumps, i.e. Mill Gulch . . . Surface 
water in upper Mill Gulch, immediately below the contingency pond (station 
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L-18) has shown changes between 1986 and 1988 which correspond 
with construction of the Mill Gulch waste rock dump . . . including decreases 
in pH from 7 to 3.2 and increases in sulphate from 8 mg/l to 268 mg/l. 
The letter then cites an additional EA passage which indicates recognition 
that "such changes are 'the result of the generation of acid from waste 
rock."' (Fitzpatrick to North, Letter, 6/29/93) These statements in the EA 
are in direct contradiction to the statement made in the Landusky life-of-
mine amendment itself, namely, that "in review of previous baseline and 
operational monitoring material for the Montana and Mill Gulch waste 
areas, no significant changes in pH values have been detected." (DSL, 
Landusky Life of Mine Amendment, 12/6/89) 
Based on the statements in the EA, ZMI claimed that the BLM and DSL 
knew about and approved the placement of sulfide bearing rock in the 
waste dump, and that they were aware that doing so would create the 
potential for acid rock drainage. Amazingly, DSL concurred. Wayne 
Jepson, writing for DSL, states that despite ZMI's life-of-mine amendment 
assertion that impacts to water quality from waste rock seepage would be 
minimal, this could not be taken as a commitment that acid drainage from 
the dump would not occur. (Jepson, Memo, 9/29/93) Jepson could have 
interpreted the Landusky Life of Mine Amendment requirement that all 
sulfide ores be placed on the heap as a refusal to accept water quality 
deterioration and an attempt to prevent further water quality declines. 
Instead, he agrees with ZMI that the 1988 and 1989 Environmental 
Assessments did not compel ZMI to maintain pre-existing water quality, 
and that, in fact, the EAs acknowledged already extant declines in 
water quality. Jepson continues by stating that after a review of the life-of-
mine amendment, he agrees with ZMI that the statement actually did refer 
solely to ore grade sulfide materials, not waste rock. In issuing its Notice of 
Noncompliance, Jepson claims, DSL had made the faulty assumption that 
this statement referred to any sulfide material. He speculates that, contrary 
to the BLM inspector's opinion, the two loads of sulfide waste were 
probably atypical of the waste being placed, and that this waste was being 
used for slope reconfiguration, and was therefore exempt from the BLM's 
April 13 prohibition of "waste disposal" in Mill Gulch waste dump. Pursuit 
of the non-compliance, he writes, "would be extremely time-consuming 
and unrewarding." (Jepson, Memo, 9/29/93) 
Thus it appears that the DSL assumed responsibility for the failure to 
permit the mine in such a way as to avoid acid drainage. Jepson states 
that 
the acid drainage problem has arisen not because ZMI has mined more 
sulfide waste rock than predicted in the 1990 EA, but rather because the 
method (Acid-Base Accounting) used by the agencies to determine whether 
or not acid rock drainage would occur is not an appropriate predictive method 
for run-of-mine waste rock. The science of predictive geochemistry, and the 
regulatory agencies' familiarity with it, has improved considerably in the last 
few years. 
No doubt the acid-base accounting system contributed to the problem; the 
agencies may have acknowledged the potential for acid rock drainage 
and misjudged its likelihood or intensity of impact. But with the benefit of 
hindsight the agency's permitting of the expansion appears a 
colossal blunder, unless the intent of the agency stipulations were such as 
to prevent this situation from occurring. Indeed, imprecision in acid-base 
accounting does not exonerate the dumping of sulfide waste on a pile 
instead of a lined heap. A straighforward reading of the statement, "Any 
sulfide material disturbed during oxide ore mining operations will be 
loaded, transported and leached on existing leach pad facilities along with 
mined oxide materials," suggests to me that any sulfide material disturbed 
during the mining process will be placed on the leach pads. This is exactly 
the assumption DSL made in issuing the notice-of-noncompliance. If there 
was a distinction to be made between overburden stripping and oxide ore 
mining, or a distinction between the fate of sulfide bearing ores and sulfide 
waste, why did they fail to appear in the text? One must also consider the 
responsibility of the company for its assurances that the acid generating 
potential of rock going into the dump would be quite low, and balance 
agency recognition in the EA of acid caused changes in Mill Gulch with the 
contradictory assurances in the life-of-mine amendment that no changes 
had been detected in the same drainage. ZMI's statement that the 
agencies were aware of the potential for acid rock drainage also indicates 
that the company too must have been aware of it. The agency allowed ZMI 
to place the rock in such a manner that it created ARD, but ZMI placed the 
rock. Both are responsible for the problem, and both must accept the need 
for changes in procedures to deal with it. 
In the wake of these problems, the company and the state agreed to a 
segregation and disposal strategy which identified, separated and 
disposed of "hot rock" in a specially designed dump. The sulfide 
bearing rock would be surrounded by layers of neutralizing material and 
capped with clay to limit water infiltration. The plan addresses the issue of 
overburden dumping, since sulfide waste would have its own dump. But it 
does not address the issue of construction with waste versus dumping 
waste. Haight's observation of sulfide bearing rock heading for the wrong 
dump calls into question the efficacy of these measures. 
When reading the current mine expansion proposal, therefore, it is 
important to remember how apparently straighforward statements became 
extremly vague and contentious when problems occurred. Can this 
happen again, and can the problems be anticipated, or does 
environmental degradation have to occur to provide the necessary 
insight? Changes may be made as a result of the previous experience, as 
Jepson indicates above, but a review of ZMI's proposed amendment for 
mine expansion again shows a recognition of "the potential to produce 
ARD if not handled properly." And the waste rock is still characterized by 
Acid-Base Accounting, a method previously described by Jepson as an 
inappropriate predictive method. (Completeness Review,6/7/1993, #74) 
c) The Result: Stream Contamination 
Waste rock dumps and heaps at ZMI have been the source of seepage 
and leaks so egregious that one heap leach pad buttress has even been 
nicknamed the "Weeping Wall" for the numerous contaminated seeps 
which originate there. The company has tried to identify sources and 
prevent discharges, but severe contamination of area streams has 
resulted nonetheless. 
With contaminated water seeping from various points around the mine, the 
operators found themselves in the curious circumstance of being in 
compliance with their DSL permit while producing acid effluent in violation 
of Montana Water Quality laws administered by the Water Quality Division. 
ZMI attempted to cope with the acid drainage problem by collecting the 
contaminated seepage before it entered on-site drainages and pumping it 
back into the closed circuit. But contamination had already occurred, and it 
continued. DSL analysis of groundwater data at the end of 1992 
concluded that groundwater below both Ruby Gulch and Alder Gulch 
showed significant deterioration of water quality during mine life with Total 
Dissolved Solids and Sulfates increasing while pH decreased in 
monitoring wells. Data for the Rock Creek drainage showed "undesirable 
impacts to groundwater" below the Sullivan Park Pad, with sulfate values 
increasing and pH decreasing. In Montana Gulch, most of the drainage 
showed no ARD effects except below the 79-84 Pad, where TDS 
concentrations increased dramatically. (Gurrieri, 12/31/92) 
This is the context in which the EPA inspected the mine in May of 1993. 
They found that in seven separate locations, the pumpback was 
insufficient to collect and return all the contaminated effluent back into the 
process circuit. Seepage flowed past the pumpback stations and entered 
the area streams, which then left the property boundary. These point 
source discharges had no NPDES permits; they were unauthorized under 
the Montana Water Quality Act and violated the Clean Water Act. The * ^ ̂  
contaminated waters flowed not only from waste dumps containing 
unoxidized waste, but also from leach pads and other structures on site, 
such as the "Alder Spur Pads," the "Weeping Wall," the "85/86 Landusky 
Pad" and the "Gold Bug adit." (DHES, Civil Complaint, 8/24/93). The 
seepage called into question the integrity of the supposedly closed 
process circuit. Given that heap leach pads are part of the closed loop, 
cyanide solution should not have "migrated" and continue to "migrate 
through this (85/86) heap leach pad," and should not have "seeped to the 
base of the pad and discharged to surface and groundwater." (DHES, Civil 
Complaint, 8/24/93) 
EPA found the pumpback system in violation about a month before 
unusually severe summer rains overwhelmed the various stations and 
emphasized their inadequacy. On July, 15, A BLM inspector arrived at the 
mine to find that rains the night before had completely washed out the 
pumpback station at Carter Gulch, which in May when the EPA inspected 
had only allowed about 1-2 gallons per minute to seep past. (Mitchell, 
Inspection Report, 7/15/93) At this location, the drainage was filled with 
sediment and over 1000 gallons per minute were flowing past the point 
where the pumpback facilities used to stand. The inspector drove to Ruby 
Gulch, where during the May EPA inspections surface flow below the 
"weeping wall" pumpback and a secondary pumpback was minimal; 
approximately 5000 gallons per minute were flowing past both inoperable 
pumback stations. (Mitchell, Inspection Report, 7/18/93) The inspector then 
drove to Alder Spur, where a pumpback station was installed to collect 
seepage from the 83/84 leach pads. He found 1000 gallons per 
minute flowing past the pumpback station. 
The Department of Health and Environmental Sciences filed suit against 
the mine on August 24, 1993, for the unauthorized discharges to state 
waters. But the dramatic overflows of contaminated effluent which 
occurred after the rains observed by the BLM in July did not receive 
differentiated attention in the suit. No acknowledgement of these events as 
a violation appears in a Notice of Noncompliance or any other state 
document except the Inspection Reports. In fact, the document record does 
not indicate any effort by DSL or DHES to address the summer situation 
directly by requiring changes in pumpback location or construction. The 
lawsuit, like the EPA inspections, seeks to require the company to end the 
discharges or obtain MPDES permits for them. 
The company immediately sent the Water Quality Bureau a list of outfalls 
increasing their number of permitted discharges from three to seven. (ZMI 
to Reid, Letter, 8/26/93) Probably because the inadequacy of the 
pumpback system to deal with storm events was never addressed after the 
summer storm events, the company reconstructed the washed out facilities 
with minor changes but in a manner which would still render them 
inoperable during and after a storm event. An August 17 DSL inspections 
report states: 
The pumpback system which collects effluent from the dump toe and returns 
it to the processing circuit has been replaced. The original system was 
washed away during the storms of July. The new tank is located out of the 
channel and is secured to trees to prevent a similar event from 
reccurring. The tank is filled from small synthetic-lined collection ponds within 
the drainage which would still be washed away during storm events. 
Therefore, retention of acidic solution during storm runoff remains unlikely. 
The redesigned system does allow for more rapid repair of the pumpback 
system after storms, however. (Jepson, Inspection Report, 8/17/93) 
The document record does not contain any indication that Jepson's 
comments resulted in changes in the pumpback system. By recognizing 
the problem without demanding change, DSL is setting itself up for a 
scenario in which it must again claim at least partial responsibility when 
pumpback problems re-emerge. Despite the lesson of the July events, 
another storm will blow out the pumpback station. Acidic solution will once 
again leave the permit boundary in the flow of an area stream. 
Land Application and Solution Inventory Excess 
The original Zortman/Landusky permit adhered to the closed loop design 
and allowed for no solution discharge. The mine had a stipulated 
freeboard capacity thought to be able to handle a 100 year event, which it 
was not allowed to exceed. Yet the mine has exceeded the freeboard 
requirements repeatedly in the last decade, and wound up discharging 
treated solution to the environment. 
The problem at ZMI first appears in the document record as an 
unanticipated, emergency situation in 1986, when over 6 inches of rain fell 
overnight and two leach pads neared solution capacity. In order to prevent 
a catastrophic failure of heaps and impoundments, the operators 
neutralized and land applied 30 million gallons of cyanide solution with 
hypochlorite. They did so in cooperation with DSL and BLM, but without 
any permit authorizing the discharge, bypassing the mandate of the WQD 
to regulate water quality degradation. 
The discharge created an interagency conflict between DHES and DSL. 
The company was violating water quality laws in order to comply with 
freeboard capacity stipulations in their DSL permit. A December 1986 
letter from DHES advises ZMI that "continuing discharges would appear to 
represent further violation of the Montana Water Quality Act. Pending 
application for permits or amendments to permits with this Department or 
any other state agency does not relieve this company from responsibility 
pursuant to the Montana Water Quality Act." (Pilcher to Banning, Letter, 
12/23/86) DHES follows with a January, 1987 letter to ZMI reiterating that 
"this Department cannot endorse unauthorized discharges in order to 
comply with stipulations in your DSL operating permit" despite the 
emergency conditions. (Pilcher to ZMI, Letter, 1/16/87) Yet DHES never 
pursued the discharges as a violation of state law, and allowed ZMI to 
apply for a permit authorizing similar discharges in the future, although the 
discharge did result in cyanide contamination beyond the permit 
boundary. A 1993 inspection report states that levels of cyanide within 
health advisory limits have been commonly detected in the Alder Gulch 
drainage, and attributes the cyanide to the emergency land 
application of 1986. (DSL, Inspection Summaries, 5/12/93) 
After the 1986 episode, the mine's operating permit changed to 
acknowledge the problem and define a response. But the changes did 
little to prevent reoccurence. DSL revised the ZMI mining permit to allow 
land application when solution inventory exceeds freeboard capacity. DSL 
did not require increased solution capacity or other measures to prevent 
excessive solution inventory, however. Not surprisingly, solution 
imbalances occurred again within a few years of the 1986 problems. 
DSL inspectors made an interesting comment on the 1986 episode in May 
of 1993, about three days before the rains of an unusually wet summer 
began. "Today, more solution capacity exists [than in 1986] because there 
are more leach pads and solution can be transferred via pipeline between 
the Zortman and Landusky mines. The total solution capacity for the leach 
pads at both mines is 340 million gallons; the pads do not operate over 
60% capacity. Therefore approximately 136 million gallons of contingency 
capacity is available in the event major storms occur in the future." (DSL, 
Inspection Summaries 5/12/94) In spite of the additional capacity, by 
August of 1993, the company found itself in a position similar to the one it 
faced in 1986. "The water balance situation at Zortman is currently at a 
po in t  whe re  t he  excess  so lu t i on  i n  ou r  sys tem mus t  be  reduced  . . . .  
Zortman Mining cannot go into winter with the current process solution 
load. Our leach system would likely be stretched beyond capacity if high 
precipitation levels continue and next year's spring runoff contains 
significant moisture." (ZMI to Winegar, Letter, 8/19/93) 
ZMI states that although they are permitted to land apply, it would not be 
an effective strategy due to soil saturation caused by the wet weather. Th 
company proposed constructing two lined solution containment ponds on 
the top of a flat section of a leach pad. Engineering reports stated that 
doing so would reduce the factor of safety by about 5 percent, due to a 
reduction in the stability of the heap. (Sitka Corp. to Geyer, Letter, 8/20/93) 
Surprisingly, the issue disappears from the record until December, when 
DSL expresses concern that land application may be necessary in the 
spring and no short term LAD site has been proposed. (Winegar to Geyer, 
Letter, 12/28/93) The company gambled with the weather and won. Winter 
precipitation and spring run-off proved to be less than normal in 1994, and 
neither pond construction nor land application occurred as a result. 
What these events make clear is the difficulty of predicting precipitation at 
the site. State officials applauded ZMI's capacity to handle storms just 
days before summer rains filled the system. The 1993 episode illustrates 
how the system can handle a stretch of above average rainfall, but then be 
vulnerable to any additional storms. One rainfall event builds upon 
another; a number of smaller events can fill up a system just as easily as 
one big 100 year event, and this cumulative effect is difficult to assess or 
predict, yet seems more likely. The solution capacity required to contain a 
100 year event may be very different from that needed to contend with a 
16 8 fairly wet precipitation year or season, in which no single precipitation 
event is extraordinary. 
The degree of uncertainty which these calculations entail can be seen in 
ZMI's description of their water balance in an August,1993 letter. ZMI 
calculates various contingencies, given their solution balance of 250 
million gallons. They state that at the moment of writing the system could 
handle an additional 100 year precipitation event of 6" and still be able to 
handle an additional 2.9" of precipitation. Were this series of events to 
occur, however, then the system could not handle normal precipitation in 
the ensuing fall months. The letter states that, given solution balances at 
the time of writing, normal precipitation calculations for the winter months 
would bring a 12 million gallon solution surplus by May of 1994. The letter 
concludes by stating that if Zortman were to experience a 100 year wet 
year from August 1993 through April 1994, 18" of precipitation would enter 
the system and render land application necessary even with the proposed 
storage ponds on top of the Mill Gulch heap. (ZMI to Haight, Letter, 
8/23/93) 
Cvanide Leaks 
In September of 1993, a liner installed in a caustic pond was improperly 
sealed, but operators failed to notice the problem until the pond had been 
leaking for 20 days. Discovery occurred only after cyanide showed up in 
monitoring wells near the processing plant. Investigators could only 
approximate the solution loss as between 5000 and 10000 gallons, 
because the leakage occurred over such a long period. The cyanide 
travelled down into the fractured bedrock aquifer under the processing 
facility. The same aquifer served the town of Zortman's municipal water 
supply, raising the possibility of renewed contamination of the town's 
drinking water. (DSL to ZMI, Penalty Notice, 1/28/94) 
According to the Notice of Noncompliance, "the underlying clay liner was 
not able to retain the solution. As a result, cyanide solution could not be 
contained, and was released into the environment." (DSL to ZMI, NON 
#224, 1/6/94) Thus not only the faulty primary liner but the presumably 
intact secondary liner failed to prevent the release of solution. Despite the 
secondary liner's failure, ZMI continued to display confidence in its 
function when proposing to utilize the same liner system in its proposed 
expansion: "The pond design is expected to provide superior 
environmental performance due to the low intrinsic leakage rate of 
composite clay/synthetic liners and due to the low permeability of natural 
clay foundation materials below the ponds which will be compacted during 
construction for optimum density." (ZMI Completeness Responses, 4/5/93, 
#73) 
Unfortunately, this leak is only one of many at the Zortman/Landusky 
facilities, and the mine must be viewed in the context of repeated cyanide 
releases to groundwater. In 1983, the company experienced cyanide 
leaks on six separate occasions, prompting a lawsuit by the DHES which 
resulted in over $20,000 in fines. (DHES vs. ZMI, Stipulation and 
Agreement, 8/11/93) The cyanide leaks polluted the Zortman public water 
17 0 supply, which came to light when a mine employee turned on a tap in 
his home several days after a spill had occurred at the mine and smelled 
cyanide in the water. (Greene to Keenan, Memo, 11/9/82) 
The Zortman Expansion: Expanding a Troubled Mine? 
The proposed expansion at the Zortman site represents a radical 
departure from the operation which was permitted in 1979. The company 
has scraped away the surface ore bodies and now must dig deeper to find 
more. But digging deeper at this site means increasing the environmental 
danger. The original mine was expected to encounter oxide ores; the 
amendment for the proposed expansion acknowledges that more than half 
the waste rock to be produced, or 43 million tons out of a total of 54-60 
million tons, will be "non-oxidized material" capable of generating acid. 
(ZMI, Completeness Review, 4/5/93) The company's responses to a 
review of their permit amendment indicate that the waste rock produced 
will also have acid formation potential:"Static tests of waste rock indicates 
that a portion of the waste has the potential to produce ARD if not handled 
properly. Although the average Acid-Base Accounting (ABA) score of the 
waste is approximately -18, most of the waste has an ABA score of -10 and 
higher. (ZMI, Completeness Review, 4/5/93)." 
The proposal must be seen in terms of the results of past mining practices 
at the site, which have resulted in the large scale and continuing 
contamination detailed below. It should be noted that previous expansions 
recognized the potential for ARD related problems while either misjudging 
their likelihood for development or proposing inadequate mitigation 
measures. Given current circumstances, before ZMI should be 
granted permission to expand in a way that increases the risk of ARD it 
should first prove it can completely resolve its current acid rock problems. 
Further, the problems which have occurred leave a great deal of doubt as 
to whether the company, despite assurances, can mine increasingly risky 
ore without creating new acid problems. Given the damage to the area 
which has already occurred, the surrounding environs should not have to 
endure that risk. 
Accident. Negligence and Intent 
At Zortman-Landusky, a mine inspection on May 12, 1993 found two 
different drainages had been severely impacted by heavy equipment. 
Inspectors found the road leading from the Alder Gulch Waste Rock Dump 
had been extended down into Carter Gulch, and then down the Carter 
Gulch stream bed. The inspection Report states, "No erosion control was 
evident. . . and no effort had been made to minimize disturbance. Within 
Carter Gulch the road completely filled the drainage bottom, and flow 
within the gulch infiltrated into the rock fill, then discharged from this fill 
several hundred feet downstream . . . ." (DSL, Inspection Summaries, 
5/12/93) In writing to the BLM, ZMI contends that an equipment operator 
misunderstood his instructions, and instead of unblocking an already 
extant road, inferred that a new road needed to be created. (Geyer to 
Olsen, Letter, 6/27/93) 
The May 11 inspection also discovered that a bulldozer had "walked 
down" the creek bottom of Mill Gulch, displacing rock and uprooting 
vegetation. While the May DSL Inspection Summary describes the 
disturbance as "minimal," a BLM report of the same date describes 
workers stacking cleared vegetation and moving rock in order to re­
establish the stream channel. (BLM, Inspection Report, 5/11/93) Mine 
officials reported that the dozer slipped off a snowy road during the winter 
and then attempted to find a way out of the creek bottom by travelling 
along the gulch with the blade up. 
To label these incidents accidental may be a convenient recourse, given 
the DSL system of assessing penalties for breaches of the operating 
permit. An accident tends to deflect responsibility from the company to the 
hapless worker, and indeed, the penalty for an "accident" is less than for 
"negligence." The "Definitions of Conduct" which accompany the 
assessment of a penalty for a violation read: "Accidental: not reasonably 
foreseeable or within the control of the operator; Negligent: failing to meet 
the level of care reasonably required by the nature of the activity; Gross: 
concious and voluntary act or omission which is likely to result in injury, 
reckless indifference to the results; Intentional: acting on purpose and in 
disregard of consequences, intending to violate the law; Aggravated: 
wanton violation of the law, knowing the effect would be to cause serious 
environmental or personal harm." (DSL to ZMI, Penalty, 1/28/94) 
Thus an accident is the least serious of the offenses listed, yet when 
considering the unauthorized construction of a road or a bulldozer driving 
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across a pond, the lines are less clear. When instructions are unclear, 
is the operator responsible, and does this constitute negligence? Would a 
lack of clear rules for equipment operation constitute a gross violation if 
the above events ensued as a result? Interestingly, the company response 
in each of these situations is to deflect blame toward the individual worker 
instead of the operator, thereby avoiding the question of company 
negligence by implying that the actions of a single worker are beyond the 
operator's control. 
Yet heavy equipment operation was involved in environmental mishaps 
on more than one occasion, and that faulty communication resulting in 
environmentally damaging construction occurred more than once as well. 
Such patterns, even if they are patterns of accidents, would appear to 
have more significance and accrue more responsibility than the term 
"accident" suggests. 
Wildlife Deaths 
The Zortman/Landusky facilities have been responsible for a number of 
wildlife deaths, including bighorn sheep, deer and migratory birds. Soon 
after the mine began operation, bighorn sheep began using the cyanide 
sprayed heaps as salt licks. Despite permit requirements, the heaps and 
ponds had not been fenced, allowing the animals easy access. In January, 
1983, the Dept. of Fish, Wildlife and Parks surveyed the bighorn 
population in the area, found them to be in good health, and 
recommended the placement of salt licks around the mine perimeter to 
discourage the animals and spare the company the expense of the 
fencing required in the permit. (Wentland to Geyer, Letter, 1/13/83) By 
August, 1983, however, several sheep had been found dead on the 
heaps, and the DFWP required the company to fence the heaps and 
ponds. 
The completion of fencing did not prevent wildlife mortalities from 
continuing. Mule deer died from drinking process waters, sometimes 
gaining access during contruction, when the fence was down, and leaping 
the fencing on other occasions. On one occasion, a dead deer was found 
outside the fence, near a cracked pipe that transported cyanide solution. 
(Lyle to DSL, Report, 12/31/91) 
In June, 1991, a flock of 40 gulls landed in the barren pond at the Zortman 
site. 30 perished; mine personnel rescued and revived the rest. (Fitzpartick 
to Olsen, 6/14/91) The mine responded by ordering netting for the ponds 
at both the Zortman and Landusky sites. The BLM required modifications 
to the Operating Plan, which included monthly reporting of wildlife 
mortalities. (Miller to ZMI, Letter, 6/17/91) Prior to July, 1991, the company 
was not required to report wildlife mortalities and an accurate assessment 
cannot be made. 
Case Study 4: The Kendall Mine 
Overview 
Ownership of the Kendall mine near Lewistown, Montana has 
undergone several changes since heap leach operations began under 
Triad Resources in 1984. Ownership transferred to Grayhall Resources in 
1986 following a state lawsuit against Triad. Grayhall went bankrupt in 
1986, and operation was taken over in 1987 by Canyon Resources in 
1987. Canyon increased the operating area by 400 percent, including 
expansion of an existing heap leach pad and development of four more 
open pits in an amendment approved by DSL in 1990. The mine serves as 
an example of how financial difficulties can lead to poor management, 
enforcement limitations and environmental problems. Since the mine 
required land application on three separate occasions, it demonstrates the 
evolution in state attitudes towards cyanide neutralization and discharge. 
Land Application 
Excess solution problems at the Kendall site began soon after Triad 
obtained its permit. Twice in 1985, the cyanide bearing ponds filled to 
capacity and then overflowed onto the ground. No land application took 
place; the operator just tried to contain as much solution as possible. Land 
application began under duress in 1986, as a bankrupt Grayhall 
Resources disregarded winter shutdown requirements and allowed the 
system to fill up to the brink of disaster. Canyon managed the land 
application during that episode, and during two subsequent episodes in 
1991 and 1993 as well. The following is an exploration of the issues 
involved with land application at the mine. 
a) Overflowing Ponds Before Land Application 
The Triad experience in 1985 with excess solution could serve as a 
model for the problems to come at other sites. All the factors which have 
resulted in land application were involved: faulty diversion ditches, 
inadequate storage capacity, unfulfilled winter shutdown procedures and 
excessive precipitation. But land application was not yet an option. 
In April, 1985, mine inspectors found all the ponds in the system "brim full," 
with the pregnant pond overflowing into an unlined emergency catchment 
pond. The mine plan called for the mine to neutralize excess solution with 
hypochlorite and pump it to the emergency catchment pond, but the mine 
was diverting run-off to the catchment pond instead. (Baltzer, Inspection 
Report, 4/16/85) 
Later inspection reports list the causes of the solution excess. The 
company had not constructed diversion ditches to permit specifications. 
The pregnant pond capacity was not large enough to accomodate 
potential runoff. The company did not draw down ponds sufficiently prior to 
winter shutdown, and continued to add water to the system past the point 
in October when evaporation ceased. (Lewis, Inspection Report, 4/18/85) 
In May, 1985, the mine pumped the contaminated water in the unlined 
emergency catchment pond to the heap leach pads, where evaporation of 
excess solution could take place. (Lewis, Note, 5/2/85) The mine also 
began planning construction of three additional, lined ponds to handle 
excess solution. Before the company completed the ponds, however, 
storms overwhelmed the system again. In an August, 1985 letter to the 
state, the mine's manager described the situation before the storm: 
"Prior to the rainstorm of August 2, 1985, the barren pond had three feet of 
freeboard, the preg [nant] pond two feet of freeboard, and for all intents 
and purposes, the lower pregnant pond was empty." (Dugdale to Lewis, 
Letter, 8/28/85) After the storm, all the ponds were full. When a light 
rainstorm hit on August 16, the mine had no additional capacity. The 
mine's barren pond overflowed. (Lewis, Note, 8/5/85) The pregnant pond 
also overtopped. (Lewis, Inspection Report, 8/16/85) The company dug an 
unlined emergency pond to hold excess solution and reduce pressure on 
the system. The operator estimated that at least 20 pounds of cyanide 
escaped in an unquantified volume of solution. (Lewis, Note, 8/5/85) 
The DHES had already filed a lawsuit against the company on August 1, 
requesting $10,000 in fines as a result of repeated losses of cyanide and 
associated contamination of ground and surface waters. (DHES, Civil 
Complaint, 8/1/85) No Notices of Noncompliance appear in the document 
record against the company, although DSL inspections recognize 
numerous breaches of the mining permit. The DHES collected $2000 in 
fines when Grayhall Resources took over the mine. The company agreed 
to a series of requirements meant to put an end to cyanide losses from the 
site. 
b) Faulty Winter Shutdown Procedures 
Unfortunately, Grayhall failed to improve management of the mine, and by 
the spring of 1987 there was once again a dangerous excess of solution in 
the system. The situation which developed at the Kendall mine in 1986 
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again illustrates how solution imbalances can occur through operator 
negligence, leaving few options but overflowing, digging unlined 
emergency ponds or land application. Winter shutdown requires the 
operator to begin to reduce solution inventory as fall approaches in 
anticipation of the typically large volume of flows entering the system with 
spring snowmelt and rains. Yet at the Kendall mine, when solution volume 
should have been decreasing, the inventory remained over a million 
gallons above that needed to handle a typical spring runoff (Dennis Smith, 
Meeting Memo, 10/29/86). Despite several warnings from the state, the 
company did nothing to alleviate the excess water in the system until it 
was too late to take any action. In August, DSL officials sent a list of 15 
areas along diversion ditches needing to be cleaned out and rerouted to 
prevent the continued flow of run-off into the closed system (Smith to 
Mountjoy, Letter, 8/13/86). The letter also requested continual spraying of 
solution from the ponds onto the heaps to aid in evaporation before winter 
shutdown. An inspection report dated September 11 states that there is no 
question that the ponds don't have adequate storage capacity for winter 
shutdown (Baltzer, Inspection Report, 9/11/86). 
Three days later, the company sent a letter committing to winter shutdown 
conditions in which one pad and two ponds full of cyanide solution would 
be empty by the onset of winter. Nothing happened. At the end of October, 
with winter fast approaching, DSL officials met with DHES personnel in an 
attempt to find a rapid means of solution disposal and thereby "prevent an 
uncontrolled discharge in the spring." (Smith, Meeting Memo, 10/29/86) 
The parties agreed to land application as the best option in an emergency 
situation, with DHES stating that it would not continually issue 
administrative orders to allow discharge. However, no such action 
occurred before the ground froze and land application was no longer an 
option according to the agencies. A December 15 inspection found the 
supposedly empty ponds and pad approaching capacity, and the system 
under ice. (Spano, Inspection Report, 12/15/86) 
The state was left with no mitigation options, other than waiting to see what 
happened in the spring. In fact, the December inspection report requests 
the installation of a spillway on one of the ponds, (Pond 5) "to prevent the 
dike from washing out next spring should the pond overtop." (Spano, 
Inspection Report, 12/15/86) A memo dated January 5, 1987 states that 
the DSL issued a Notice of Noncompliance because, despite numerous 
cautionings, "Management at the mine chose to maintain the facility at 
"status quo." As a result, there is a good chance that a discharge of 
process water will occur in the spring as snow melts and rain accumulates 
exceeding the small capacity left (Smith to Amestoy, Memo, 1/5/87)." 
With the arrival of spring, the situation, in the words of DSL inspector Scott 
Spano, was "critical." (Spano, Inspection Report, 4/8/87) Spano's report 
states that Pond 5 had 16 inches of freeboard before a discharge 
occurred, with a 70% chance of rain, snow on the hillsides above and 
unmelted ice covering most of the ponds. The operator responded by 
preparing to discharge neutralized solution on south-facing slopes. Spano 
states, "Although this not an approved discharge by DSL/DHES, there is 
no other choice. Failure to do so would result in an uncontrolled, 
untreated discharge from Pond 5 down the valley." 
b) From Closed Loop to Permitted Discharge 
The Grayhall permit committed to winter shutdown with adequate capacity 
to allow for spring run-off, without entertaining the possibility of what might 
ensue if the company or the weather failed to live up to permitted 
specifications. It made no mention of land application procedures in the 
case of emergency and therefore allowed for no discharge. In the fall of 
1986 the problem became clear when Grayhall Resources failed to reduce 
solution levels in the system to a safe volume. Under the circumstances, a 
regulated discharge, if possible, was preferable to an uncontrolled 
discharge, and DSL and DHES set about approving an emergency permit 
to discharge by land application. 
The state issued the permit in 1987 with a number of stipulations. With 
Grayhall in bankruptcy, Canyon Resources carried out the land application 
under the rules of the permit approved by the state. The rules included: 1) 
batch treatment of cyanide solution in a pond dedicated to the purpose, 
with a 24 hour waiting period during which time the solution would be 
circulated to ensure complete neutralization throughout; 2) three 
consecutive tests of the batch indicating that cyanide levels were lower 
than the state standard; 3) testing of the solution as it was applied every 
two hours to ensure that the solution was meeting the state standard; 4) a 
maximum of 1 million gallons applied. 
The emergency permit to discharge was intended to be a one time 
affair, but the DSL's response to the emergency was to modify the permit 
to allow land application, converting the closed loop system to a system 
that discharges to the environment. Kit Walther, in an early 1987 letter, 
reports Canyon's Bob Perry as stating that he wants a permanent 
amendment so that in the future, controlled land application discharges 
can occur if the operation cannot attain the required freeboard through 
evaporation. (Walther to Eckles, Letter, 4/1/87) In essence, the operator 
wanted land application to become a routine management tool, not an 
emergency measure subject to DSL incident by incident approval. Even 
after a 1990 amendment authorized land application, the question of 
whether land application was an emergency or routine measure remained 
unresolved. 
Canyon's 1990 amendment to their operating permit expanded the mine's 
operations dramatically. Since the amount of solution in the system also 
increased dramatically, the expansion should have necessitated 
increased storage capacity. But the amendment contended that previously 
constructed ponds would provide adequate storage capacity to meet the 
permit requirements. The only addition to the excess solution 
management system was a land application plan designed to handle a 
100 year storm. Land application went from an unpermitted emergency 
measure to become an integral part of excess solution management. 
Agency comments on the amendment application recommended that 
Canyon consider 1) switching from Calcium hypochlorite to hydrogen 
peroxide, due to the toxicity of the Chlorine produced; and 2) 
increase storage capacity given that actual precipitation in the area does 
not seem to coincide with the average measurements on which the 
original storage capacity calculations were based. These were only 
recommendations, however, not requirements, which Canyon perhaps 
considered but decided not to pursue. 
The terms of the 1990 amendment allowed Canyon to land apply 
whenever a lack of storage capacity rendered it necessary. The 
amendment committed to batch detoxification with a 24 hour holding 
period and three negative tests for cyanide levels before discharging onto 
land. However, testing of the discharge from the batch pond, according to 
the amendment, must occur every eight hours, not every two hours as the 
state required earlier in 1987 when issuing the emergency permit to 
discharge. Circulation of the solution within the batch pond, a requirement 
for the emergency discharge, is not mentioned in the amendment. 
Thus the amendment clearly delineated the procedures for land 
application to take place without settling the crucial issue of who controlled 
land application, the company or the state. Land application began as a 
last ditch, emergency option; the amendment approved its use whenever a 
solution budget imbalance rendered it necessary, an undefinitive phrase 
open to multiple interpretations. In fact, both the permitting process and the 
amendment's final terms appear to diminish the state's power to exert 
control over land application and solution management. The state 
recommends, but does not require, design improvements which later 
events suggest might have spared the environment. The non­
emergency land application process requires less care from Canyon in 
ensuring complete neutralization before discharge than the emergency 
process. It wasn't long before these issues, implicit in the permitting stage, 
became regulatory and enforcement problems. 
c) Diversion Ditch Maintenance 
Less than two years later, during the summer of 1991, Canyon again 
employed the land application system. What caused the land application? 
A 100 year storm? No. The BLM, in a July, 1991 letter, points out the 
following: 1) the amount of rainfall in and around Lewistown has been 
heavy but not extraordinary: 2) the land application areas are intended for 
emergency use only, not routine solution inventory management, and 3) 
the freeboard requirement means that considerably more freeboard than 
was available in Canyon's system must be present in the fall to 
accommodate spring run-off and still maintain the required storage 
capacity throughout. The BLM concludes by requesting Canyon to 
recalculate its water solution inventory (Miller to Benbow, Letter, 7/3/91). 
The letter implies that inadequate facilities or a problem with procedures 
have created the necessity for land application, not extraordinary weather 
A site inspection in June, in the midst of land application, revealed that a 
diversion ditch had failed near Pond 7, adding 1 million gallons of run-off 
to the system as well as rock and sediment to the pond (Pagel, Inspection 
Report, 6/27/91). These documents indicate that in spite of the 1989 
amendment's assurances, the system either lacked the capacity to 
maintain freeboard requirements in an above average year and/or 
that poor adherence to winter shutdown procedures failed to prepare for 
the possibility of a more wet than normal spring. Yet the system was 
supposed to be designed to cope with a 100 year event at all times, and 
Canyon had the opportunity, in 1989, to construct the capacity to do so. 
The situation was exacerbated by the failure of the diversion ditch, which 
was more a maintenance problem than a weather problem. An October 
1991 list of problems at the mine, compiled by DSL, states that land 
application became necessary because "1) company did not meet 
required freeboard going in to winter shutdown; 2) diversion ditch was not 
adequate to divert runoff and failed adding ~ 1, 000, 000 gallons to the 
system (DSL, Meeting List, 10/24/91)." The memo suggests that the 
company, not the weather, is to blame. 
c) Continuous vs. Batch Application 
On May 10, 1991, Canyon called DSL to report that they had only 2.9 feet 
of freeboard instead of the 6.3 feet required by the permit, and were batch 
treating 700, 000 gallons of solution with calcium hypochlorite for land 
application. Three days later they called again, this time to report that they 
had begun continuous land application at 4:15 AM after receiving a heavy 
rain. They committed to returning to batch treatment "about Wednesday." 
As for the state's response, a June, 1991 Inspection Report inquired 
belatedly, "Do they get to land apply when they want?" (Pagel, Inspection 
Report, 6/27/91) 
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The permit specifically required that the company use a batch method 
of treatment before land applying; continuous application is a violation of 
the permit. Worse, the company did not return to batch application on 
Wednesday or throughout the land application process. On July 22, 1991, 
Canyon's Robert Vine informed DSL that the company had disposed of 
over 6.2 million gallons of solution and over 280, 000 pounds of calcium 
hypochlorite using "direct injection of calcium hypochlorite into the intake 
side of the land application pump (Vine to Spano, Letter, 7/22/91)." Thus 
there was no 24 hour holding time to ensure neutralization of the batch, 
making it all the more likely that an oscillation in the rate of calcium 
hypochlorite introduction or a variation in the solution's cyanide levels 
would bring about a cyanide discharge. The company tested the 
discharge every two hours during the day and every six hours at night. 
This is more frequent than the eight hours required by the permit, but the 
permit presumed a batch treatment which had already undergone three 
negative tests for cvanide before being released. The eight hour tests 
were therefore an additional precaution. In the case of continuous 
discharge, no preliminary testing had been done to determine the cyanide 
level. The testing occurred as the solution left the system at 280 gallons a 
minute. A review of the testing data shows two tests with levels of 12.5 
mg/L free cyanide and 5.0 mg/L free cyanide, respectively. (Kendall, Table 
of Land Applied Solutions, 1991) All sorts of cyanide variation could have 
occurred during the intervals between tests, and even if a test detected 
high cyanide, some quantity of the solution would have already left the 
system before it could be turned off. 
Canyon attempted to counter this possibility by adding additional 
calcium hypochlorite to the discharge to more than account for any 
variation in the cyanide level. However, direct injection required 
overchlorination, which in turn damaged the environment. Scott Spano, in 
a July 1991 reply to Vince's letter, informed Canyon that direct injection 
usually leads to overchlorination and that a batch treatment method is 
preferable, but does not mention that the permit compels Canyon to utilize 
batch treatment (Spano to Vine, Letter, 7/31/91). An October 1991 DSL list 
of problems at the site includes "Water treated during land application was 
overchlorinated, probably as a result of direct injection of chlorine instead 
of batch treatment, as was required by their permit (DSL, Meeting List, 
10/24/91)." 
The environmental result of the land application is best described by two 
inspection reports by the DSL's Joe Frazier. In May, 1991, Frazier notes 
"white precipitate coats surface of spray area and standing vegetation 
(Frazier, Inspection Report, 5/29/91) ." A month later, Frazier's inspection 
reports "some of the understory (grasses and forbs) is currently dead or 
dying. The coniferous vegetation shows no effect although most is coated 
with a white precipitate up to 3' to 4' above ground level .... Water was 
seeping at several locations below and downgradient of the spray area. 
Foam was present at the largest seep (Frazier, Inspection Report, 
6/25/91)." Spano's July, 1991 letter implies that overchlorination, 
particularly without the 24 hour wait to dissipate free chlorine ions, leads to 
application of a solution that is extremely toxic to plants and aquatic life. 
As a result of Canyon's activities, vegetative mortality can be expected to 
take place. (Spano to Vine, Letter, 7/31/91) A year later, in 1992, a 
DSL memo indicates that Canyon had requested to move their land 
application area because the "application of +6,000,000 gallons last year 
caused the silty clay soil on LAD 3 area to slip toward Leach Pad 4 and 
permanent diversion ditch (Snyder, Memo, 6/3/92)." In viewing these facts, 
it should be remembered that the heap leach operation began as a closed 
system without any discharge, and that the state recommended in 1989 
that Canyon use hydrogen peroxide, not calcium hypochlorite, in any 
future discharges. 
In sum, Canyon land applied in a way that was not only detrimental to the 
environment but was in clear violation of their 1989 permit. The company, 
not the state, dictated the terms of land application, telling the DSL when 
and how the process would proceed. Even when these steps violated the 
amended permit, the DSL complained but did not issue a Notice of 
Noncompliance. Amending the permit was apparently interpreted by both 
parties as a relinquishment of state control. 
d) Calcium Hypochlorite versus Hydrogen Peroxide 
In the summer of 1993, Canyon once again found itself without enough 
freeboard. In correspondence sent to DSL during the 1991 episode, the 
company stated its intention to increase the size and storage capacity of 
Pond 8 in order to alleviate the need for future discharges. No evidence 
appears in the document record that the increase took place, and 
whatever the remedial steps taken in the wake of 1991, they were not 
enough. 
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At the end of July, 1993, the company informed the state that they did not 
have adequate freeboard capacity and intended to land apply, using a 
batch method. They further stated that testing would be conducted as 
outlined in the Plan of Operations. In spite of state recommendations and 
the vegetation mortality which occurred in 1991, the company proposed to 
continue using calcium hypochlorite (Vine to DSL, Letter, 7/27/93). 
The DHES responded with a letter stating that Canyon, in order to comply 
with the Montana Water Quality Act, needed a permit to discharge 
wastewaters into state waters, and such a permit must be issued, as in 
1987, before the mine could begin land applying (Fraser to Vine, Letter, 
8/10/93). Canyon maintained, however, that DHES was involved in the 
permitting process which resulted in the DSL approved Plan of Operations 
and allows Canyon to discharge whenever necessary without a separate 
permit (Ryan to Reid, Letter, 8/13/93). Canyon states that "we will continue 
to coordinate land application at the Kendall Mine with the DSL and the 
BLM in the approved manner specified by our permit," and commences 
with the application of calcium hypochlorite neutralized solution. 
Meanwhile, DHES meeting notes indicate that the application of calcium 
hypochlorite treated solution in such quantities constitutes a point source 
discharge, for which state law requires a permit, and that the state's non-
degradation rules may also be applicable. The notes show the state 
considering options under non-degradation, including a non-degradation 
review and authorization, a decision to consider the discharge 
insignificant, and a compliance order (Reid, Meeting Notes, 8/24/93). A 
September, 1993 letter from Canyon to DHES, reporting Canyon's 
understanding of the state's position, suggests that DHES and DSL 
planned to "remodel" permit requirements for the mine without continuing 
to press the issue on the need for a separate permit. 
Perhaps anticipating the changes, Canyon switched to hydrogen peroxide 
in September, 1993. But the company also switched again to continuous 
discharge, which was not approved in their plan of operations. A 
September 14, 1993 letter informed DSL that the company plans to pump 
treated water to Pond 3, from which the same volume of water would be 
constantly drained to the land application area (Vine to Winegar, Letter, 
9/24/93). While the switch may have represented an improvement, and the 
methodology may have been appropriate, they were not part of the 
approved permit, and do not appear to undergo any review or approval 
process. It seems somewhat ironic that the company stated its strict 
adherence to the existing permit when DHES requested an additional 
discharge permit, and yet less than a month later the company was 
defining its own land application regime without a process of review and 
approval. 
Inadequate Baseline and Degradation Uncertainty 
In order to determine whether a leak has occurred at the site, current 
cyanide levels in groundwater must be compared to baseline data - data 
collected before the operation in question began. At Canyon's Kendall 
mine, current cyanide levels have been attributed to a combination of 
historic cyanide seeping through old tailings and spills from the previous 
operator, Grayhall. It is not possible to distinguish between the two 
sources, because Grayhall's original permit included only one test at one 
groundwater monitoring well and revealed the results only as < .02 m/l 
total cyanide. No other parameters were tested. What little baseline data 
was gathered did not indicate the presence of any historic cyanide before 
Grayhall. Thus it is not possible to characterize the movements of cyanide 
beneath the surface, or attribute elevated monitoring well readings to 
underground cyanide migration. The baseline data for groundwater which 
are contained in Canyon's 1989 amended permit of operations include 
more parameters but are still based on only one day's testing. Given the 
unpredictable movement of unknown quantities of solutions beneath the 
surface, one day's result may be very different from the next, and may be 
far higher or far lower than the average for the well. 
Thus when a tear in the primary liner leaked solution out of the system, as 
occurred in April 1993, the only way of knowing if the secondary liner 
contained the solution entirely was to look at the monitoring well results 
downgradient. The downgradient well had no detectable CN, and the 
detection limit of the method used was .005 ppm. Hence there was either 
no CN present or less than .005 ppm. DSL assumed that .005 ppm was 
the ambient level, concluding there was no degradation. If they said there 
was no measurable degradation, their conclusion would be quite 
acceptable and the problem would be the detection limit. 
Canyon exploited similar uncertainty in arguing against responsibility for 
elevated readings at a number of wells. A summary of 1989 data, which 
included high cyanide readings at several wells, states, "Cyanide in 
groundwater appears to reach maximum concentrations during the spring 
and early summer months. According to a Canyon report, increased 
volume of water moving through the alluvial material during the spring 
months could liberate weakly bound cyanide in the alluvium. Naturally 
occurring cyanide, the report continues, occurring in concentrations up to 
.39 mg/l total cyanide in nearby areas undisturbed by current mining, 
could also enter the hydrologic cycle during spring thaw and runoff 
(Kendall, Water Quality Summary Report, 1989)." Nick Bugosh, 
commenting for DHES, reached an opposite, and equally plausible 
conclusion: "Perhaps the rise is attributable to spring start -up discharging 
more solution over pads and ponds . . . ." (Bugosh to Brown, Memo, 
1/29/90) In other words, tears or leaks in the system may have occurred 
over the winter, and the addition of new solution may have caused the 
elevated spring readings. Either explanation could be valid. 
In a similar vein, Canyon responded to a nearby rancher's contention that 
Pad 3 is leaking and showing cyanide in monitoring well TMW - 6 by 
blaming elevated cyanide readings on spills committed by their 
predecessor, Grayhall. "We believe it is leakage prior to 1988 that is 
showing up in TMW-6 on June 6, 1989, that has been mobilized by the 
heavy spring run off and rains. . . . [Canyon] believes that cyanide solution 
seeped into the Pad 3 area between the time Grayhall began leaching 
and the time Canyon Resources arrived in 1987. . . . The entire pad and 
pond complex has a history of prior cyanide contamination . . . . " (Kendall, 
Question Responses, 6/28/89)Canyon's contention could have been 
correct. Given the unpredictable nature of the situation and the lack of 1 9 2 
long term baseline data to characterize fluctuation prior to their operation, 
it would be difficult to prove otherwise unless an actual breach in the 
system was observed. But the opposing contention might also be valid. 
Liner Integrity and Cvanide Leaks 
Canyon has had two documented leaks of solution from the permit 
boundary since assuming responsibility. Yet one leak may reveal a 
number of problems. Such was the case with a leak which occurred for an 
unknown length of time early in 1991. Mine officials first suspected a 
problem when they detected water flowing from a sub-drain pipe near 
solution Pond 3B. Inspection of 3B found small tears in the liner, but the 
quantity and sewage smell of the solution found in a collection pond 
downstream of Pond 3B suggested another leak. Canyon traced the flow 
of this solution to a seep in a hillside above Pond 3B. Tests indicated the 
presence of high cyanide levels in the seep. Canyon then proceeded to 
the processing plant uphill from the seep, where they found that the 
grouting around the drains had cracked. 
However, the cyanide solution should have been contained by Pond 1, 
since the floor drains drained into it. But Pond 1 also had a leak, allowing 
the solution to drain down the hillside, bypass Pond 3B and flow into the 
collection pond and a ditch which led into Pond 6. Pond 6 should have 
contained the solution, but a bulldozer had driven out onto the pond liner, 
tearing it, and had pushed a quantity of sharp, coarse fragments onto the 
liner, causing additional punctures. The solution then drained out of Pond 
6 and into the surrounding environment. One apparent leak turned ' 
out to be many. 
In the second incident, in September 1991 employees cleaning part of the 
process system failed to equalize pressure by closing the proper valves in 
the pressurized cyanide solution lines. A pipe inside the metal recovery 
plant ruptured under the resulting excess pressure, releasing 2500-3000 
gallons of solution into a diversion ditch outside. Emergency drains which 
were supposed to catch any release and funnel it into a lined pond were 
plugged because the pond was in the process of receiving a new liner. 
Pumpback captured some of the cyanide solution, but the rest flowed past 
the permit boundary in storm water contaminated by the spill. (DSL, News 
Release, 10/1/91) 
Heap Stability: A Known and Unanswered Question 
In the spring of 1986, Grayhall filed for bankruptcy protection, and DSL 
inspectors found Grayhall's operations in a state of disarray. A March 1986 
report describes most of the problems as relating to the recent construction 
of Leach Pad 3 (Smith, Inspection Report, 3/28/86). They found the 
diversion ditch constructed above Pad 3 had almost filled completely with 
sediment. They found Grayhall had not disposed of the plastic which 
covered the Pad for the winter; it remained on the top of the heap, 
indicating that the company had not been actively pursuing preparations 
for the spring. They found that the company had proceeded with leaching 
on Pad 3 even though it had not completed constructing the parts of the 
heap designed to protect the environment. The March report cites the * ^ ̂  
need to finish lining the pad, place bentonite over all exposed PVC and 
extend the liner up to the top of the dike. In addition, spillways to Pad 3 
had not been constructed, so that the pressurized solution lines ran 
outside of lined spillways. 
A July, 1986 follow-up inspection states, "I don't see where any significant 
work has been completed since the last inspection almost three months 
ago (Spano, Inspection Report, 7/29/86)." The construction work on Pad 3 
was still incomplete; the liners had not been pulled up to the top of the 
dike, and in many places were covered with cyanide bearing ore. 
Leachate had ponded on the east side of the pad and was 5 inches away 
from spilling beyond the liner and contacting the soil. An August 1, 1986 
letter from DSL informed Grayhall that the entire pad must be lined with 
PVC and a cover of fine tailings, in accordance with the permit (Manley to 
Mountjoy, Letter, 8/1/86). 
The written record indicates that Pad 3 construction did not proceed in a 
satisfactory manner, and it contains little evidence that Grayhall made 
construction modifications to Leach Pad 3. An August 13, 1986 letter to 
Grayhall quotes Steve Mountjoy, Grayhall's operator, as stating there is no 
more PVC on site and no money to buy more and finish lining the pad 
(Smith to Mountjoy, Letter, 8/13/86). Yet in a July 17, 1986 letter, Mountjoy 
stated that the spillways had been completed and the pressurized lines 
placed in them (Mountjoy to Manley, Letter, 7/17/86). He also claimed that 
Pad 3 construction has been completed according to permit 
requirements. No further specific references to Pad 3 construction appear 
in the record. 
Thus Canyon inherited Leach Pad 3, whose construction was already 
suspect. In 1989, Canyon proposed to expand Leach Pad 3 and combine 
it with Leach Pad 4 into one big pad. In early 1989, the company submitted 
a proposed amendment, and the state completed an environmental 
assessment. A public hearing was held on the amendment on June 19, 
1989. What was not available to the public for comment during the hearing 
were the results of an auger drilled core sample of the Leach Pad 3 dike, 
which indicated that the pad's lack of completion was more than 
superficial. The core sample was taken because DSL decided a stability 
analysis of the pad was needed. Originally, no stability analysis of the 
expansion was planned. Craig Pagel of DSL, after a review of Leach Pad 
3's history which revealed that it was designed and permitted without 
simulation or geotechnical stability analysis, requested a stability analysis 
for the expansion (Pagel to Walther, Memo, 6/5/89). The stability analysis, 
performed by a consultant to Canyon before the hearing, concluded that 
the pad was stable, based on "conservative" assumptions and "assuming 
the subsurface conditions are as described by others." These assumptions 
turned out to be wrong. 
An auger hole drilled into the dike face revealed that Grayhall did not 
construct the Leach Pad according to the permitted conditions upon which 
the stability analysis was based. Leach Pad 3 construction was supposed 
to include topsoil removal, foundation preparation and compaction of 196 
a six inch clay liner, placement of a tailings layer over the clay liner and 
installation of a smooth PVC liner. The auger hole encountered roots and 
topsoil at the dike base; the topsoil was not stripped and the clay and 
tailings layers were not implemented. In addition, the stability analysis 
assumed drained foundation conditions, when in fact the foundation was 
constructed without underdrains and limited foundation preparation and 
showed evidence of seepage in the dike face (Pagel to Cole, Memo, 
8/2/89). Not only was the heap lacking two of its three liners, but its 
potential lack of stability raised the possibility of the heap sliding down 
over the dike and off the PVC liner, releasing huge quantities of cyanide. 
The results of the core sample, which called into question the conclusion 
of stability, appeared after the public comment period had ended and 
therefore were not disclosed at the public meeting on the expansion. 
Pagel, in a August 2, 1989 interdepartmental memo, disagreed with the 
"truncation" of the review process and stated his belief that more thorough 
review and the inclusion of the core sample results would have changed 
the environmental assessment conclusions which approved the 
expansion (Pagel to Cole, Memo, 8/2/89). 
Canyon's response was to conduct further stability analyses which 
concluded that while the poor construction resulted in an unquantifiable 
risk of failure, expanding the pad would not increase the likelihood of dike 
failure. The company also agreed to install a meter to measure slope 
movement and thus deformation of the pad's walls. However, neither of 
these actions addressed the question of whether or not the Pad was 
actually stable given its dubious foundation. The slope indicator might tell 
if the dike was failing, but it wouldn't stop the failure. Based on the 
additional analysis performed by Canyon's consultants, Pagel concluded 
on August 16, 1989, that "the stability of the toe area is marginal, and an 
unquantified environmental risk does exist. However, given the 
conservative assumptions for unknown foundation conditions, and the 
demonstration that pad expansion will not increase driving forces in the 
toe area, the risk is considered reasonable and practical (Pagel to Cole, 
Memo, 8/16/89)." 
Yet proceeding with already constructed Leach Pad 3 was not the only 
option open to the company. The company could have taken remedial 
construction action, or removed the old pad and reconstructed the new 
pad entirely. These options would have cost far more. While Pagel may 
have concluded that the risk was reasonable and practical, the fact 
remains that DSL chose to take the risk rather than require the company to 
incur the extra expense of starting from scratch on Leach Pad 3 and doing 
the job right. The company knew from Grayhall's history as well as the 
core sample that the pad was shoddily constructed; they chose to build 
upon the mistake rather than correct it. 
Enforcement: Violations but no Notice of Noncompliance 
Canyon Resources took over a mine with severe problems in the spring of 
1987. Grayhall Resources had filed for bankruptcy the year before while 
continuing to operate the mine in a haphazard and dangerous manner. In 
March of 1986, inspectors found Grayhall actively spraying cyanide 
solution on recently constructed Pad 3 without having constructed lined 
spillways for the pad and all connected ponds. The company had been 
warned of the deficiency twice, and had committed to constructing the 
spillways on two other occasions. The same inspection also revealed that 
pressurized solution lines from the barren pond to Pad 3 were not placed 
in lined channels, so that a rupture would leak instantly into the ground. 
Once again, the company had been warned and had agreed to line the 
channels, prior to start-up. The state issued a Notice of Noncompliance 
(Smith to Grotbo, Memo, 4/3/86). 
Yet the number of Notices of Noncompliance which the DSL issued in no 
way matched the number of leaks and other problems occurring at the site. 
As the year continued, Grayhall admitted to cyanide losses due to leaks in 
the fall of 1986 while their pond system filled to far above the level 
required to accommodate anticipated spring run-off. The number and 
quantity of the losses were never substantiated, as Grayhall never 
specified the number of leaks or spills and the state never pursued 
specification. A DHES letter dated April 17, 1987, states, "Company 
representatives have freely admitted to such losses during the Fall of 1986 
and have attributed dramatic increases in cyanide concentration in the 
monitoring well system to that/those spills (DHES, Letter, 4/17/87)." 
Not only was the state aware of the cyanide losses, but the record 
indicates that the DSL appears to have been aware of the possible 
sources of continuing leaks under Grayhall, which resulted in the elevated 
cyanide readings. But these possible leak sources only appear in the ^ " 
documents after Canyon takes over operations and begins to rectify the 
problems. For instance, an inspection report on March 18, 1987 describes 
Canyon's remedial activities: "... - this includes draining Pond 5 to 
examine for leaks. Although this pond has been repaired, it is still under 
suspicion of adding to CN - groundwater problem. Also, the small pond 
below the lab/office building, which is used to collect lab effluent, should 
be drained and at least checked for leaks. This is also under suspicion of 
adding to groundwater problem (Spano, Inspection Report, 3/18/87)." 
Similarly, a May 6, 1987 report states: "The spillway between Ponds 4 & 5 
has been glued, and may go a long way towards eliminating the 
groundwater problem." The "groundwater problem" was occurring 
throughout Grayhall's 1986 operations; it did not simply appear with the 
Canyon assumption of responsibility. A March, 1986 letter from Grayhall 
informed DSL that TMW#4 was showing elevated levels of cyanide, and 
surmised that the readings might be due to a leak in the Pond 5 liner 
(Mountjoy to Grotbo, Letter, 3/27/86). 
Grayhall's statements may only prove that, given the company's 
bankruptcy, the state had no real enforcement tools to bring Grayhall into 
compliance, did not expect any response to notices since other warnings 
went unheeded, and therefore allowed these possible leaks to continue 
unannounced until Canyon took over. Yet unquestionably, they also 
represent a failure on the part of the state to fulfill its enforcement duties. 
The DSL knew that leaks were occurring, they had a good idea of their 
source, and they did not issue a Notice of Non-Compliance or take action 
to prevent these losses from continuing to occur. Not until April, 1987, ^ ̂  
after Canyon has taken over the mine's management and begun remedial 
action, did the DHES sends Grayhall's trustee a letter demanding a 
compliance plan and an expanded monitoring well network to "document 
and control the losses." (Keenan, letter to Eckles, 4/17/87) By the time 
DHES sent their letter, cyanide had already been exiting the system for at 
least six months. 
C) Immunity Under Bankruptcy 
Meanwhile, bankruptcy law prevented the state from pursuing the Notices 
of Noncompliance against the company or revoking the company's cash 
performance bond, despite the repeated and continuing violations of the 
permit. A memo from the Department of State Lands' staff attorney 
indicates that the state intended to pursue a Notice of Noncompliance and 
considered revoking Grayhall's cash bond, but a lack of clear court 
opinion on the legality of assessing fines or removing resources from a 
bankrupt entity, reported in the attorney's memo, stopped DSL from 
pursuing any fines (Butler to Amestoy, Memo, 11/19/86). The resulting 
Notice of Noncompliance, dated December 9th, 1986, therefore had no 
teeth, because, as the DSL notes in a letter to Grayhall, they did not intend 
to collect the fines for as long as Grayhall was in bankruptcy (Manley to 
Eckles, Letter, 4/30/87). Nor did the state intend to shut the mine down, for 
even if the state chose to rescind the permit, it would be left cleaning up 
the site with funding from a bond of only $71,000. Thus December of 1986 
found the mine without adequate capacity to handle spring run-off and 
without any means of attaining the capacity before spring, and the ** ' 
state without enforcement or remediation options. 
EA vs EIS: The Canvon Expansion 
In 1989 the state prepared an Environmental Assessment for the Canyon 
expansion. The DSL Commissioner concluded that the EA provided 
sufficient consideration of environmental issues associated with the 
expansion, stating, "The department's check-list environmental 
assessment considered the direct, indirect, and cumulative impact of the 
proposed pad expansion. The environmental impacts are not considered 
to be significant." (Casey to Jensen, Letter, 7/12/89) However, at least one 
vocal DSL technical staff member complained that the EA assumptions 
were flawed and the review process inadequate, (see Heap Stability 
above) Bolstering his opinion, both the EPA and the BLM concluded that 
the state should have prepared an Environmental Impact Statement in 
order to comply with National Environmental Protection Act requirements. 
The EPA said the EA lacked quantitative support for qualitative 
assurances that no significant impacts to the environment would occur. 
The agency stated that while some of the proof may have been provided in 
the permit application, the EA should have referenced or included the 
data. The agency listed four concerns: 1) Permanent alterations to 400 
acres of land, 2) Increased production of ore and waste, 3) Concerns 
about short and long-term impacts from cyanide heap leach systems, and 
4) Topographic and vegetative changes visible for extended distances. As 
a result of these significant issues, the EPA believed "the proposed 
expansion could have supported preparation of an EIS." (Wardell to 202 
Casey, Letter, 10/30/89) In addition, the EPA's letter supports the 
development of alternative actions. Only an EIS would have required 
consideration of alternatives to the two options considered in the EA: mine 
closure and expansion. (Sundby, Billings Gazette Article, 11/1/89) 
The BLM, in a July 1989 letter to the state, states that "it is difficult to 
definitely conclude that this EA does or does not fully meet NEPA 
requirements." The letter reiterates EPA concerns that there are no 
alternative actions considered, and that "generic statements" assess 
potential impacts instead of quantitative analysis. In addition, the BLM 
found the EA deficient in its analysis of the cumulative impacts of "piece­
meal" expansion. The letter concludes that with only 10% of the proposed 
expansion on BLM land, the agency can state that the EA "barely" meets 
NEPA requirements. Were the BLM area greater, however, the agency 
could not support the state's position that the EA is sufficient. (BLM to DSL, 
Memo, 7/11/89) 
Heavy Equipment Accidents 
Two incidents which occurred during Canyon's tenure demonstrate the 
risk of cyanide release posed by negligent vehicle operation. In February, 
1991, DSL inspectors on site to inspect a cyanide leak watched as a 
bulldozer operator drove out onto a pond liner. The bulldozer tore the liner 
badly and pushed coarse, sharp fragments onto the liner which created 
additional punctures. The pond served as an overflow pond which 
normally did not contain cyanide, but cyanide solution was present as a 
result of the January 1991 leak from the floor drains in the ore 
processing plant. The inspectors watched as the cyanide trapped in the 
pond drained through the tear and out into the surrounding environment. 
(Spano to Casey, Memo, 2/14/91) 
In August, 1992, a company pickup rolled into another pond containing 
cyanide when an employee taking water samples left the truck out of gear. 
The company drained the pond, removed the truck and inspected the liner. 
They did not observe any damage to the pond liner. (Spano, Memo, 
6/8/92) 
While driving a bulldozer out onto a pond intentionally may seem more 
egregious than forgetting to leave a parked vehicle in gear, both accidents 
involved negligence on the part of company personnel, which either 
caused a cyanide release or created the danger of one. Yet neither 
incident received a notice of noncompliance from the state. 
